THE HUMANITARIAN DISCOURSE OF FORCE:   EXPLAINING U.S. PRESIDENTS' JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION by Maxey, Sarah
  
 
THE HUMANITARIAN DISCOURSE OF FORCE:  
 
EXPLAINING U.S. PRESIDENTS’ JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
 
of Cornell University 
 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Sarah Robin Maxey 
 
August 2017 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Sarah Robin Maxey 
 
  
  
 
THE HUMANITARIAN DISCOURSE OF FORCE:  
 
EXPLAINING U.S. PRESIDENTS’ JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
Sarah Robin Maxey, Ph.D. 
 
Cornell University 2017 
 
 
Conventional wisdom assumes that national security justifications are the most effective way to 
bolster support for military action and uniformly persuade the domestic audience. Using an 
original dataset of justifications for all potential U.S. interventions, 1990-2013, I show that 
contrary to these expectations U.S. presidents employed humanitarian justifications in every 
military intervention of the past 25 years. Why are humanitarian justifications prevalent, even in 
popular, security-driven interventions? To what extent do these justifications facilitate the use of 
military force?  
Combining content analysis, survey experiments, and archival research, I focus on the domestic 
audience to argue that humanitarian justifications are necessary to build a coalition of support 
from a public with diverse foreign policy beliefs. In particular, humanitarian claims resonate 
with individuals who are unconvinced by security justifications and are otherwise active 
opponents of intervention. As a result of their broad appeal, presidents have an incentive to 
emphasize humanitarian claims as often as possible; however, the same constituents that make 
humanitarian justifications necessary also constrain their use. Specifically, individuals with 
cooperative internationalist values are uniquely influenced by humanitarian claims, but punish 
leaders who misuse humanitarian explanations. The findings have implications for whose 
support matters most in the build-up to military interventions and the conditions under which 
presidents can use moral appeals to obtain this support.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2013, President Barack Obama addressed the nation to make the case for 
military action against Syria. Intervention was necessary, Obama argued, because “Assad’s 
government gassed to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images 
from this massacre are sickening: Men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas” 
(Obama 2013). Despite the clear evidence of attacks on civilians, Obama’s humanitarian 
appeals—defined as references to the protection or promotion of the welfare of foreign 
civilians—failed to mobilize support for military action. Only 28 percent of the public favored 
air strikes in response to the use of chemical weapons and only 37 percent favored air strikes 
even if Syria refused to give up its chemical weapons (Pew 2013). The President eventually 
pursued diplomatic alternatives instead (Koh 2016, 999).  
 One year later, in September 2014, Obama again made the case for military action in 
Syria, this time to combat the growing threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL). This address focused on “what the United States will do with our friends and allies to 
degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group” (Obama 2014). In contrast to the 2013 
response, the prospect of a terrorist threat successfully mobilized public support. Polls conducted 
immediately after Obama’s speech reported that 53 percent of respondents approved of his 
planned military campaign and a growing number were concerned that U.S. action would not go 
far enough (Pew 2014a). However, in addition to the national security concerns, Obama also 
continued to justify U.S. military action against ISIL in humanitarian terms. His 2014 address 
first outlined the threat ISIL posed to the people of Iraq and Syria before describing threats to 
U.S. citizens, asserting, “In a region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are 
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unique in their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They enslave, rape, 
and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious minority with genocide” (Obama 
2014). Given the ineffectiveness of humanitarian justifications in 2013 and the public’s 
confusion about the objectives of intervention in 2014—62 percent did not believe the U.S. 
operation had a clearly defined goal (Pew 2014)—Obama’s continued use of humanitarian 
appeals raises questions about the incentives behind presidents’ justifications for military action.  
Obama’s rhetoric in the Syrian case is not unique, but suggests there is much left to be 
understood about the strategies presidents use to justify interventions and when different 
justifications effectively bolster public support. Analysis of national addresses reveals that U.S. 
presidents have used humanitarian justifications in almost every potential military intervention of 
the past 25 years. However, presidents also appear to exercise discretion when using 
humanitarian claims in security-driven interventions, taking care to present national security as 
the dominant explanation for action. Combined, presidents’ widespread use of but muted 
emphasis on humanitarian claims presents a puzzle for the relationship between official rhetoric 
and public attitudes. This pattern runs counter to three alternative explanations for presidents’ 
justification strategies: 1) that presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian claims as often as 
possible to persuade an emotional and inattentive public (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1922; 
Mearsheimer 2011); 2) the expectation that national security threats are a sufficient and effective 
means of rallying public support (Brody 1991; Drezner 2008a); and 3) the implicit assumption 
that the effects of humanitarian claims are best studied in cases of potential humanitarian 
interventions (Finnemore 2003). 
 Contrary to these existing accounts, justifications that reference the protection or 
promotion of the welfare of foreign civilians are a common part of how U.S. presidents 
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communicate with their publics about military action. Additionally, the influence of these claims 
is not limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. Why do presidents consistently use 
humanitarian justifications for interventions best explained in national security terms? Who is the 
target audience for these claims? To what extent do these moral appeals allow presidents to 
manage public perceptions of military action?  
This project attempts to explain the role of moral appeals in contemporary interventions 
by focusing on characteristics of the domestic audience that shape presidents’ opportunities to 
build stable coalitions of support. In particular, the public’s foreign policy preferences vary along 
two dimensions based on answers to the questions: Should the U.S. play an active role in 
international affairs? What form should this active role take? Combined, these two dimensions 
generate three categories of foreign policy beliefs: 1) militant internationalists who favor 
engagement in global affairs and support the use of military force to achieve foreign policy 
goals, 2) cooperative internationalists who also support an active U.S. foreign policy, but are 
skeptical of military force, and 3) isolationists who do not support U.S. involvement in solving 
international problems (Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1994; 
Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Building on these known divisions, I identify cooperative 
internationalists as the target audience for communication strategies and as the segment of the 
public most likely to impose the political costs that hold the president accountable for military 
action. I then demonstrate that cooperative internationalists are also uniquely responsive to 
humanitarian claims. The important position these individuals occupy in the domestic coalition 
creates the incentives that drive both the widespread use and limited emphasis of humanitarian 
claims. Clarifying the composition of domestic coalitions both explains the pattern of 
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humanitarian justifications and sheds new light on whose support matters most for initiating and 
sustaining military interventions. 
Humanitarian Justifications in Contemporary Interventions  
Explaining the Justifications of U.S. Presidents 
 Justifications are the overt and public rationale that presidents use to convince the public 
that military action is legitimate and worth the potential costs and risks. In the U.S. context, 
presidents have considerable power over how military interventions are framed and perceived by 
the public. This power stems from their information and first-mover advantages on matters of 
foreign policy (Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013; Kernell 1997; Neustadt 1980; Western 
2005). In the context of potential military interventions, the complexity of collecting and 
interpreting details about foreign crises and military options gives the president a “near-
monopoly control” over information relative to both the public and Congress (Kernell 1997, 
183). Additionally, the role of Commander in Chief gives the president the final authority to 
decide when and how the U.S. conducts military interventions. The president is thus the first to 
know that the U.S. intends to take military action and can present information about the 
intervention to the public before and in greater detail than media coverage or political elites. 
These advantages enable the president to use official statements to shape the terms of the debate 
about military action and block sources of dissent (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). While public 
attitudes towards military action are influenced by information from a variety of sources, 
including media coverage and elite cues, the president’s justifications provide the initial frame to 
which all other sources respond. Examining the justifications offered by the president in national 
addresses thus provides leverage for understanding how the White House attempts to manage 
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public opinion and the conditions under which it will be able to mobilize the domestic audience 
in support of military action.  
 In this project, I examine the pattern of and domestic incentives behind two broad 
categories of justifications: humanitarian and security. Humanitarian justifications assert that 
military action is necessary to protect or promote the welfare of foreign civilians. These 
justifications include statements such as Obama’s claims that U.S. airstrikes in Syria had “helped 
save the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children” (Obama 2014). Alternatively, 
security justifications contend that the U.S. must take military action to protect or promote U.S. 
national security and strategic interests. In the Syrian case, Obama employed security 
justifications when he explained that, “If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing 
threat beyond that region, including to the United States” (Obama 2014).  
I developed these categories of justifications inductively from manual coding of post-
Cold War national addresses—outlined in detail in Chapter 3—but they also reflect the two 
purposes of military action legitimated by international law. The United Nations Charter 
establishes a general prohibition on the use of force with exceptions for states’ rights to self-
defense if an armed attack occurs and threats to international peace and security recognized by 
the Security Council (United Nations 1945). Security justifications are in line with the use of 
force to defend against threats to U.S. and international security. Humanitarian justifications 
reflect the Chapter VII provision for addressing threats to international peace and security, as 
well as related agreements such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 2005 World Summit 
resolutions that legitimate the use of military force to protect foreign civilians (Bellamy 2006; 
Finnemore 2003, 79). 
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 While almost all leaders benefit from publicly presenting their rationale for taking 
military action, this project focuses on the justifications offered by U.S. presidents because the 
U.S. is unique in its ability to project military power around the world and is the state most often 
involved in interventions (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). The analysis is also limited to 
justifications for interventions in the post-Cold War period and begins in 1990. Considering only 
the post-Cold War period precludes conclusions about the historical pattern of justifications, but 
holds constant the feasibility of humanitarian justifications as a primary rationale for action. 
Before the end of the Cold War, humanitarian crises were viewed as the internal affairs of states 
whose sovereignty could not be violated without also violating the UN Charter (Finnemore 
1996a). As a result, states often avoided humanitarian rationales for action even in the face of 
grave humanitarian crises because these appeals alone could not legitimate intervention (Wheeler 
2000). Therefore, prior to the post-Cold War period it is not possible to determine whether 
presidents’ emphasis of humanitarian justifications in security interventions was limited by the 
composition of the domestic coalition or because primarily humanitarian interventions were not 
considered internationally legitimate uses of force. 
Humanitarian Justifications in Post-Cold War Military Interventions 
 Understanding when and how humanitarian justifications influence support for military 
intervention sheds light on what it takes for a justification to effectively bolster public support 
and whose support matters the most. Humanitarian claims are conventionally assumed to be 
suboptimal justifications for military action—because they do not present an immediate threat to 
U.S. security, leaders will have to work hard to make the case that protecting foreign civilians is 
worth the financial expense and risk of American casualties. For this reason, the effects of 
humanitarian justification have almost exclusively been studied in the context of potential 
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humanitarian interventions, where humanitarian claims are the only feasible explanation for 
taking immediate military action and the “discussions are, again, not about interest and 
advantage. They are about responsibility and duty” (Finnemore 1996b, 87). However, this 
approach to humanitarian justifications overlooks the prevalence of humanitarian claims in 
interventions driven primarily by security concerns.  
 In fact, U.S. presidents from both political parties have used humanitarian appeals as part 
of their justification strategy for every military intervention of the post-Cold War period. I define 
military interventions as deployment of combat troops across international borders with the 
purpose of engaging in coercive action that lasts at least one week.1 In the context of this study, 
interventions must last at least one week because single-strikes carry a lower burden of 
justification. Presidents are less likely to be held accountable for non-sustained uses of military 
force and thus may justify these types of military action differently, if at all. Focusing on military 
interventions also excludes cases in which the U.S. responded to a foreign crisis by sending aid 
or support for UN peace operations that were conducted with the consent of the target state. Like 
single-strike operations, non-coercive actions carry fewer costs and risks and, as a result, the bar 
for public justifications is significantly lower.  
By this definition, the U.S. has participated in nine military interventions since 1990, five 
of which pursued primarily security objectives and four of which were humanitarian 
interventions.2 As Table 1.1 shows, the president employed humanitarian justifications to evoke 
concern about foreign civilians in each case, regardless of whether the intervention’s goals were 
																																																						
1 The requirement that intervention last at least one week is added to standardize the threshold for justifications, but 
this definition is consistent with existing studies (Finnemore 2003, 9–10; Kreps 2011, 15; Saunders 2011, 21).  
2 All interventions contain multiple objectives, but I follow Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) in 
classifying interventions by their primary, or principle, policy objective. This decision and the related coding are 
outlined in detail in Chapter 3.  
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primarily humanitarian or security-driven. The prevalence of humanitarian claims across 
interventions also indicates that these justifications are not specific to the rhetorical style of any 
particular president or to especially challenging or long-term military actions.  
Table 1.1 Examples of Humanitarian Justifications in All Post-Cold War Interventions 
Case 
Primary 
Policy 
Objective 
Example of Humanitarian Justification 
Gulf War 
(1991) Security 
“Iraq’s brutality against innocent civilians will not be permitted to 
stand. And Saddam Hussein’s violations of international law will not 
stand. His aggression against Kuwait will not stand” (G. H. W. Bush 
1990g). 
Somalia 
(1992-93) Humanitarian 
“I have to remind my fellow Americans and all of the people in the 
world who have an aversion to the events of the last two weeks not to 
forget that over 300,000 people lost their lives there, were starved, were 
murdered, were subject to incredibly inhumane conditions because of 
the chaotic and lawless behavior of the people who had authority” 
(Clinton 1993c). 
Haiti 
(1994) Security 
“Our reasons are clear: to stop the horrific atrocities that threaten 
thousands of men, women, and children in Haiti” (Clinton 1994f). 
Bosnia 
(1994-95) Humanitarian 
“Two weeks ago, in a murderous attack, a single shell killed 68 people 
in the city’s market. And last week with our NATO allies, we said that 
those who would continue terrorizing Sarajevo must pay a price” 
(Clinton 1994b).  
Kosovo 
(1999) Humanitarian 
“I think the most important thing now is for us to save lives, return 
people to their homes, get them the humanitarian aid they need, and to 
remove completely and irrevocably the threat of aggression by the Serb 
military and other forces in Kosovo” (Clinton 1998).  
Afghanistan 
(2001-14) Security 
“Not only is our military destroying those who would harbor evil…but 
we’re liberators. We’re freeing women and children from incredible 
oppression” (G. W. Bush 2002). 
Iraq 
(2003-10) Security 
“We care about those who suffer under the hands of dictator in Iraq. 
We care deeply about those who dissent and then are tortured, about 
those who express an opinion other than what the dictator thinks and 
are raped and mutilated. The condition of the Iraqi citizen is on our 
mind and in our heart” (G. W. Bush 2003c).  
Libya (2011) Humanitarian 
“The United States of America is different. And as president, I refused 
to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking 
action” (Obama 2011). 
Syria/ISIL 
(2014) Security 
“When we helped prevent the massacre of civilians trapped on a distant 
mountain, here’s what one of them said: ‘We owe our American friends 
our lives. Our children will always remember that there was someone 
who felt our struggle and made a long journey to protect innocent 
people.’ That is the difference we make in the world” (Obama 2014). 
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The examples of humanitarian claims outlined in Table 1.1 suggest that by focusing 
almost exclusively on cases of humanitarian intervention, normative accounts have overlooked a 
major category of military action in which humanitarian claims play a prominent role. 
Additionally, focusing on humanitarian interventions assumes that the prevalence of 
humanitarian justifications is a result of developing humanitarian norms, disregarding U.S. 
presidents’ long history of combining humanitarian and security explanations for war (Bass 
2008; Bogen 1966). As a result, little is known about the influence or incentives behind 
humanitarian justifications in a context in which they are frequently used, can significantly 
bolster public support, and have the potential to create a false pretense for otherwise unpopular 
interventions. By focusing on how the composition of the domestic audience drives presidents’ 
justification strategies in both security and humanitarian interventions, this project provides a 
comprehensive account of humanitarian justifications that is consistent with both their long 
history and current patterns of use. 
Argument in Brief: Building a Domestic Coalition from a Diverse Audience 
 I argue that the pattern of humanitarian justifications in U.S. interventions is explained by 
the composition of the domestic coalition that presidents must build to mobilize support for 
military action and avoid politically costly opposition. Humanitarian claims are useful—even in 
popular security-driven interventions—because they are uniquely capable of strengthening 
support among cooperative internationalists who are the target audience for communication 
strategies and the individuals most likely to form a politically costly opposition. By appealing to 
this key group, humanitarian appeals allow presidents to minimize the risk of domestic dissent; 
however, they do not give leaders free rein to pursue military action. When humanitarian claims 
are stretched beyond their role as supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions, 
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they can generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The 
importance of maintaining a stable domestic coalition of support thus explains why presidents 
use humanitarian claims widely but limit their emphasis in security interventions.  
This domestic coalition argument stands in contrast to existing accounts of the 
relationship between justifications and attitudes towards military action, which can be divided 
into two competing camps. The first presents humanitarian justifications as a convenient cover 
for interventions that promote the U.S. strategic interests or the president’s political objectives 
but do not otherwise resonate with emotional, impulsive publics (Carr 1939; Holsti 1992, 440; 
Morgenthau 1951). Alternatively, the second portrays a prudent public that sorts through 
justifications to evaluate the risks and benefits of intervention and responds to humanitarian 
claims only to the extent that these justifications communicate new information about the 
expected costs or success of military action (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; 
Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). However, both of these accounts are based on the 
implicit assumption that there is a uniform U.S. public that responds to justifications for military 
action in homogeneous ways.  
This assumption is challenged by evidence that the U.S. public is composed of 
individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences that can be systematically evaluated along 
two dimensions: 1) whether they believe the U.S. should play an active role in the world, and 2) 
what form this active role should take (Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; 
Wittkopf 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). From these two dimensions, individuals can be 
divided into three categories of foreign policy beliefs. Isolationists believe that the U.S. should 
not play an active role in solving international problems, regardless of the objectives. Militant 
internationalists believe that the U.S. should play an active role in the world and that this role 
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should focus on using and maintaining U.S. military strength. Cooperative internationalists also 
support active U.S. engagement in global affairs, but believe this engagement should take the 
form of cooperative efforts to reach humanitarian goals. Figure 1.1 summarizes these dimensions 
and the related foreign policy beliefs. 3 
Figure 1.1 Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 
  Preferred Form of U.S. Engagement 
 
  Military Cooperative 
 
Should the 
U.S. play an 
active role in 
world affairs? 
Yes Militant Internationalists 
Cooperative 
Internationalists 
No Isolationists 
 
 
Building on these categories, I contend that these same dimensions also determine how 
individuals respond to alternative justifications for military action and can be used to identify the 
target audience for humanitarian claims. Because they do not support active engagement in 
international affairs, isolationists are unlikely to offer sustainable support in response to either 
security or humanitarian justifications, making them an inefficient target for presidential appeals. 
By contrast, because they approve of engaged foreign policy and are focused on solving 
problems by demonstrating military strength, militant internationalists are the most consistent 
																																																						
3 The defining and unifying characteristic of isolationists is their lack of support for engagement in international 
affairs and, because they are not easily convinced to support action for either militant or cooperative goals, I analyze 
this category in the aggregate. However, in her study of attitudes toward foreign aid, Prather (2016) demonstrates 
that isolationists can be disaggregated into liberals and conservatives based on their attitudes towards redistribution. 
Liberal isolationists support domestic redistribution, but not foreign aid. Because there is no comparable domestic 
dimension for military intervention, this distinction is less relevant for understanding how individuals respond to 
justifications for the use of force.  
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source of support for both security and humanitarian interventions. Presidents can thus never 
count on the support of isolationists and almost always count on the support of militant 
internationalists. This characterization leaves individuals with cooperative internationalist values 
as the group that is skeptical of military action but can be persuaded to offer sustainable support 
if the president uses effective justifications. Cooperative internationalists are thus a critical 
component of a stable domestic coalition and a key target for presidents’ justification strategies. 
The importance of gaining and maintaining support from these individuals is compounded by 
their political engagement—cooperative internationalists are expected to be particularly attentive 
to foreign policy and willing to take political action to express their discontent, making them a 
source of potentially costly opposition.  
Given the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists, the question becomes: 
When do these individuals respond to justifications for intervention? Because they prefer 
cooperative approaches to foreign policy, cooperative internationalists are inherently skeptical 
that military action is the best way to solve international problems and will be unconvinced by 
security justifications. Instead, humanitarian justifications are uniquely capable of bolstering 
support among these individuals because they circumvent skepticism by shifting the focus to 
humanitarian objectives and the necessity of military action to protect foreign civilians. The 
same attention to humanitarian objectives that makes humanitarian justifications resonate with 
cooperative internationalists also makes these individuals sensitive to their misuse. If presidents 
are perceived as overstating humanitarian claims in security interventions, they will provoke 
backlash from this key group. The central position of cooperative internationalists in the 
domestic coalition thus creates an incentive for and constrains the use of humanitarian 
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justifications. Presidents’ efforts to appeal to these individuals and maintain stable coalitions of 
support account for the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary interventions.  
The domestic coalition argument creates observable implications at three different levels. 
First, in terms of the pattern of presidents’ justifications, it expects humanitarian claims to be 
widely present but carefully balanced in security interventions. Second, at the individual level, it 
contends that people with cooperative internationalist values respond most strongly to 
humanitarian justifications, are skeptical of security justifications, and impose political costs on 
presidents who misuse humanitarian appeals. Finally, in terms of White House decision making, 
it expects concern about building a domestic coalition from a public with diverse foreign policy 
preferences to guide the communication strategy for military interventions. The multi-method 
design presented in the following section evaluates the implications at each of these levels.  
Methods and Case Selection 
 This project employs a multi-method design to address three empirical questions 
generated by the domestic coalition argument: 1) What is the pattern of humanitarian 
justifications for potential interventions in the post-Cold War period? 2) How do individuals’ 
underlying foreign policy beliefs influence their response to alternative justifications and 
sensitivity to seemingly deceptive claims? 3) Does the White House recognize the importance of 
building a stable domestic coalition from a public with diverse foreign policy preferences and 
does this recognition inform official communication strategies? Together, these questions 
explain the role that humanitarian justifications play in contemporary interventions and clarify 
whose support is necessary to mobilize the domestic audience. In this case, a multi-method 
design that combines quantitative, experimental, and qualitative methods is necessary to address 
each question at the appropriate level of analysis. This approach also allows me to “test 
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assumptions that are generally untested in single-method research, thereby transforming key 
issues of descriptive and causal inference from matters of speculative assertion into points of 
empirical debate” (Seawright 2016, 1).  
 The first step to understanding the influence of humanitarian justifications is to identify 
when and how these justifications are used and how this pattern compares to the use of security 
explanations. This analysis extends the study of humanitarian justifications beyond the context of 
humanitarian interventions by demonstrating that these claims are common across all types of 
potential interventions in the post-Cold War period. To illustrate and analyze the pattern of 
humanitarian justifications over time, I construct an original dataset of justifications for all 
potential U.S. military interventions from 1990 to 2013. Potential interventions include crises 
from the UCDP and MID datasets that received public attention, in immediate and specific 
detail, with the threat of coercive action. To investigate how justifications are distributed across 
different types of interventions, I code each crisis as a potential humanitarian or security 
intervention. I then use content analysis of national addresses that reference a potential 
intervention to capture the pattern of justifications for each crisis. From the content analysis, I 
create indicators for whether humanitarian claims were present in a given speech and the relative 
emphasis placed on these claims.  
 The second question investigates individual-level behavior in response to humanitarian 
claims to determine whether the pattern of justifications is likely to resonate with the domestic 
audience. To separate the effect of humanitarian justifications from attitudes about the president 
and exposure to different coverage of events, I design survey experiments that vary both the type 
of justification used and the perceived sincerity of the president’s explanation for action. The 
survey instrument measures individuals’ underlying foreign policy beliefs, their support for 
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military action, trust in the president, expectations about the intervention’s outcome, and 
willingness to support additional humanitarian efforts in the future.  
 Together, the dataset of justifications and survey experiments show that both the pattern 
of humanitarian justifications and individuals’ responses are consistent with the argument that 
concern about the domestic coalition drives justification strategies. Humanitarian justifications 
help build and sustain a coalition of support for military action; however, the quantitative 
analysis cannot determine whether this outcome was the intent of White House strategy or a 
beneficial side effect of a communication plan developed to reach other objectives. Qualitative 
analysis of administrations’ communication strategies is used to consider: 1) whether presidents 
recognize the importance of building a domestic coalition that includes individuals with diverse 
foreign policy preferences, and 2) the extent to which this recognition drives their choice of 
justifications for military action. To understand how administrations view the domestic audience 
and take this audience into account when developing communication strategies, I conduct case 
studies of one security intervention and one humanitarian intervention—the 1991 Gulf War in 
Iraq and U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993-1995, respectively. These analyses draw on 
archival materials including speech drafts, internal memos, meeting notes, official 
correspondence, and press guidance collected from the George H.W. Bush and William J. 
Clinton Presidential Libraries.  
Case Selection 
I use the Gulf War case to examine how presidents develop communication strategies for 
security interventions because it represents one of the three largest, security-driven U.S. military 
actions of the post-Cold War period.4 This intervention is security-driven because it responded 
																																																						
4 The intervention involved both the deployment of thousands of U.S. ground troops for more than a week and 
incurred billions of dollars of financial costs. The Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and 
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primarily to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which both constituted an act of aggression condemned 
by the international community and posed a threat to U.S. regional and economic interests. 
While Saddam Hussein was accused of human rights violations prior to military action and the 
U.S. pursued the humanitarian Operation Provide Comfort following the end of the Gulf War, 
these abuses did not increase significantly in the buildup to military action. As Evans noted 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom more than a decade later, the humanitarian argument “was a 
very strong one a decade and more ago, when Saddam was massacring Kurds in the late 1980s 
and the southern Shi’ites in the early 1990s—as the world in both cases looked steadfastly the 
other way—but it had much less application in recent years, when no such catastrophe was 
occurring or imminent and, awful as it was, the Iraqi regime’s behaviour was not much worse 
than a score or two of others” (Evans 2004, 71). Instead, the impetus for the Gulf War was Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait and threat to both U.S. allies and access to oil.  
Given these conditions, examining communication strategies in the Gulf War highlights 
the role of humanitarian claims in one of the largest security interventions of the post-Cold War 
period. As the first major military operation following the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War 
also helps establish scope conditions of the domestic coalition argument by investigating whether 
the utility of humanitarian claims was an established fact or something the Bush administration 
discovered as it navigated the new world order (Haass 1999, 6). Additionally, the central role 
played by a multilateral coalition in Operation Desert Storm (Kreps 2011, 49) and narrow votes 
in favor of military action in both the House and Senate (Clymer 1991) suggest the President had 
reason to persuade the public, the international community, and political elites. Both the 
domestic coalition and alternative explanations—that the president was focused on the 
																																																						
Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq are unique in this respect for the post-Cold War period (Belasco 2009; Daggett 
2010; Salazar Torreon 2016).  
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international audience or elite debates—are therefore feasible and the Gulf War case provides a 
helpful context for clarifying the relative emphasis the Bush administration placed on appealing 
to each audience.  
To determine whether concern about the domestic coalition also drives justification 
strategies in response to humanitarian crises and during periods of non-intervention, the second 
case study considers U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 for two reasons. First, the 
conflict led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the post-Cold War period. In addition to 
blocking humanitarian aid from reaching Bosnian Muslims and laying siege to Sarajevo, the 
Serbs engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In one of the conflict’s most 
egregious and publicized tragedies, Serbian forces attacked the U.N. safe area in Srebrenica, 
systematically killing 7,000 boys and men (Power 2002, 393). The genocide received 
international attention, influenced the international community’s approach to UN peace 
operations, and contributed to the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in The Hague. Understanding how humanitarian justifications were used in this case 
thus evaluates the domestic coalition argument in one of most substantively important 
humanitarian interventions of the last twenty-five years.  
 Second, U.S. policy towards the Bosnian conflict shifted from Clinton’s threats of 
military action on the campaign trail and early attempts to lift the arms embargo to a 
commitment to pursing a negotiated solution in 1993 and 1994 to increased participation in 
airstrikes and the commitment of U.S. troops to implement the Dayton Accords in 1995. 
Investigating changes in the Clinton administration’s communications at different stages of the 
Bosnian conflict thus allows me to evaluate how humanitarian claims are used to manage 
domestic pressure during periods of non-intervention and mobilize domestic support for military 
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escalation. Examining periods of intervention and non-intervention within a single case 
highlights how the Clinton administration changed their communication strategy over time to 
justify both inaction and the commitment of U.S. troops while also holding constant any conflict 
or country-specific confounders.  
Overview of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation aims to explain why presidents consistently use humanitarian claims in 
interventions best justified in terms of U.S. national security as a means of clarifying the limits 
and mechanisms of democratic accountability for the use of force. To this end, the project’s 
structure reflects the same three motivating questions that drive its methodology: How do 
presidents employ humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions? Which individuals 
respond to these claims and to what extent do these individuals punish leaders for deceptive 
justifications? Does the pattern of humanitarian claims reflect the White House’s efforts to build 
a stable coalition of support from a public with diverse foreign policy preferences?  
 After providing a detailed account of the domestic coalition argument in Chapter 2, 
which contends that the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists both drives and 
constrains the use of humanitarian justifications, the dissertation proceeds in three parts that 
address each of these questions in turn. First, Chapter 3 uses an original dataset to examine the 
pattern of humanitarian justifications in presidents’ national addresses from 1990 to 2013. The 
domestic coalition argument generates theoretical expectations for how presidents use and 
emphasize humanitarian justifications across different types of interventions. It expects 
presidents to use humanitarian claims in both humanitarian and security interventions to 
persuade cooperative internationalists. However, because cooperative internationalists are 
sensitive to the perceived overuse of humanitarian appeals, it also expects presidents to exercise 
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discretion in their emphasis of humanitarian claims in potential security interventions. The 
chapter analyzes the trends of justifications by intervention type to evaluate the domestic 
coalition argument against two alternatives: a “kitchen sink” hypothesis that expects presidents 
to use all possible justifications all the time to please an emotional and impulsive public, and a 
“situational determinants” hypothesis that expects presidents to use humanitarian claims only 
when they reflect an ongoing humanitarian crisis. The findings show that humanitarian claims 
have played an important role in explanations for military action across the post-Cold War 
period, are not confined to cases of humanitarian intervention, and, consistent with concern about 
maintaining the support of cooperative internationalists, are emphasized with discretion.  
 Chapter 4 builds on this analysis to examine whether the pattern of humanitarian 
justifications effectively bolsters support among cooperative internationalists. To this end, I 
employ a survey experiment that classifies respondents by their underlying foreign policy beliefs 
and varies both the type and sincerity of the president’s justifications for military intervention. I 
find that cooperative internationalists are skeptical of security justifications but respond strongly 
to humanitarian claims. By contrast, militant internationalists support intervention and 
isolationists oppose intervention regardless of the justifications used. The support of cooperative 
internationalists is thus the benefit that presidents gain by adding humanitarian claims to their 
justifications for security interventions. This support is particularly important because the results 
also indicate that cooperative internationalists are politically engaged and willing to take action 
to impose political costs on presidents who pursue military intervention without their approval. 
Additionally, evidence from the survey experiments indicates that humanitarian justifications 
bolster the support of cooperative internationalists by increasing their concern with the welfare 
of foreign civilians rather than by changing their perceptions of the president’s motives.  
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 To this point, humanitarian justifications appear well suited to increasing support for 
intervention among cooperative internationalists, able to maintain the support of militant 
internationalists, and effective without requiring respondents to change their perceptions of the 
president’s motives. Presidents should thus have an incentive to use humanitarian justifications 
as often as possible. Why then do presidents limit their emphasis of humanitarian justifications in 
security interventions? Chapter 5 leverages the survey experiment’s variation in the sincerity of 
justifications to show that cooperative internationalists also impose limits on the utility of 
humanitarian claims. When respondents received information that the president was using 
humanitarian claims insincerely as a cover for security or political interests, the support of 
cooperative internationalists dropped dramatically. In addition to withdrawing their support for 
the intervention, backlash from these individuals also imposes political costs on the president in 
terms of approval ratings and a willingness to support his reelection. Unlike cooperative 
internationalists, the support of militant internationalists and isolationists is not significantly 
affected by evidence that the president used humanitarian claims to cover up security motives. 
Combined, the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 highlight the important role cooperative 
internationalists play in facilitating the domestic mobilization of support necessary to pursue 
military action and in holding presidents accountable for their foreign policy decisions.  
 Having shown that humanitarian justifications are a common explanation for military 
action—in both security and humanitarian interventions—and bolster support among cooperative 
internationalists, the remainder of the dissertation demonstrates that this pattern of justifications 
reflects an intentional White House communication strategy. Case studies of the 1991 Gulf War 
and U.S. policy towards Bosnia, 1993-95, show that administrations are aware of heterogeneity 
in public opinion and design communication strategies to build domestic coalitions of support 
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among a diverse audience. Chapter 6 details the George H.W. Bush administration’s 
communication strategy for the Gulf War to reveal that the administration acknowledged sources 
of heterogeneity in public opinion, was concerned about public support and the potential for 
backlash, and used humanitarian justifications to target key groups. While the administration also 
conducted a public diplomacy campaign geared towards the international audience and worked 
to manage congressional dissent, creating and maintaining the support of the domestic audience 
was the primary goal of the communication plan in general and presidential speeches in 
particular.  
 Building on evidence that the White House acknowledges and responds to the need for a 
diverse domestic coalition, the Bosnian case study presented in Chapter 7 serves two purposes. 
First, it demonstrates that presidents use humanitarian justifications to strategically target key 
groups in the domestic coalition in both humanitarian and security interventions. Second, 
analyzing the administration’s communication strategy over the course of this conflict illustrates 
that cooperative internationalists remain the key constituency and humanitarian claims are used 
to manage domestic pressure during periods of non-intervention and escalating military 
involvement.  
 The dissertation concludes by considering the stability of foreign policy beliefs in a 
changing political context. I demonstrate that the results are generally consistent over time but 
were affected by the 2016 presidential election. To evaluate the extent to which foreign policy 
beliefs are likely to remain relevant in an increasingly polarized environment, the conclusion 
draws on additional survey evidence to demonstrate that the partisanship of the president does 
not significantly moderate the effect of foreign policy beliefs on support for alternative 
 22 
justifications. The conclusion also considers the implications of the domestic coalition argument 
for the White House, humanitarian and anti-war organizations, and U.S. foreign policy.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A DIVERSE DOMESTIC COALITION 
 
 Conventional wisdom assumes that national security is the foremost concern for a state 
and its citizens (Drezner 2008). Worried about its own safety, the United States’ (U.S.) public 
will rally to support military action that responds to or prevents attacks on American soil and 
national interests (Brody 1991). By extension, justifications that evoke U.S. national security and 
connect intervention to U.S. interests are expected to be the most effective means of bolstering 
public support for military action. As international norms governing the use of force shifted 
following the end of the Cold War, some scholars argued that leaders could also effectively use 
humanitarian justifications to bolster public support for action in response to humanitarian crises.  
Focused on demonstrating that humanitarian claims can now provide a solely sufficient and 
internationally accepted explanation for action, these studies examined the influence of 
humanitarian justifications almost exclusively in the context of potential humanitarian 
interventions  (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 
2000).  
Both of these approaches to understanding justifications for military intervention are 
rooted in the assumption that for an intervention to be popular the president must make a 
compelling case that the use of force serves U.S. interests. In security interventions, evidence of 
imminent aggression and threats to national security demonstrate the importance of action. In 
humanitarian interventions, leaders can make the case that inaction in the face of humanitarian 
crises threatens U.S. values and international peace and stability. However, recent cases of 
intervention, as outlined in the introduction, challenge both sides of this conventional wisdom by 
revealing that the influence of humanitarian justifications is not resigned to humanitarian 
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interventions. Instead, humanitarian appeals are prevalent in security-driven interventions, 
including those that receive high levels of public support. This pattern raises questions about the 
expectation that, all else equal, security justifications are the most effective means of mobilizing 
support for the use of force and about norms scholars’ implicit assumption that the effects of 
humanitarian justifications are best studied within the context of humanitarian interventions. 
 The widespread use of humanitarian claims in contemporary security interventions is 
particularly puzzling because additional justifications create political risks. First, presidents have 
a limited amount of time to publicly make the case for intervention and set the terms of the 
debate that follows. Time spent outlining humanitarian objectives risks diluting the strength of 
the president’s overall message by taking away the time available to make the best possible case 
in terms of U.S. national security. Second, presidential speeches provide soundbites that are 
repeated in media coverage of the intervention and presented to a public that generally pays little 
attention to foreign policy (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989). Speeches that promote 
multiple themes and justifications risk creating soundbites that divert attention from security 
explanations to less compelling rationales. Finally, leaders who promote humanitarian goals may 
be punished by the public if those goals are not met. Highlighting humanitarian objectives in 
security interventions thus unnecessarily creates expectations for humanitarian outcomes and 
raises the bar for success, which may undermine public support in the long-run (Eichenberg 
2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).  
This project aims to provide a better understanding of the pattern and influence of 
humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions by addressing three questions: Why do 
leaders consistently use humanitarian justifications for interventions best explained in national 
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security terms? Who, if anyone, responds to these moral appeals? Under what conditions do 
humanitarian justifications effectively increase support for military action?  
In response to these questions, I argue that the explanation for presidents’ justification 
strategies lies in the composition of the domestic coalition of support. The U.S. public is a 
heterogeneous audience with diverse foreign policy beliefs that influence which justifications 
individuals find most persuasive. Within this audience, the support of individuals with 
cooperative internationalist values is particularly important for reducing the political costs of 
intervention. These individuals possess a unique combination of traits—an inherent skepticism of 
military action, a willingness to actively oppose intervention, and high levels of political 
engagement—that make them a critical target audience for presidential justifications. 
Humanitarian justifications maximize the support of cooperative internationalists while the 
effectiveness of security explanations is limited. The importance of persuading these individuals 
explains the prevalence of humanitarian appeals in contemporary interventions. As a result of 
their broad appeal, presidents should have an incentive to emphasize humanitarian claims as 
often as possible; however, the same individuals that make humanitarian justifications necessary 
also constrain their use. When humanitarian justifications appear insincere they no longer bolster 
the support of cooperative internationalists and the domestic coalition falls apart.  
 This account sheds new light on justifications as an under-examined mediator of the 
relationship between the president and public support for military action. By examining how 
heterogeneous foreign policy preferences shape attitudes toward the use of force and illuminating 
the power of humanitarian appeals, the project addresses the broader questions: What is required 
to effectively justify military action to the U.S. public? How much public support is necessary to 
facilitate intervention? This approach contends that the composition of domestic support matters 
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more than the magnitude and identifies a critical target audience for presidential appeals. 
Additionally, contrary to conventional wisdom, it implies that national security claims are not 
always the most effective justifications for military action. Individuals also respond to moral 
appeals for military action and the influence of these appeals is not limited to cases of 
humanitarian intervention. The argument also has implications for the threat that presidents will 
misuse humanitarian claims to provide a false pretense for action, demonstrating both that 
successful domestic coalitions give presidents leeway to pursue intervention and that the 
diversity of foreign policy beliefs plays an important role in maintaining democratic 
accountability for the use of force.   
In this chapter I present the theory of justifications for a diverse domestic coalition in 
detail. I first highlight the importance of official justifications and the nature of presidents’ 
concerns with public opinion. I then outline two competing accounts of the relationship between 
public opinion and presidents’ justification strategies and demonstrate that neither of these 
alternatives can comprehensively explain the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary 
interventions. The following section describes the origins of foreign policy beliefs before 
outlining the domestic coalition argument, linking evidence that the U.S. public is made up of 
individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences with presidents’ political incentives and 
information advantages. I then rule out additional explanations focused on partisanship, the 
international audience, and changes in international norms governing the treatment of civilians in 
conflict. The chapter concludes by outlining the observable implications of the domestic 
coalition argument, which are systematically evaluated in each of the subsequent chapters.  
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What are justifications and why do they matter? 
 
Why Justifications Are Necessary 
 
 U.S. presidents’ efforts to justify military action stem from their democratic 
accountability to citizens who bear the burden of war (Kant 1795).5 Presidents who undertake 
military action without the support of the public risk political punishment, either at the polls or 
through tightened institutional constraints that make it more difficult for leaders to pursue their 
political agendas (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Larson and 
Savych 2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013). These constraints help democracies avoid risky conflicts 
and hold leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions (Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; 
Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). Leaders thus pay careful attention to public opinion (Berinsky 
2009; Holsti 1992, 2004). They develop frames for intervention to bring public opinion in line 
with their policy choices and attempt to control the flow of information to shape public 
perceptions of military action (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Kernell 1997; Western 2005, 17). 
 While media coverage (Brody 1991; Brody and Shapiro 1989; Groeling and Baum 2008) 
and partisan discourse (Berinsky 2007) also influence public perceptions, presidents’ information 
advantages on matters of foreign policy make their justifications particularly important in 
military interventions (M. Baum and Groeling 2010). In his capacity as Commander in Chief, the 
president introduces the prospect of military action to the public and offers the initial explanation 
for intervention, setting the terms of the debate that follows. Examining presidents’ justification 
strategies thus sheds light on a central part of the process through which public support is 
mobilized to facilitate military action (Krebs 2015, 15). 
																																																						
5 Recent work demonstrates that autocratic leaders in civilian regimes with powerful elites can also be constrained 
by their publics (Weeks 2008, 2012). While the dissertation focuses on constraints imposed by democratic 
institutions in the United States, I would also expect leaders in autocratic regimes to face pressure to justify military 
action when their publics can enforce audience costs.  
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Justifications versus Motivations 
 
Justifications for military action are a key link between presidents’ foreign policy choices 
and public support for intervention. In the context of this project, I define justifications as the 
public and overt rationale leaders use to convince their publics that military action is legitimate, 
necessary, and worthy of support. Notably, the justifications for an intervention are distinct from 
the motivations for military action. While presidents can pursue military action for any number 
of reasons, their motivations cannot be directly observed by either scholars or the public. Instead, 
Krebs and Jackson (2007, 42) argue that to understand the consequences of political rhetoric, 
public justifications are not only observable, but are also the most relevant unit of analysis for 
understanding how the public perceives military action: 
We cannot observe directly what people think, but we can observe what they say 
and how they respond to claims and counter-claims. In our view, it does not matter 
whether actors believe what they say, whether they are motivated by crass material 
interests or sincere commitment. What is important is that they can be rhetorically 
maneuvered into a corner, trapped into publicly endorsing positions they may, or 
may not, find anathema. Rhetoric affects political outcomes even when all actors 
are cynical operators with little interest in genuine deliberation. The resolution of 
political issues through public debate need not imply any significant level of 
intersubjective consensus. 
 
Following this logic, the project focuses on presidents’ strategic choice of justifications to sell 
intervention to the U.S. public. It begins with the assumption that presidents choose justifications 
carefully and intentionally based on what they expect to resonate with the broadest possible 
domestic audience. In this way, studying the content of justifications speaks to both the 
conditions under which intervention frames are effective and how presidents think about 
managing public opinion. 
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Public Attitudes Towards Foreign Policy 
 
 Investigating the prevalence of humanitarian justifications in security-driven 
interventions is grounded in the long-running debate about the role of morality in foreign policy. 
Existing accounts divide into two camps that present the public as emotional and impulsive or 
self-interested and rational. Examining the combination of humanitarian and security claims 
reveals shortcomings in existing theories’ abilities to explain how leaders justify interventions 
and sheds light on when and how other-regarding, moral appeals bolster public support. 
The Emotional Public 
Morality plays a central role in many realists’ conceptions of public opinion (Carr 1939; 
Drezner 2008a; Goddard and Krebs 2015, 11; Holsti 1992, 440; Kertzer and McGraw 2012, 247; 
Lipset 1988; Mearsheimer 2011; Morgenthau 1951; Rathbun 2008). In his early account of 
realism in international politics, Carr (1939, 146) claimed that “The place of morality in 
international politics is the most obscure and difficult problem in the whole range of international 
studies.” The perceived role of morality also distinguished realists from utopians, where realists 
“hold that relations between states are governed solely by power and that morality has no part in 
them. The opposite theory, propounded by most utopian writers, is that the same code of 
morality is applicable to individuals and to states” (Carr 1939, 153). Unlike leaders who 
understand the complexities of foreign policy, these foundational theories portrayed the public as 
emotional and easily persuaded by moral appeals. This view of the public’s relationship with 
foreign policy was consistent with early studies that presented public opinion as impulsive, 
unstructured, and lacking in content (Almond 1950; P. E. Converse 1964; Holsti 1992, 442; 
Lippmann 1922). From this perspective, presidents use humanitarian justifications to 
“bamboozle” the public “into supporting strategic aims at odds with their own interests rightly 
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understood” (Goddard and Krebs 2015, 11). Because the national interest is “best served by the 
very Realpolitik that ordinary citizens find abhorrent, policymakers need to either brace 
themselves for political backlash, or camouflage their policies in anti-realist rhetoric” (Kertzer 
and McGraw 2012, 245). From this perspective, humanitarian justifications thus provide a cover 
for interventions that promote strategic national security goals but would otherwise be 
unpalatable to the public. However, these justifications become problematic when the public uses 
them to pressure leaders into taking risky action for humanitarian purposes that do not serve the 
national interest (Snyder 1991). 
The common ground among these “emotional public” perspectives is the expectation that 
the public responds positively and consistently to humanitarian claims and that presidents can 
use these justifications to manage public opinion. The role of justifications is thus to evoke an 
emotional response from the public by framing military action in terms that it can support and 
feel good about. Recent scholarship casts doubt on this perspective by demonstrating that the 
public holds realpolitik views usually attributed only to far-sighted leaders (Drezner 2008; 
Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Rathbun 2008). Moreover, leaders do not limit their deployment of 
humanitarian justifications to cases in which intervention is otherwise unjustifiable or the public 
is unconvinced by appeals to national security concerns.  
The Prudent Public  
 
In line with evidence that the public holds realpolitik foreign policy preferences, a second 
camp draws on public opinion data to suggest that the public acts as a prudent constraint on the 
use of force (Reiter and Stam 2002; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). When faced with a 
potential intervention, the public weighs the costs of action relative to the likelihood of success 
and the importance of the principal policy objective (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and 
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Reifler 2009; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). The prudent public supports 
intervention to restrain the aggression of foreign powers and to address humanitarian crises, but 
is skeptical of using force to accomplish internal political change (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and 
Britton 1998). Eichenberg (2005) argues that public concern with the operation’s policy 
objectives is driven by its overarching interest in success—the public supports interventions it 
thinks will end well. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) show that when the public believes an 
intervention will ultimately be successful, it is not only more likely to support military action, 
but is also willing to pay relatively high costs to achieve victory. Costs may include military 
casualties (Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Kriner and Shen 2014; Larson and Savych 
2005; Larson 1996; Mueller 1973) and finances (Flores-Macías and Kreps forthcoming; Geys 
2010), which can be offset by the prospect of multilateral approval (Grieco et al. 2011) and 
burden-sharing (Kull and Destler 1999).  
These accounts are united by their presentation of a discriminating public that can sort 
through presidential rhetoric to decide whether the benefits of the intervention are worth the 
risks. The role of justifications is thus to communicate information to the public to convince it 
that success is possible and that action is worthwhile. The prudent public will see through false 
claims and will only be influenced by humanitarian justifications when the intervention’s 
principle policy objective is humanitarian. From this perspective, presidents have no incentive to 
use humanitarian appeals in security-driven cases because they will not further bolster support. 
The prevalence of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions is thus expected to 
reflect the post-Cold War acceptance of humanitarian interventions as a legitimate and 
potentially prudent form of military action (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 
2000). 
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However, this approach cannot explain why presidents feature humanitarian justifications 
in interventions that the public expects to be successful and that already have high levels of 
approval. In other words, if the public is primarily interested in calculating the costs and benefits 
of action, presidents should have no incentive to offer additional humanitarian explanations for 
interventions for which the national security benefits are obvious and widely supported. Nor can 
this perspective account for the widespread use of humanitarian claims in security interventions 
where these justifications do not provide additional information about the intervention’s 
objectives or the likelihood of success.   
Despite the inability of the emotional and prudent public explanations to account for the 
pattern of humanitarian justifications, there are two conditions under which they could feasibly 
still drive presidents’ justification strategies. First, presidents could use humanitarian claims 
because they incorrectly believe these appeals matter, in which case it would not be possible to 
infer anything about public opinion from the content of presidents’ justifications. Given the 
amount of time and resources administrations devote to understanding and attempting to 
influence public opinion, it is unlikely that presidents would continue to use humanitarian 
justifications across conflicts and administrations if they did not generate any benefits. Second, 
presidents could use humanitarian justifications because these claims provide a costless 
rhetorical filler. In other words, humanitarian appeals could make for exciting oratory without 
raising costs or expectations about the intervention’s outcome. This explanation is inconsistent 
with the number of speeches given in the context of security-driven interventions, such as 
Afghanistan 2001, that focus primarily or exclusively on humanitarian objectives.  
However, to more directly test and rule out these alternative accounts, the following 
chapters directly evaluate their hypotheses for justification patterns and public opinion alongside 
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the implications of the domestic coalition argument. Chapter 3 examines the emotional and 
prudent public explanations’ ability to account for the pattern of humanitarian justifications in 
contemporary interventions, Chapter 4 considers whether they are consistent with how 
individuals respond to humanitarian justifications, and Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which 
the public holds the president accountable for his rhetorical choices.  
Building Public Coalitions  
 Both the emotional and prudent public explanations are built on the implicit assumption 
that there is a single U.S. public that responds to information about military interventions in a 
uniform way. However, studies of partisanship and foreign policy beliefs demonstrate that rather 
than an “undifferentiated whole” (Berinsky 2007, 977), the U.S. public is a diverse audience with 
foreign policy preferences that vary systematically based on individuals’ views of when and how 
the U.S. should engage in international affairs (Chanley 1999; Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Hurwitz 
and Peffley 1987; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1986; 
Wittkopf 1990; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Connecting presidents’ justification strategies to 
a disaggregated domestic audience, I argue that support for intervention requires a broad 
coalition of approval from a public with diverse foreign policy beliefs and that security 
justifications alone are often insufficient for this coalition building process. Presidents have 
incentives to build public approval for military action to avoid short-term costs of dissent and 
maintain leeway to pursue their political agenda and to bolster election prospects in the long-
term. 
 The logic of coalition building is commonplace in discussions of election campaigns. In 
the development of campaign messages and allocation of resources, “campaigns will generally 
ignore or take for granted each candidate’s most committed supporters and concentrate their 
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persuasive efforts on the undecided or weakly committed swing voters” (Mayer 2007, 361). 
Failure to build an electoral coalition that includes moderate and independent swing voters 
alongside the core constituency can cost the candidate the election (Abramowitz 1999, 61). 
Additionally, the importance of building coalitions does not end with the president’s election. 
Instead, Edwards (2000, 47) argues that coalitions are “at the core of governing in America. The 
necessity of forming coalitions is inevitable in a large, diverse nation in which political power is 
fragmented both vertically and horizontally.” As a result, “presidents are involved in a 
permanent campaign to build supportive coalitions” in order to maintain the political capital 
necessary to carry out their domestic agenda (Edwards III 2000, 48).  
Public opinion polls play an important role in these coalition building efforts. The White 
House uses internal public opinion polls to identify the issues around which a coalition can be 
built, the segments of the public that can be brought into a coalition on the given issue, and the 
messages most likely to persuade these key individuals (Druckman and Jacobs 2015, 40). 
Recognizing that the segments of the public tracked by internal polls reflect these groups’ 
strategic importance to the White House, Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 167) contend that the 
“analysis of representation needs to address not only possible disparities in influence but also the 
distinct strategies of elites to cultivate and to mobilize based on policy domains.”  
 In the context of election campaigns, while the composition of coalitions may change 
over time and across candidates, the necessary magnitude of support is relatively straightforward. 
The candidate needs enough support in enough states to cross the 270 vote threshold in the 
electoral college—a feat which is often but not always equivalent to winning a majority of the 
popular vote. To cross the threshold of electoral success, the candidate must build a coalition that 
combines co-partisans with a sufficient number of independents and moderate voters from the 
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opposing party. The broader the electoral coalition, the more confident the candidate can be in 
his or her prospects for electoral success. For example, Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 182) 
explain Reagan’s election and contributions to the future of the Republican party in terms of 
successful coalition building:  
Reagan’s careful calibration of his public positions to reflect his subgroup polling 
contributed to the formation of a new and broader conservative coalition—one that 
widened its appeal from the affluent and philosophical conservatives to political 
independents and, most strikingly, religious conservatives. The result was a broader 
and more enduring coalition for future Republican presidential and congressional 
politicians.   
 
Electoral coalitions and coalitions of support for military action both require the president 
to maintain the approval of a base constituency while appealing to a broader audience; however, 
there are a number of important differences between these two types of coalition building.  
During election campaigns, opposition and attacks from committed members of the opposing 
party are both expected and business as usual. Additionally, the time point at which the success 
or failure of coalition building matters is clearly identified ahead of time—the strength of the 
coalition on election day is decisive and sufficient to elect the president even if support begins to 
decline in the immediate aftermath.  
While the logic is the same, coalition building in the context of support for military action 
differs on each of these dimensions. In the build-up to military action, rather than winning 
individual votes, the president needs the support of the public as leverage to navigate 
institutional constraints on the use of force and minimize the political risks of action. Explaining 
the importance of public support for policy decisions, Edwards (2000, 48) notes that “Leading 
the public—changing opinions and mobilizing citizens into action—is perhaps the ultimate 
resource of the democratic political leader. It is difficult for others who hold power to deny the 
legitimate demands of a president with popular support.” With the public on his side, the 
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president undercuts the incentives of Congress and other elites to oppose the intervention, 
increasing his leeway to take action (Kernell 1997; Schultz 2003).  
However, in contrast to the votes needed to win an election, the threshold at which the 
president has enough support for military action to reap these benefits is both undefined and 
likely to vary by crisis. Under these uncertain conditions, the president has an incentive to shore 
up as much support as possible, both to maximize his leeway to navigate institutional constraints 
and to account for the inevitable erosion of support over time (M. Baum and Groeling 2010; 
Berinsky 2009; Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Kam and Ramos 2008; Kriner and Shen 
2014). In this context, a vocal opposition is less tolerable than during election campaigns. Rather 
than an expected sign that the other party thinks their candidate is better, the appearance of a 
mobilized opposition to military action raises questions about the legitimacy and prudence of the 
president’s foreign policy. These doubts exacerbate the erosion of support and decline of the 
president’ information advantage. They also create political incentives for elites who disagree 
with the president to voice their dissent and take action to block the intervention. As a result, 
while the White House will always aim to maximize support, it will also be concerned with 
limiting opportunities for opposition. In this context, the goals of presidents’ justifications for 
military action are two-fold: 1) to bolster support for intervention as much as possible, and 2) to 
limit the intensity of dissent so that even individuals who oppose intervention are not compelled 
to take to the streets or otherwise take action to punish the president.  
Finally, because the political salience of military action does not have a clear endpoint, 
the White House must consider how an intervention’s popularity affects its short- and long-term 
political goals. In the short-term, support for military action means the president can move 
forward with his desired foreign policy without threatening his approval rating or other items on 
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the domestic agenda. In the long-term, support ensures that if the intervention becomes a salient 
issue in the next campaign it will reflect positively on the candidate.6  
Taken as a whole, these differences suggest that the domestic coalition for military action 
must be both more encompassing and more concerned with mitigating vocal opposition than 
electoral coalitions. Coalitions built along the partisan lines that shape election campaigns are 
unlikely to meet these criteria for two reasons. First, because the prospect of military intervention 
primes national identity over partisan identity (Kam and Ramos 2008; Levendusky Forthcoming; 
Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Malhotra and Popp 2012) targeting only co-partisans and 
independents underestimates the size of the potential coalition. Second, linking military action to 
party politics polarizes the intervention and encourages both public and elite dissent from the 
opposing side, facilitating rather than preventing the growth of a vocal opposition.  
Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 182) also recognize that “the president treats domestic and 
foreign policy differently” and argue that the president relies on “discrete policy preferences to 
shape his domestic policy statements and on aggregate public mood in crafting his foreign policy 
positions.” However, their analysis relies on a broad category of foreign policy decisions that 
includes defense spending and trade agreements alongside military action. Instead, I contend that 
military interventions are not foreign policy as usual and demand a unique form of coalition 
building. Rather than appealing to the aggregate public mood or to independents and co-
partisans, the relevant coalition for military action is built by persuading individuals with 
different types of internationalist foreign policy beliefs, outlined in detail in the following 
																																																						
6 Because the president is also the leader of his party, the role of the intervention in the next election is expected to 
be a concern regardless of whether the president is running for reelection. However, Croco (2011) provides evidence 
that in some circumstances the public does not hold new candidates culpable for the mistakes of their predecessors.  
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section. By appealing to these groups, the president’s message targets the full range of 
individuals who could feasibly be persuaded to sustain support for military action. 
In sum, while the logic of coalition building—recruiting moderates to join a base of 
supporters—applies to both electoral coalitions and coalitions of support for military action, 
there are important differences between the composition and process of building these coalitions. 
In particular, coalitions of support for military action—what the remainder of this project refers 
to as the “domestic coalition”—are not built along strictly partisan lines, are more sensitive to 
dissent, and must be sustained for undefined periods of time. As the following section outlines, I 
contend that all presidents, regardless of party or popularity, need to construct a domestic 
coalition that includes militant and cooperative internationalists in order to maintain support for 
military action. However, the composition of the president’s electoral coalition may influence the 
ease with which he or she is able to build stable coalitions of support for intervention. Presidents 
elected with broad support from Democrats and other groups that contain a disproportionate 
number of cooperative internationalists will already have credibility with these key 
constituencies, making their justifications for military action more salient. Alternatively, 
presidents with electoral coalitions that contain a disproportionate number of militant 
internationalists or isolationists will need to build domestic coalitions of support for military 
action that extend far beyond their core constituencies and are more likely to face an uphill 
battle. The interaction between these two processes of coalition building is beyond the scope of 
this project but is an important area for future research. 
How Coalitions Shape Communications Strategies 
The White House recognizes the importance of building domestic coalitions from a 
diverse audience and makes use of internal polls to craft messages that resonate with target 
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groups without alienating the relevant base (Druckman and Jacobs 2015). For example, 
Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 21) examine internal polling and speeches under the Johnson, 
Nixon, and Reagan administrations to demonstrate that: 
Modern White House communications stands out for its use of scientific polling to 
anticipate public reactions before presidents speak. Presidents have developed the 
administrative capacity of a public opinion apparatus to track and use their private 
polling to calibrate strategy to widen their discretion on government policy while 
building and retaining public support. They use this institutionalized capacity to 
precisely fashion their public communications in order to narrow their policy 
responsiveness to particularly salient issues, cater to politically powerful supporters 
on issues that are less salient, and broaden public support through personal appeals.  
 
Polls designed to inform the communications strategy reveal that the White House both 
recognizes and is concerned about tailoring its message to different subgroups within the 
domestic audience. In their case studies of presidential polls and communications, Druckman and 
Jacobs (2015, 29) find that “general vital signs, however, rarely satisfied presidents and their 
senior staff” and instead “Starting in earnest with Johnson, the White House’s political needs 
drove its collection of data on five categories of public opinion: policy preferences, issue 
approval, most important problem, personality traits, and subgroup demographics (e.g., social 
and religious orientations).” This understanding of how individuals differ in their perceptions of 
the most important problems facing the country and how these differences vary across personal 
and social demographics provides the White House with the necessary tools to identify and build 
a domestic coalition of support for military action.  
 The domestic coalition argument put forth below contends that in the development of 
communication strategies for military action, the White House acknowledges that the public 
holds heterogeneous foreign policy beliefs and crafts justifications that resonate across these 
beliefs. While polls consider the same concerns about the role of the U.S. in the world and the 
most effective tools of foreign policy that make up the categories of beliefs outlined in the 
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following section, it is unlikely that the White House talks about these divisions using academic 
terminology. Instead, I expect the White House to identify the underlying groups as the key 
target audience for justifications based on an inherent understanding that there are sizeable 
segments of the public who are skeptical of military action because they are concerned with the 
morality and human costs of war. Appealing to moral and humanitarian considerations is thus 
necessary to bring these individuals on board or, at a minimum, to limit their dissent. White 
House discussions are expected to reference these beliefs in terms of broad internationalist or 
isolationist sentiment or by focusing on interest or demographic groups that consistently 
correlate with different underlying foreign policy preferences. For example, religious groups are 
likely to raise moral concerns about war that are rooted in the just war tradition and also reflect 
cooperative internationalist sentiments. Similarly, at the individual level skepticism towards 
military action and concern with humanitarian outcomes is more likely to appear among 
individuals who are relatively young, well-educated, women, or non-southerners (Mandelbaum 
and Schneider 1979, 43).   
Disaggregating by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
The Development of Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Having established the importance of building a coalition of support for military 
intervention, I then pose the question: what are the relevant divisions for understanding which 
groups can be persuaded to join this coalition? The domestic coalition argument I develop in this 
chapter begins with the assumption that different aspects of interventions resonate with different 
segments of the public based on individuals’ underlying foreign policy beliefs. Attention to 
systematic differences in the foreign policy preferences of the U.S. public first gained traction 
with Mandelbaum and Schneider’s (1979) analysis of the 1976 presidential election. Noting the 
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erosion of a Cold War consensus about the U.S. role in the world, the authors attribute the 
challenges facing Jimmy Carter’s campaign to the absence of “a resource held by its 
predecessors in conducting the nation’s affairs, namely, a domestic consensus for foreign policy” 
(Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 34). In the 1976 campaign, this challenge was linked to 
debates over détente and antimilitarism which played an important role in the primaries of both 
parties (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 35). Abstracting from the campaign, the authors then 
conduct factor analysis of survey data from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations to 
demonstrate that these debates are symptomatic of a growing split in the internationalist public. 
The findings show that “Most Americans continue to agree that the United States should take an 
active role in world affairs, but there is no longer agreement on what role it should be” 
(Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 41). Rather than a unified source of support or opposition, “It 
is more appropriate to think of foreign policy attitudes as arrayed along two dimensions, an 
internationalist-isolationist dimension (whether the United States should play an active role in 
world affairs) and a cross-cutting liberal-conservative dimension (what kind of role it should 
play)” (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 41).  
 Under Mandelbaum and Schneider’s typology, liberal and conservative internationalists 
are defined by their support for alternative goals and tools of U.S. foreign policy. Liberal 
internationalists’ goals commit the U.S. to a world role of cooperative internationalism that uses 
non-aggressive means to reach economic, humanitarian, and peace-oriented ends (Mandelbaum 
and Schneider 1979, 42). By contrast, conservative internationalists favor a competitive 
internationalism that employs aggressive American leadership and interventionist strategies to 
defend U.S. interests and uphold military commitments (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 42). 
Despite the liberal/conservative terminology, the authors find no significant differences in the 
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partisanship of the groups and note that, rather than standing in direct opposition, the two 
categories share a common internationalist foundation that makes coalition building possible 
(Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 43). Whether the White House can successfully build a 
coalition between the two groups depends on the specific policy; however, no domestic 
consensus is possible without broad support from internationalists. When either liberal or 
conservative internationalists oppose a policy, “they can usually find allies from among the 43 
percent of the public who are noninternationalists and do not want to interfere in other countries’ 
affairs” to create a problematic majority (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 48).  
 Building on this evidence of distinct foreign policy preferences, a subsequent wave of 
studies focused on refining the relevant dimensions and evaluating opinion data from different 
sources (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1986, 1988, 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 
1986, 1987; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). These efforts coincided with a proliferation of 
alternative terminologies; however, by the late 1980s a general consensus had developed around 
Wittkopf and Maggiotto’s (1983) “cooperative” and “militant” internationalist nomenclature. In 
this project, I continue to rely on the cooperative/militant terminology for two reasons: 1) it most 
directly reflects the form of engagement supported by each subgroup, and 2) it avoids confusion 
with political ideology and partisanship, which correlates with but does not directly reflect 
foreign policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 1990).  
 Following the end of the Cold War, scholars confirmed that the same two dimensions 
continued to structure the U.S. public’s foreign policy beliefs in the face of changing security 
threats (Chanley 1999; Holsti and Rosenau 1996; Wittkopf 1994). Wittkopf (1994, 377) outlined 
the potential for changes in post-Cold War attitudes, noting “the perceived threat of communism 
and how to deal with the Soviet Union occupied central roles in giving definition to Americans’ 
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foreign policy beliefs. They were crucial in differentiating between cooperative and militant 
internationalism.” However, his analysis proceeded to provide evidence that these orientations 
remained relevant for understanding the public’s attitudes towards foreign policy, leading to the 
conclusion that “The visions predate the Cold War and will surely transcend it, thus 
incorporating the new issues that will compete for attention in the post-Cold War era” (Wittkopf 
1994, 378). Similarly, using time series data Chanley (1999, 23) demonstrates that different 
dimensions of internationalism have structured foreign policy attitudes since at least 1964 and 
shows that “aggregate changes in public support for internationalism are consistent and 
predictable.”  
 Having determined which categories best characterize the public’s foreign policy beliefs, 
scholars then turned to the question of how foreign policy preferences are formed (Kertzer et al. 
2014; Nincic and Ramos 2010; Rathbun et al. 2016). Drawing on work from political 
psychology, Ninic and Ramos (2010) contend that individuals’ foreign and domestic policy 
beliefs are driven by the extent to which they are self-regarding or other-regarding. Employing 
an alternative value framework of conservation and self-transcendence, Rathbun et al. (2016) 
argue that because foreign policy preferences are rooted in the same personal values that shape 
the public’s general social preferences, even low-information individuals can hold coherent 
foreign policy attitudes.  
Kertzer et al. (2014) go a step further, employing insights from moral foundations theory 
to highlight the different moral values that drive militant and cooperative internationalist and 
isolationist foreign policy beliefs. From this perspective, cooperative internationalism “captures 
the distinction between the self and other in international affairs” and is associated with 
individuals who “typically believe that the United States should work with other countries and 
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international organizations to solve global problems” (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829). By contrast, 
militant internationalism is primarily concerned with the national interest and “marks the familiar 
division between hawks and doves over the importance, effectiveness, and/or desirability of 
using force to reach foreign policy objectives” (Kertzer et al. 2014, 830). Notably, this 
distinction highlights the difference between the cooperative/militant internationalist dimension 
and the more general hawk/dove framework—hawks align closely with militant internationalists, 
but the category of doves cannot distinguish between individuals who are skeptical of force but 
support action under some circumstances (cooperative internationalists) and those who are 
committed to non-engagement (isolationists).  
Defining the Dimensions of Foreign Policy Beliefs 
  In line with this scholarship, I conceptualize foreign policy beliefs along the same two 
dimensions defined by when and how individuals believe the U.S. should be involved in 
international affairs. First, individuals are positioned along an isolationist-internationalist 
dimension based on how active of a role they believe the U.S. should play in the world (Hurwitz 
and Peffley 1987; Kertzer 2013; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 
1990; Wittkopf 1994). Isolationists oppose active engagement, while internationalists believe the 
U.S. should remain engaged in addressing international problems. 
Although internationalists are united by the belief that the U.S. should play an active role 
in the world, they are divided along a second cooperative-militant dimension based on what form 
U.S. engagement should take. Individuals with militant internationalist values view military 
power as a critical tool for pursuing U.S. foreign policy and give the highest priority to national 
security goals (Schneider 1983, 40). As a result, militant internationalists are inclined to support 
interventions as an effective way to solve international problems. Alternatively, individuals with 
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cooperative values do not believe military force is a particularly effective tool of foreign policy 
(Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, 38). They favor humanitarian and multilateral foreign policy 
goals (Kertzer et al. 2014, 826) and would prefer that leaders focus on global problems such as 
the scarcity of natural resources, pollution, and international economic inequality rather than 
maximizing U.S. military security (Schneider 1983, 40).  
Public and Elite Internationalism 
 
 These three overarching categories of foreign policy beliefs—militant internationalists, 
cooperative internationalists, and isolationists—are drawn from public opinion surveys and 
theoretically grounded in the moral values that drive individuals’ social preferences in everyday 
life. Similarly, the White House drafts national addresses to communicate the president’s 
justifications for military action to the general public.7 The theory put forth below thus aims to 
explain how diversity in foreign policy preferences among the U.S. mass public influences 
justification strategies and the conditions under which the domestic audience can be mobilized to 
support military action. In this respect, it is decidedly public rather than elite focused.  
 However, early studies of heterogeneity in foreign policy beliefs provide evidence that 
divisions in internationalist sentiment also exist at the elite level (Holsti 1979; Holsti and 
Rosenau 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996; Wittkopf 1987). In his comparison of elite and mass attitudes 
towards the U.S. role in the world, Wittkopf (1987, 140) demonstrates that although cooperative 
and militant distinctions remain dominant, elite attitudes are more complex than the two 
dimensions outlined above. The foreign policy divisions found in leader surveys do not map 
neatly onto the mass survey data, in part because, unlike the public, “elites apparently differ over 
the means of American foreign policy, not necessarily its ends” (Wittkopf 1987, 142). Based on 
																																																						
7 Chapters 6 and 7 examine the development of White House communication strategies to provide evidence for this 
claim. 
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these findings, Wittkopf (1987, 143) concludes that “Perhaps the best we can say, then, is that 
American leaders continue to be appropriately described as ‘selective internationalists,’ but they 
defy easy characterization beyond that.”  
Evidence that foreign policy beliefs take different forms at the public and elite levels is 
comparable to findings that realism has a simpler, “folk” variant that appears in public opinion 
(Drezner 2008; Kertzer and McGraw 2012). At the individual level, foreign policy beliefs are 
impulses about when and how it is appropriate for the U.S. to engage in the world that guide 
individuals’ instinctive responses to different foreign policy decisions. At the elite level, foreign 
policy preferences are part of a political strategy based on a more complex understanding of the 
world and the long-term opportunities and consequences for engaging with other states. The 
extent to which the divisions in the public’s foreign policy beliefs also account for heterogeneity 
in the decision-making of political elites thus remains an open question that, while beyond the 
scope of this project, is worthy of future attention. 
The Limitations of Two-Dimensional Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 The two dimensions of foreign policy beliefs outlined above—whether the U.S. should 
play an active role in international affairs and what form engagement should take—provide the 
foundation for the analysis that follows because they identify the broadest possible category of 
individuals that can feasibly be convinced to provide sustainable support for military action. 
Individuals with internationalist beliefs approve of U.S. engagement with the world and, under 
certain circumstances, can be convinced that engagement should take the form of military action. 
Dividing internationalists by their concern with military strength sheds further light on the 
conditions under which different types of internationalists can be persuaded to support military 
intervention. Focusing on these broad categories thus represents the minimum level of 
 47 
disaggregation necessary to understand how underlying foreign policy beliefs shape the U.S. 
domestic audience and its willingness to support the use of force.  
 However, because individuals exist along a spectrum of beliefs, foreign policy attitudes 
are more complex than any single categorical measure can capture. This classification is further 
complicated by the fact that the existing definitions of militant and cooperative internationalists 
vary in their operationalization and conflate preferences for the goals and means of U.S. foreign 
policy—militant internationalists’ preference for military means is paired with national security 
goals and cooperative internationalists’ preference for diplomatic or multilateral means is paired 
with humanitarian objectives. As a result, militant internationalism captures individuals who 
favor taking consistently aggressive postures and those who believe force is necessary to address 
threats to U.S. national security but should be used sparingly. Cooperative internationalism may 
include individuals who are committed to multilateralism for all foreign policy goals and those 
who believe U.S. engagement should focus primarily on promoting the common good. Similarly, 
the isolationist category may include pacifists or anti-imperialists who believe force is never 
warranted and individuals with the belief that force is acceptable in response to a direct attack on 
the U.S.  
 To capture this additional variation, some scholars further divide the cooperative and 
militant categories. For example, Wittkopf (1994, 379) identifies four foreign policy belief 
systems, including: “internationalists (those who support both forms of internationalism), 
isolationists (those who oppose any form of involvement abroad), accommodationists (those who 
support cooperative internationalism but oppose militant internationalism), and hard-liners 
(those who support militant internationalism but oppose cooperative internationalism).”8 While it 
																																																						
8 Emphasis in original.  
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offers a more fine-grained description of the public’s foreign policy beliefs, further 
disaggregating the cooperative and militant internationalist categories does not provide 
additional leverage for understanding who can be convinced to support military action—
individuals with any combination of internationalist values offer potential and sustainable 
support for military action, making them an efficient target for presidential appeals, while 
isolationists are unlikely to support intervention. Therefore, as a first step towards understanding 
how sources of heterogeneity in the domestic audience influence mobilization for the use of 
force, here I focus on how justifications resonate with the broad categories of foreign policy 
beliefs.9 
 In sum, this section presents existing evidence that the public holds diverse foreign policy 
preferences divided along two dimensions: whether the U.S. should play an active role in the 
world and what form that role should take. While existing studies highlight the persistence and 
foundations of foreign policy beliefs, they do not evaluate the extent to which these beliefs 
influence politics or decisions to use military force. In the following section I outline a theory of 
domestic coalitions and argue that applying these foreign policy beliefs to the study of 
presidents’ justifications for and public attitudes towards military action clarifies: 1) whose 
support is needed to mobilize the domestic audience for military action, and 2) the conditions 
under which this mobilization is possible. 
Argument: Humanitarian Justifications and the Domestic Coalition 
 
Disaggregating the public by foreign policy beliefs allows me to clarify both the target 
audience for presidents’ justifications and the types of justifications that resonate with this 
																																																						
9 Additionally, the experimental results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that within these three general 
categories individuals respond similarly to justifications for military action. This level of aggregation thus appears to 
capture the relevant differences in how individuals react to the president’s explanation for intervention. 
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audience. In addition to favoring disengagement with international affairs, isolationists are 
themselves relatively disengaged from the political process (Wittkopf 1986, 435). Schneider 
(1983, 41–42) refers to such individuals as the “inattentive public” and demonstrates that they 
“tend to be poorer and less well educated and to know and care little about foreign affairs, which 
they see as remote from their daily concerns.” These individuals are “not so much opposed as 
they are nonsupportive” (Schneider 1983, 43)10 of U.S. involvement in international affairs, will 
only approve of military action when there is a direct and immediate threat to U.S. interests, and 
demand “swift, decisive action but not long-term involvement” (Schneider 1983, 42). Because 
they offer only short-term support for immediate threats to U.S. security and because their lack 
of engagement makes them an improbable source of active dissent, I expect isolationists to be an 
inefficient target for presidents’ justifications. Instead, isolationists will be unlikely to sustain 
support for military action, regardless of the justifications used.  
Alternatively, internationalists endorse U.S. engagement in international affairs and can 
be persuaded to offer long-term support for interventions. They are also more likely to be 
educated and knowledgeable individuals (Kertzer 2013, 237) who are engaged in politics and are 
represented in greater proportions among political elites than among the general population 
(Wittkopf 1987, 134).11 I expect that this level of political engagement makes internationalists a 
credible source of active domestic dissent. Presidents thus need to develop justification strategies 
that target and persuade a majority of internationalists to build a sustainable domestic coalition of 
																																																						
10 Because these individuals are characterized by disinterest and disengagement rather than an ideological 
commitment to staying out of global affairs, Schneider refers to them as non-internationalists rather than 
isolationists. In line with the broader literature on foreign policy beliefs, I use the term isolationist to refer to any 
individual who does not believe the U.S. should play an active role in the world. 
11 I focus on the foreign policy beliefs and coalitions of support among the U.S. public; however, these foreign 
policy beliefs are also held by political elites (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Wittkopf 1987). Appealing to elites with 
diverse foreign policy beliefs may also be key to building and sustaining elite coalitions (Saunders 2015). 
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support. With the right justifications, the support of internationalists is both possible and 
sustainable, making them the primary target audience for presidents’ justifications.  
Among this target audience, I expect security and humanitarian justifications to resonate 
differently with militant and cooperative internationalists. Individuals with militant 
internationalist values are the most likely supporters of military interventions because, as 
outlined above, they believe both that the U.S. should be engaged in the world and that military 
force is a central part of this active engagement. I expect these individuals to be persuaded by 
security justifications, which introduce a threat to U.S. national security that can only be 
addressed through military action. However, their baseline belief that military force effectively 
solves international problems, including humanitarian crises, means that militant internationalists 
can also be convinced by humanitarian justifications.  
By contrast, individuals with cooperative internationalist values are the equivalent of 
swing voters in potential domestic coalitions of support. They believe the U.S. should be 
engaged in solving international problems and thus can be convinced that intervention is 
necessary. However, individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are hesitant to use 
military force and are focused on the multilateral pursuit of humanitarian goals, making them 
less likely to be persuaded by security justifications. Instead, I expect that cooperative 
internationalists can be swayed primarily by humanitarian justifications which shift the focus of 
intervention from the matters of realpolitik associated with security claims to what Drezner 
(2008, 54) refers to as “internationalist policy priorities,” including “the protection of human 
rights, democracy promotion, or the strengthening of multilateral institutions.” Humanitarian 
justifications are thus unique in their ability to maximize support among a coalition of militant 
and cooperative internationalists. 
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In short, I argue that internationalists, especially those with cooperative preferences, are 
the target for presidents’ justifications and that combining humanitarian and security 
justifications is ideally suited to resonate with this audience. In addition to creating a stable 
coalition of support, the approval of cooperative internationalists is particularly important 
because, unlike isolationists—the other skeptics of military intervention—these individuals are 
attuned to political developments and are likely to turn their discontent into a vocal opposition 
that raises the political costs of intervention. Figure 2.1 summarizes the categories of foreign 
policy beliefs based on their willingness to support military action and the expected 
persuasiveness of alternative rationales for action to demonstrate that cooperate internationalists 
are the key target audience for justifications. 
 
Figure 2.1 Identifying the Target Audience for Justifications 
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Mobilizing and Managing Domestic Pressure in Humanitarian Crises 
 In the context of security-driven interventions, presidents thus have an incentive to 
include humanitarian justifications to persuade the broadest possible coalition of 
internationalists. However, the importance of maintaining support from a coalition of 
internationalists remains even when the intervention instead responds to a primarily 
humanitarian crisis or when the White House intends to pursue a policy short of intervention. In 
the face of a humanitarian crisis, the justification strategy necessary to build a coalition of 
support for action is straightforward and unlikely to carry political costs. Cooperative 
internationalists will be inclined to support the use of force if it is presented as the only way to 
achieve humanitarian objectives and end human suffering. At the same time, militant 
internationalists will respond to the necessity of using military force to solve the humanitarian 
problem. In this case, the White House communications strategy is expected to employ 
humanitarian justifications as the primary rationale for action because they are capable of 
bolstering support from the full range of internationalists and do not run the risk of appearing 
insincere. 
 However, the White House often responds to humanitarian crises with action short of 
military intervention, as cases such as the early stages of the Bosnian conflict (1992-1994), 1994 
Rwanda, and 2003 Sudan highlight. If the crisis is short-lived and does not receive media 
attention or present a direct threat to U.S. interests, the domestic audience is unlikely to pressure 
the president to take increased military action. Alternatively, if the crisis escalates over time, 
media and elite discourse will make the humanitarian case, regardless of the White House’s 
communication plan. The prevalence of arguments that the humanitarian toll of the crisis is 
building and only U.S. military action can end the suffering creates domestic pressure for action. 
 53 
Faced with evidence of overwhelming harm to foreign civilians, cooperative internationalists’ 
desire to end the crisis can outweigh their skepticism towards the use of force. Combined with 
militant internationalists’ belief that only military action can effectively solve the problem, 
cooperative internationalists’ response to evidence of egregious humanitarian abuses creates 
pressure for action from the key players in the domestic coalition. To mitigate dissent and avoid 
paying political costs for inaction, the objective of the White House communication strategy in 
this context is to manage the domestic pressure for escalation. In particular, the president will 
need to offset pressure from cooperative internationalists by justifying non-intervention in 
humanitarian terms and reassuring them that humanitarian objectives can be met through means 
other than force. Therefore, while the content and objective of justifications is expected to 
change in cases of humanitarian intervention and non-intervention, presidents remain concerned 
with the domestic coalition and target cooperative internationalists with their communication 
strategies.  
The Distribution of Foreign Policy Beliefs 
Given the skepticism of cooperative internationalists, presidents could attempt to drown 
out their potential dissent by maximizing the support of militant internationalists. However, 
examining the distribution of foreign policy beliefs in the general public reveals that this 
approach to coalition building is not a viable option. Instead, gaining support from individuals 
with cooperative internationalist beliefs is critical to achieving and maintaining a majority of 
support.  
In their account of U.S. foreign policy beliefs during the Cold War, Mandelbaum and 
Schneider (1979) used data from the Chicago Council Survey to create indicators of the different 
varieties of internationalism based on what foreign policy goals individuals thought were “very 
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important.” Their results indicated that without the support of both cooperative and militant 
internationalists, a domestic consensus in favor of intervention was not possible.  
In the more than 30 years after the initial study, the distribution and content of U.S. 
foreign policy beliefs have changed, but the need for a coalition of cooperative and militant 
internationalists remains. Drawing on data from 13 waves of the Chicago Council surveys, 1974-
2015, Figure 2.2 illustrates changes in the average percentage of respondents who listed militant 
or cooperative internationalist goals as “very important.”12 Average support for militant 
internationalists policies ranges from a maximum of 46 percent in 1982 to a minimum of only 14 
percent in 2012. Cooperative internationalist policies received a consistently higher average level 
of support that ranges from a high of 61 percent when the survey was first conducted in 1974 to a 
low of 43 percent in 2001.  
 
Figure 2.2 Changes in the Distribution of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
12 Response options associated with cooperative and militant internationalism are taken from Mandelbaum and 
Schneider (1979). A complete list of the policies associated with cooperative and militant internationalism, as well 
as responses to individual items, is included in the appendix. Not all policy options were included on the survey 
every year. Figure 2.2 reports the average percentage of respondents who thought cooperative or militant policies 
were “very important” for all relevant policies listed in the given year. 
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While these averages do not capture the relative strength of individuals’ militant or 
cooperative internationalism, over time variation highlights two key points about the distribution 
of foreign policy beliefs and potential domestic coalitions of support. First, there is covariance in 
the level of support for cooperative and militant policies because both draw on a common 
commitment to an active role in international affairs.13 Second, while support for policies waxes 
and wanes over time, at no point could a consensus be reached without the approval of 
individuals who support cooperative internationalist policies. The combined support of 
individuals with cooperative and militant internationalist beliefs is therefore critical to building a 
stable domestic coalition that both includes a majority of the public and is capable of sustaining 
intervention in the long-term. Because they are skeptical of military action, the need for support 
from cooperative internationalists is expected to present an obstacle to the formation of domestic 
coalitions. 
Leading and Misleading the Public with Humanitarian Justifications 
If humanitarian justifications resonate with the segments of the public most likely to 
actively oppose intervention, can presidents use these claims to convince the public to support 
any intervention? The extent to which humanitarian justifications allow leaders to circumvent 
domestic constraints draws on recent developments in the study of deception in international 
relations. Understanding the potential for deception and public backlash is particularly important 
in the case of humanitarian justifications because their misuse can prevent the U.S. from 
responding to genocide and mass atrocities in the future.  
 
 
 
 
																																																						
13 Each foreign policy goal was presented separately and individuals’ support for militant and cooperative 
internationalist goals was thus not mutually exclusive.  
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Deception and Democratic Constraints 
 
 Leaders have significant incentives to lie to their publics about military action (Alterman 
2004; Mearsheimer 2011). Deception allows leaders to avoid dissent, hide mistakes, and 
convince the public to support action that is difficult but necessary to protect the national 
interest. In his account of dishonesty in international politics, Mearsheimer (2011, 58) argues that 
“It is reasonably easy for policymakers to lie to their publics” because they control the 
intelligence apparatus and can manipulate the flow of information, taking advantage of the fact 
that “most people will be inclined to trust what their leaders tell them unless there is hard 
evidence that they are being deceived.” Similarly, Schuessler (2015, 117) suggests that deception 
is not only possible, but is “a natural outgrowth of the democratic process.” However, 
democratic leaders risk blowback and domestic political costs if caught in a lie, which “even if it 
makes good strategic sense—might spill into the national arena and cause significant trouble by 
legitimizing and encouraging dishonesty in daily life” (Mearsheimer 2011, 84).  
Reiter (2012) argues that the risks of blowback and public backlash are not only costly, 
they are prohibitive. Elected leaders realize that “if an attempt at deception is exposed, then they 
will suffer heavy domestic political costs” (Reiter 2012, 595). Democratic political institutions, 
including government bureaucracy, political competition, and the marketplace of ideas, ensure 
that deception will eventually be exposed and therefore “elected leaders are unable to elude 
public constraints by manipulating public estimates of the benefits and costs of war” (Reiter 
2012, 595). The expected costs of deception are in line with Cobb et al.’s (2013) examination of 
belief perseverance, which finds that when positive misinformation—such as the humanitarian 
benefits of a conflict—is exposed, the backlash against leaders exceeds the initial positive 
benefit. Similarly, Alterman (2004, 19) asserts that Americans are so accustomed to leaders’ lies 
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that “most have adapted to official falsehood as a way of life,” but argues that despite the 
prevalence of deceit, “presidents cannot lie about major political events that have potentially 
serious ramifications—particularly those relating to war and peace—with impunity. These lies 
inevitably turn into monsters that strangle their creators” (Alterman 2004, 314). 
These existing accounts converge around the expectation that lying about matters of 
foreign policy is commonplace but politically costly. However, they remain vague regarding the 
amount of deception required to generate these prohibitive costs, in part because they focus 
primarily on acts of provocation and covert operations.14 While provocation and covert 
operations are particularly dramatic and costly examples of deception, the opportunities to use 
misleading justifications as a pretext for military action are both more common and less easily 
exposed. Humanitarian justifications are particularly susceptible to misuse because they are 
feasible in a wide range of cases—all military interventions inevitably involve some form of 
harm to civilians. Additionally, because no state has a perfect human rights record, stories of 
human rights abuses are both widely available and difficult to discredit. Justifications are thus a 
most likely case for deception and the extent to which they activate the same domestic 
constraints that prevent false provocation remains an open question. 
Lessons from the 2003 Iraq War 
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq raised additional questions about the extent to which the 
U.S. public holds presidents accountable for telling the truth about military action. When 
inspectors did not find weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—the Bush administration’s primary 
justification for action—following the initial invasion, scholars examined how democratic 
institutions failed to constrain the use of force, focusing on shortcomings of the marketplace of 
																																																						
14 See Schuessler’s (2015) discussion of overselling and the 2003 Iraq War for a notable exception. 
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ideas and Bush’s successful management of the media (M. Baum and Groeling 2010; Kaufmann 
2004), as well as the salience of different types of justifications and opportunities for dissent in 
the post-9/11 security environment (Bellamy 2004, 2005; Krebs and Lobasz 2007). Contrary to 
Reiter’s (2012) expectation that democratic institutions prevent deception, the Bush 
administration’s ability to persuade the public at the beginning of the Iraq War seemed to 
indicate that neither the public nor the media could hold leaders accountable for misleading 
justifications. Instead, the extent to which misperceptions about the Iraq case remained 
uncorrected led Kaufmann (2004, 7) to conclude that: 
…democratic political systems may be inherently vulnerable to issue manipulation. 
The logic of the marketplace of ideas in foreign policy is based on the proposition 
that median voters have strong incentives to scrutinize expansionist arguments and 
reject those that seem to serve only narrow interests or risk weakening, rather than 
strengthening, national security. There is reason to believe, however, that median 
voter logic can often be bypassed by elite manipulation of how issues are framed 
in debate. 
 
 Beyond Iraq’s implications for democratic accountability, Bush’s perceived abuse of 
humanitarian justifications also raised concerns about two long-term consequences for 
humanitarian norms. First, based on the perception that humanitarian appeals helped sustain 
support for the intervention when the WMD rationale became untenable (Bellamy 2004; 
Evangelista 2008, 21; Fisher 2003), humanitarian justifications could provide a pretext for action 
and allow the U.S. to become involved in otherwise unpopular interventions. Second, examples 
of failed or costly interventions associated with humanitarian appeals could affect the U.S. 
approach to future conflicts (Stapleton 2015) and the over-use of humanitarian claims could 
undermine the credibility of future U.S. appeals (Bellamy 2005). Declining public acceptance of 
humanitarian claims is especially problematic to the extent that it prevents action to address mass 
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atrocities and undermines efforts to expand and institutionalize humanitarian norms, such as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Bellamy 2006; Evans 2004; ICISS 2001).  
The Consequences of Deception 
 Disaggregating the public into individuals with heterogeneous values regarding 
intervention sheds light on whether there are costs associated with deception and the conditions 
under which presidents are likely to be punished for making false claims. When used effectively, 
humanitarian justifications help crowd out opportunities for dissent—they provide a rationale for 
the use of force that persuades cooperative internationalists and prevents opponents of the 
intervention from using the humanitarian toll of war to make the case against military action.15 
As a result of their broad appeal, presidents should have an incentive to emphasize humanitarian 
claims as often as possible, consistent with concerns that humanitarian justifications could 
provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular and illegitimate military action (Bellamy 2004, 2005; 
Evans 2004). Contrary to this intuition, I argue that the same individuals that make humanitarian 
justifications necessary also constrain their use. Because cooperative internationalists do not 
believe problems are best solved with military force, are inherently skeptical of interventions, 
and are attentive to foreign policy decisions, they are also expected to be sensitive to the misuse 
of humanitarian appeals as a cover for security goals. When humanitarian justifications are 
stretched beyond their role as supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions, they 
can generate backlash from the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The implication 
for leaders’ justification strategies is that more is not always better when it comes to 
humanitarian appeals. 
																																																						
15 See Krebs (2015), Krebs and Lobasz (2007), and Krebs and Jackson (2007) on how narrative and rhetorical 
choices set the boundaries of debate and create obstacles to dissent. Krebs and Lobasz (2007, 412) refer to this 
phenomenon as rhetorical coercion, “a strategy that seeks to rhetorically constrain political opponents and maneuver 
them into public assent to one’s preferred terms of debate and ideally to one’s policy stance.”  
 60 
The use of humanitarian justifications and potential for backlash suggest that U.S. 
presidents simultaneously guide and are constrained by public opinion. Humanitarian 
justifications can suppress dissent and help build a strong coalition of support for military action, 
but overreliance on these claims can generate costly backlash against the president and the 
intervention. Presidents thus have an incentive to use humanitarian justifications, but avoid 
inviting close inspection of humanitarian outcomes. To this end, I expect them to consistently 
use humanitarian justifications, but maintain a clear emphasis on security justifications as the 
primary rationale for security-driven interventions. Therefore, humanitarian justifications can 
facilitate intervention when used effectively, but they do not provide a blank check for military 
action.  
Taken as a whole, the domestic coalition argument accounts for both the prevalence and 
limitations of humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions. It clarifies the target 
audience for presidents’ communication strategies and sheds light on the mechanisms of 
democratic accountability for the use of force by identifying the individuals most likely to 
impose political costs for deception and unjustified military action. The argument generates 
theoretical expectations for three levels of analysis—the pattern of justifications in presidential 
addresses, the public’s response to the type and sincerity of justifications, and the White House’s 
overarching communication strategies. Table 2.1 summarizes the expectations for each level of 
analysis and the method I use to evaluate these expectations in the following chapters.  
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Partisanship and the Domestic Coalition 
 The studies outlined above and Figure 2.2 show that the public holds diverse foreign 
policy beliefs that influence its response to a wide range of policies and have structured foreign 
policy attitudes for at least the last thirty years (Kertzer et al. 2014; Rathbun et al. 2016; 
Table 2.1 Expectations of the Domestic Coalition Argument by Level of Analysis 
Level of Analysis Theoretical Expectations Method of Evaluation 
Pattern of 
Justifications 
• Presidents use humanitarian justifications widely, 
but limit their emphasis in security-driven 
interventions. 
Content Analysis 
(Chapter 3) 
Individual 
Responses to 
Justifications 
• Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of 
humanitarian justifications than security 
justifications.  
• Militant internationalists offer high levels of support 
regardless of the type of justification. 
• Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of 
the type of justification. 
• Cooperative internationalists are more politically 
engaged than isolationists. 
Survey 
Experiments 
(Chapter 4) 
Individual 
Responses to 
Deception 
• Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs 
are most sensitive to deceptive humanitarian 
justifications. 
• Individuals with militant internationalist beliefs are 
sensitive to deceptive security justifications, but are 
not sensitive to deceptive humanitarian 
justifications. 
• The attitudes of individuals with isolationist beliefs 
are not significantly influenced by the presence of 
deception. 
Survey 
Experiments 
(Chapter 5) 
Communication 
Strategies 
• Discussions of speeches focus on domestic audience 
and consider how justifications resonate with 
different groups. 
• Communication strategies are designed to manage 
domestic pressure, especially from cooperative 
internationalists. 
• Concerns with the domestic coalition and efforts to 
persuade cooperative internationalists are present in 
security interventions, humanitarian interventions, 
and non-interventions. 
Case Studies 
(Chapter 6, 
Chapter 7) 
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Wittkopf 1986). Building on this evidence, I argue that these beliefs also shed light on who can 
be mobilized to support military action and the conditions under which presidents are most likely 
to persuade key groups. However, foreign policy beliefs are not the only source of heterogeneity 
in the domestic audience. How do the benefits of using foreign policy beliefs to understand the 
composition of the domestic coalition compare to other divisions in American politics?  
 Most notably, studies of both American politics and international relations reveal that 
individuals’ partisan identities influence their attitudes towards domestic and foreign policies. 
The influence of partisanship extends to a wide range of attitudes, including individuals’ 
opposition to the use of torture, responses to endorsements by international institutions, and 
reasons for supporting humanitarian action (Grieco et al. 2011; Kreps and Maxey Forthcoming; 
Wallace 2013). Partisanship also affects the incentives of political elites. Kriner and Shen (2014) 
demonstrate that the partisanship of members of Congress moderates their responses to casualties 
and willingness to criticize military action. Similarly, Trager and Vavreck (2011, 526) show that 
partisanship conditions the domestic pressures leaders face during international crises and creates 
incentives for “Democratic presidents to fight wars they will not win.”  
 In addition to individual attitudes and incentives, elite cue theory suggests that 
partisanship also determines the extent to which leaders will be able to persuade the public. 
Berinsky (2007) argues that public opinion towards military action is determined by patterns of 
elite conflict. In their decision to support or oppose an intervention, individuals will listen to and 
seek out the advice of politicians and opinion leaders who share their political predispositions 
(Berinsky 2007, 975). The statements and advice of elites who do not share an individuals’ 
political predispositions are expected to resonate less. This approach to public opinion is 
consistent with theories of motivated reasoning, which contend that individuals seek evidence—
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in this case, public statements about military action—that is in line with their pre-existing 
political beliefs and discount evidence to the contrary (Taber and Lodge 2006). 
 Evidence of rising polarization in U.S. politics suggests that the centrality of partisanship 
to public opinion is poised to increase over time. Examining partisanship at the elite level, Lee 
(2009, 68) concludes that “The dramatic increase in partisan conflict represents one of the most 
striking developments in Congress over the past 25 years.” While this polarization has yet to 
produce more ideologically extreme outcomes, it is exacerbated by presidents’ attempts to 
champion particular issues and can limit the president’s ability to influence Congress and policy 
(Lee 2008, 2015). Increased polarization also influences the coalition-building strategies 
employed during election campaigns by encouraging candidates to focus more time and 
resources on mobilizing their base of support rather than winning over moderate voters from the 
other party (Panagopoulos 2016). 
Despite a consensus that Congress has become more polarized over time, the extent to 
which this polarization extends to the U.S. public remains a subject of debate. In one camp, 
studies suggest that the U.S. public has remained centrist in its views while elite polarization 
creates the misperception that the country is more divided than ever (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; 
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011; McAdam and Kloos 2014).  McAdam and Kloos (2014, 11) 
summarize this perspective with their contention that, “the deep partisan divide that characterizes 
today’s Congress, party activists, and other political elites is typically not mirrored in the general 
public. Quite the opposite: the general public has remained largely centrist in its views, while the 
parties—especially the GOP—and their candidates have been pushed off center.” Explanations 
for parties’ shifts from the center include pressure from social movements, party sorting, and the 
improved coordination of party teams, while explanations for the appearance of increased public 
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polarization range from misperception to news coverage (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Lee 2009; 
Levendusky and Malhotra 2016a, 2016b; McAdam and Kloos 2014).  
By contrast, a second camp contends that polarization is on the rise among both the 
political elite and public. Responding to Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope’s (2006) dismissal of a 
culture war between blue and red states, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, 554) claim that 
“Polarization in America is not just an elite phenomenon. The American people, especially those 
who care about politics, have also become much more polarized in recent years. To a 
considerable extent, the divisions that exist among policymakers in Washington reflect real 
divisions among the American people.” These findings are in line with more recent evidence that 
the effects of partisan polarization increasingly influence individuals’ economic and political 
choices (McConnell et al. In press).  
The Importance of Foreign Policy Beliefs in a Polarized Context 
While the verdict is still out on the extent of polarization among the U.S. public, the 
widespread influence of partisan identity raises two questions for the strength of the domestic 
coalition argument: 1) Given an individual’s partisan identity, do foreign policy beliefs provide 
any additional leverage for understanding attitudes towards military action? 2) If foreign policy 
beliefs and partisanship are not synonymous, does the latter moderate the effect of the former? 
An individual’s foreign policy beliefs are expected to correlate with his or her partisan 
identity because both traits correspond to similar moral foundations (Jost et al. 2003). Moral 
foundations theory identifies five moral foundations—harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, 
authority/respect, purity/sanctity, and ingroup/loyalty—that individuals hold in different 
combinations and at different magnitudes, which in turn influence political attitudes (Graham et 
al. 2013; Haidt and Graham 2007; Kertzer et al. 2014). Linking these beliefs to political 
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ideology, Haidt and Graham (2007, 98) find that “Political liberals have moral intuitions 
primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral 
motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.” Alternative 
measures of psychological foundations also find clear differences based on ideology and 
demonstrate that “conservatives are more resistant to change, oppose ambiguity, and prefer 
definitive outcomes that provide closure” (Brutger 2016, 8; Jost et al. 2003). Notably, these 
studies of moral foundations gauge political ideology rather than party identification. While not a 
direct measure of partisanship, party and ideology are closely linked in the U.S. context and 
political ideology is also a central part of studies partisan polarization (Fiorina, Abrams, and 
Pope 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). 
In terms of foreign policy beliefs, the same individual-level moral foundations of harm 
and fairness associated with liberalism are linked to cooperative internationalism, while the 
community-level ingroup, authority, and purity foundations held by conservatives are linked to 
militant internationalism (Kertzer et al. 2014, 833–34). Isolationists are not clearly associated 
with any of the moral foundations (Kertzer et al. 2014). Table 2.2 summarizes the moral 
foundations and their connections to ideology and foreign policy beliefs.  
Table 2.2 Moral Foundations of Ideology and Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Ideology Foreign Policy Belief 
Foundation Liberal Conservative Cooperative Internationalism 
Militant 
Internationalism 
Harm/Care 
 
X X X  
Fairness/Reciprocity 
 
X X X  
Authority/Respect 
 
 X  X 
Purity/Sanctity 
 
 X  X 
Ingroup/Loyalty  X  X 
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As Table 2.2 shows, because of overlap among the moral foundations that drive both 
foreign policy beliefs and political attitudes, individuals with liberal values are more likely to be 
cooperative internationalists, while individuals with conservative values are more likely to be 
militant internationalists. However, the values also reveal that the link between political ideology 
and foreign policy beliefs is not exact. In particular, conservatives hold values associated with 
cooperative internationalism and isolationists are not easily associated with either ideology. 
Partisanship, ideology, and foreign policy beliefs are thus expected to be correlated, but not exact 
reflections of each other.  
This expectation is borne out in the sample of respondents for the survey experiments 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As the cross tabulations presented in Table 2.3 show,16 the 
majority (66 percent) of individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs were Democrats, but 
non-negligible numbers were also Republicans (18 percent) and independents (16 percent).17 
Notably, cooperative internationalists account for 32 percent of all Republicans in the sample 
and 50 percent of independents. These descriptive statistics suggest that even if presidents only 
appeal to members of their own party or potential swing voters, Republican presidents who 
disregard cooperative internationalists would be overlooking a substantial portion of their own 
constituents.  
 
 
																																																						
16 See the appendix for cross tabulations by political ideology.  
17 Respondents self-reported their partisanship on a seven-point scale that ranged from strong Democrat to strong 
Republican. Democrats include individuals who reported that they were strong Democrats, Democrats, or 
independents that leaned towards Democrats. Republicans include individuals who reported that they were strong 
Republicans, Republicans, or independents that leaned towards Republicans. Independents are only those 
individuals who did not lean towards either party. See the appendix for results that code leaners as independents and 
examine the distribution of strong partisans. See the Chapter 4 appendix for the full survey instrument and measures 
of foreign policy beliefs.  
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Table 2.3 Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Partisan ID 
 Democrat Republican Independent Total 
Cooperative 
Internationalist 
66% 
(559) 
 
18% 
(150) 
16% 
(139) 
100% 
(848) 
Militant 
Internationalist 
27% 
(114) 
 
56% 
(235) 
17% 
(69) 
100% 
(418) 
Isolationist 39% 
(95) 
32% 
(78) 
29% 
(70) 
100% 
(243) 
N 769 463 278  
Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of 
individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with 
the given party. Counts reported in parentheses. 
 
Similarly, while a majority of militant internationalists (56 percent) were Republicans, 27 
percent were Democrats and 17 percent were independents. Militant internationalists make up 15 
percent of all Democrats in the sample and 25 percent of the individuals who identified as 
independents. Therefore, Democratic presidents who fail to target militant internationalists 
disregard more than a quarter of potential swing voters and a sizeable percentage of their own 
party.  
Partisanship does a particularly poor job of identifying and explaining the attitudes of 
isolationists who are spread more evenly across parties. The plurality of isolationists in the 
sample were Democrats (39 percent), but the percentage who identified as Republicans (32 
percent) or independents (29 percent) were not far behind. The lack of a relationship between 
isolationism and partisanship is confirmed by logistic regression models, reported in the 
appendix, which use party to predict foreign policy beliefs. While Democrats are significantly 
more likely to be cooperative internationalists and Republicans are significantly more likely to 
be militant internationalists, the marginal effects of party on isolationists are more muted. 
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Changing one’s party identity from non-independent to independent increased the predicted 
probability an individual identified as an isolationist by 0.11, but this marginal effect pales in 
comparison to the effect of identifying as a Democrat on the predicted probability of being a 
cooperative internationalist (+0.34) and the effect of identifying as a Republican on the predicted 
probability of being a militant internationalist (+0.34).  
Together, the distribution of partisans is consistent with evidence from moral foundations 
theory that political ideology (and therefore partisanship) and foreign policy beliefs have 
common drivers. However, the number of partisans that fall outside of the modal category and 
the lack of a clear pattern of partisanship among isolationists suggests that foreign policy beliefs 
are not simply party identity by a different name. Instead, foreign policy beliefs capture more 
than just partisanship. By recognizing that isolationists, who cut across party lines, are inefficient 
targets for presidents’ justifications, taking these beliefs into account provides a more accurate 
picture of who can be mobilized to support military action. Additionally, by focusing on when 
and how individuals believe the U.S. should engage with the world, foreign policy beliefs 
highlight the mechanisms—the activation of concerns about the protection of innocent civilians 
or national security—through which individuals from both parties can be convinced to support 
military action. As a result, foreign policy beliefs are capable of generating concrete theoretical 
expectations for the types of justifications needed to effectively mobilize domestic support for 
intervention that cannot be derived from partisanship alone.       
The Partisanship of the President 
 In addition to correlating with foreign policy beliefs, studies of partisanship also suggest 
that the presidents’ party identification influences the credibility of his or her justifications for 
military action. If individuals seek out elite cues from opinion leaders who share their political 
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predispositions (Berinsky 2007), a president from the opposing party is unlikely to be persuasive 
regardless of the justifications he or she uses. Leaders’ inability to communicate with members 
of the opposing party is exacerbated by polarization, which makes any item on the president’s 
agenda more contentious (Lee 2008) and creates a general dislike and distrust of the other party 
that “leads individuals to distrust government, especially when the opposing party is in control” 
(Levendusky Forthcoming). From this perspective, the connection between foreign policy beliefs 
and responsiveness to justifications could be moderated by partisanship to such a degree as to be 
inconsequential—no matter how many humanitarian justifications a Republican president uses, 
he or she will be unable to convince Democratic cooperative internationalists to support a 
military intervention led by a member of the opposing party. 
 However, there is also evidence that Americans possess strong national identities that can 
be activated in the face of international crises and threats to mitigate partisan divisions (Kam and 
Ramos 2008; Levendusky Forthcoming; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Malhotra and Popp 
2012). Levendusky (Forthcoming, 8) notes that “by changing the salience of an individual’s 
identities—partisan versus American—one can change how they evaluate those from the other 
party.” As an inherently partisan figure, presidents will often be ill-equipped to prime the 
unifying national identity (Levendusky Forthcoming, 27). However, because of the president’s 
informational and first-mover advantages, international crises mute the effects of partisanship 
and “The fact that the president is the president, rather than a Republican or Democrat, becomes 
the crucial factor” (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, 325).  
 From this view, military interventions—especially in their early stages—represent the 
peak of the president’s ability to appeal across partisan lines. Foreign policy beliefs thus help 
explain how individuals form opinions about military action at the moment that partisanship 
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matters least. Evidence from recent U.S. military actions in Syria supports this claim. Between 
2013 and 2017, Barack Obama and Donald Trump—arguably two of the most polarizing U.S. 
political figures in recent history—both proposed military strikes in response to Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons and oversaw military operations against ISIS forces operating in the same 
country. If partisanship is the dominant factor behind public attitudes towards military action, 
Democrats should support the action when it occurred under Obama’s leadership and oppose 
operations conducted during Trump’s presidency. Similarly, Republicans would be expected to 
oppose action encouraged by Obama and support action taken by Trump. Contrary to these 
expectations, in 2013 Pew polls revealed that 46 percent of Democrats and 56 percent of 
Republicans favored military action against Syria if the use of chemical weapons was confirmed 
(Pew Research Center 2013). When the U.S. conducted air strikes following Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons in 2017, support among Republicans increased, but 45 percent of Democrats 
continued to support the action (Pew Research Center 2017b). Partisan polarization alone cannot 
explain Democrats’ consistent level of support. It also cannot account for the bipartisan 
support—including 64 percent of Republicans and 60 percent of Democrats—that existed for 
Obama’s military campaign against ISIS (Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy 2014a).  
 In sum, partisanship is a salient force in U.S. politics, but it does not account for the full 
variation in foreign policy beliefs nor does it render their effects inconsequential. Examining 
foreign policy beliefs produces substantive expectations for the resonance of different 
intervention frames and is better equipped to determine which segments of the domestic 
audience can be mobilized to support military action, as well as the conditions under which this 
mobilization is possible. However, as the polarization of the U.S. public continues, party and 
foreign policy beliefs are likely to interact in important ways. In Chapter 8, the conclusion poses 
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this interaction as an empirical question and takes up the task of understanding its implications in 
greater detail.   
Humanitarian Justifications and International Audiences 
 The argument presented above focuses on variation within the U.S. public to explain 
presidents’ consistent use of humanitarian justification. To this end, it assumes that the domestic 
audience is the primary target of humanitarian claims. However, humanitarian justifications 
could instead be employed to placate international audiences and gain international approval for 
intervention, which both increases the legitimacy of the intervention and indirectly bolsters 
public support (Chapman 2011; Chapman and Reiter 2004; Grieco et al. 2011). By many 
accounts, humanitarian justifications are particularly well-suited to international audiences 
because they frame military action in terms of internationally held standards of appropriate 
behavior (Finnemore 1996a, 159). Using humanitarian justifications to evoke international norms 
and standards such as the Responsibility to Protect thus presents intervention as a response to 
threats to international peace and security, rather than as a purely self-serving action to protect 
narrow U.S. national security interests.  
 While multilateral support can increase both the legitimacy of an intervention and the 
opportunities for burden-sharing, it is also “more time-consuming, less reliable, and more 
limiting than operating alone” (Kreps 2011, 6). As a result, leaders make strategic choices about 
when to expend the effort necessary to seek multilateral approval (Chapman 2011, 6). The 
consistent pattern of humanitarian justifications thus does not map onto the variation in the 
importance or pursuit of multilateral approval, suggesting that the international community is not 
the intended audience for humanitarian claims.  
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 Additionally, unlike at the domestic level where humanitarian justifications persuade the 
most likely opponents of intervention, recent conflicts indicate that the opponents of intervention 
at the international level are often unconvinced by humanitarian appeals. For example, when the 
UNSC passed Resolution 688 in response to Iraq’s oppression of Kurds and Shiites, Russia and 
China committed to veto any version that contained enforcement provisions and the non-
permanent members of the Council were “anxious not to set a precedent that might legitimize 
Council action on humanitarian grounds alone” (Wheeler 2004, 33). Similarly, Russia, China, 
and India opposed the humanitarian rationale for NATO actions in Kosovo in 1999 (Wheeler 
2004, 43) and, more recently, Russia and China publically rebuked the U.S. and NATO for using 
misleading humanitarian statements to gain support for intervention in Libya (Foust 2012).  
Therefore, at the international level humanitarian claims can spark rather than circumvent 
opposition and they are more likely to be the subject of debate than interventions clearly defined 
in terms of self-defense. This international debate is particularly noteworthy because opposition 
to humanitarian claims most often comes from veto-holding members of the UNSC who have the 
power to block international approval for U.S. interventions.18 In sum, international approval is 
neither consistently sought after nor most effectively obtained with humanitarian justifications. 
U.S. presidents’ deployment of humanitarian justifications in already popular intervention is thus 
unlikely to be primarily directed at international audiences.  
 Civilians and Contemporary Conflicts 
 While humanitarian justifications are not limited to humanitarian interventions, their 
effectiveness could still be confined to contemporary conflicts, which are unique in the salience 
of humanitarian norms (Finnemore 2003; Garraway 2014; Wheeler 2000), the emphasis placed 
																																																						
18 See Voeten (2005) on why approval from the UNSC is particularly sought after and important for establishing the 
legitimacy of a military intervention.  
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on civilians (Conway-Lanz 2014; Crawford 2014; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006), and the 
attention given to post-war reconstruction (Barakat and Zyck 2009; Bass 2004; Bellamy 2008; 
Gheciu and Welsh 2009; Orend 2002; Recchia 2009). These perspectives suggest that presidents’ 
common use of humanitarian claims is tied to changes in warfare. They highlight both a potential 
scope condition to the argument—the prominence of humanitarian justifications reflects changes 
in the U.S. commitment to protecting civilians—and an alternative explanation for the purpose of 
humanitarian justifications—to prepare the public for future reconciliation and reconstruction 
efforts.  
Growing Concern for Civilians 
 Contemporary conflicts can be distinguished from past eras along multiple dimensions. If 
the patterns highlighted in existing scholarship hold, conflict and conflict-related deaths are in 
decline (Gleditsch 2013; Goldstein 2011; Levy and Thompson 2011; Pinker 2011) and states are 
less likely than ever before to formally declare war (Fazal 2012). When war does take place, a 
developing consensus suggests that government and public attention to protecting civilians has 
increased significantly over the past decades (Evangelista 2014, 3). This increased concern with 
the protection of civilians can be tied to changes in norms that govern conduct in war, public 
concern with civilian casualties, and the types of conflicts in which the U.S. is involved—in 
particular, counterinsurgency efforts which require winning the hearts and minds of civilians to 
meet their military objectives (Conway-Lanz 2014; Crawford 2013, 2014; Valentino, Huth, and 
Croco 2006). Combined, these changes create an environment in which the U.S. not only 
distinguishes its military targets from the civilian population, but also publically declares its 
concern for civilians’ well-being and desire to make their lives better. For example, as U.S. 
forces began strikes in Iraq on March 19, 2003, George W. Bush told the nation that “I want 
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Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare 
innocent civilians from harm” and that “We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their 
great civilization, and for the religious faiths they practice” (G. W. Bush 2003e). Days earlier, he 
addressed the Iraqi people directly, assuring them that the U.S. military campaign would be: 
…directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As 
our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you 
need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a 
new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of 
aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions 
of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be 
gone. The day of your liberation is near (Bush 2003a).  
 
This approach stands in stark contrast to the treatment of civilian populations in past 
conflicts that more closely reflected total war scenarios. In total war, public morale and industrial 
production become critical to the war effort (Biddle 2014) and “because total war pits the 
belligerent energies of whole populations against one another, any member of an adversary’s 
population counts as a legitimate target” (Saint-Amour 2014, 420). Given the fortunate absence 
of total war scenarios in recent decades, the effectiveness of humanitarian justifications—even 
among cooperative internationalists—could be limited to cases in which the target state’s society 
is not implicated in the conflict. When military efforts are designed to break the morale of an 
opponent’s society, humanitarian claims focused on protecting foreign civilians could appear 
contradictory and undermine the overall rationale for military action.  
World War II offers the most recent example of U.S. military action that included the 
mass mobilization of entire societies as part of the war effort. In the early months of U.S 
involvement, Roosevelt declared, “We know what we are fighting for. We realize that the war 
has become what Hitler originally proclaimed it to be—a total war” (Roosevelt 1942). As the 
existing scholarship expects, references to the welfare or protection of German and Japanese 
 75 
civilians in this case are few and far between, with rare and brief exceptions such as Truman’s 
warning that “I urge Japanese civilians to leave those cities if they wish to save their lives” 
(Truman 1945). However, the absence of references to the German and Japanese people does not 
reflect the absence of either humanitarian justifications or concern with foreign civilians. Instead, 
humanitarian justifications were present throughout WWII, but focused on protecting and aiding 
civilians in countries under German or Japanese occupation. In the same speech in which he 
labeled the conflict a total war, Roosevelt (1942) evoked the suffering of civilians across Europe 
as a justification for the domestic costs of action: 
The price for civilization must be paid in hard work and sorrow and blood. The 
price is not too high. If you doubt it, ask those millions who live today under the 
tyranny of Hitlerisms. Ask the workers of France and Norway and the Netherlands, 
whipped to labor by the lash, whether the stabilization of wages is too great a 
“sacrifice.” Ask the farmers of Poland and Denmark, of Czechoslovakia and 
France, looted of their livestock, starving while their own crops are stolen from 
their land, ask them whether “parity” prices are too great a “sacrifice.” Ask the 
businessmen of Europe, whose enterprises have been stolen from their owners, 
whether the limitation of profits and personal incomes is too great a “sacrifice.” 
Ask the women and children whom Hitler is starving whether the rationing of tires 
and gasoline and sugar is too great a “sacrifice.”   
 
Similar humanitarian claims also followed the advance of Allied troops into and the eventual 
liberation of occupied territories. Rather than “follow the pattern set by Mussolini and Hitler and 
the Japanese for the treatment of occupied countries,” Allied forces in Italy were “already 
helping the Italian people in Sicily” and “providing them with the necessities of life until the 
time comes when they can fully provide for themselves” (Roosevelt 1943). Such efforts were 
part of the U.S.’s “determination to restore these conquered peoples to the dignity of human 
beings, masters of their own fate, entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom 
from want, and freedom from fear,” a policy that Roosevelt was committed to pursuing even if it 
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stepped “on the toes of those Americans who, playing party politics at home, call that kind of 
foreign policy ‘crazy altruism’ and ‘starry-eyed dreaming’” (Roosevelt 1943).   
 In sum, the norms associated with targeting civilians and separating combatants from 
noncombatants may operate differently in cases of total war. However, examples from WWII 
indicate that humanitarian justifications are not limited to conflicts in which the boundaries 
between societies and militaries are clearly delineated. Instead, Roosevelt used humanitarian 
claims to justify the costs of action throughout the war and publically recognized that these 
moral appeals operated along a different, but critical dimension of foreign policy. Humanitarian 
justifications can thus be adapted to bolster support for military action, even in total war 
scenarios, and their ability to build support through moral mechanisms is not inherently limited 
to contemporary interventions. 
Anticipating Reconstruction 
 Rather than building a stronger coalition of domestic support, humanitarian justifications 
could also reflect the increased focus on post-conflict reconstruction (Barakat and Zyck 2009; 
Gheciu and Welsh 2009; Recchia 2009). In the past decade, peace-building and reconstruction 
efforts have become commonplace in U.S. foreign policy and are often construed as an extension 
of the conflict itself (Barakat and Zyck 2009, 1069). This emphasis on reconstruction is 
consistent with the “responsibility to rebuild” pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001, 
39) and has sparked debate over whether postwar justice—jus post bellum—is a necessary 
component of just war theory (Bass 2004; Bellamy 2008; Orend 2002). The prominence of 
reconstruction efforts in recent interventions suggests an important alternative explanation for 
the widespread use of humanitarian justifications: if presidents anticipate reconstruction, they 
could use humanitarian claims to preemptively build support for the humanitarian efforts set to 
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follow the initial invasion. In this case, humanitarian appeals could be useful because they 
generate support for a different stage of the intervention, rather than from different segments of 
the domestic audience.  
 Within and between case variation in the pattern of humanitarian justifications 
demonstrates that reconstruction efforts alone cannot explain the role of humanitarian appeals in 
contemporary interventions. First, as the previous section highlighted, humanitarian justifications 
have a long history in U.S. interventions and their presence does not track closely with the 
development of jus post bellum. Additionally, cases such as the 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya 
illustrate that humanitarian justifications are not limited to interventions that required a U.S. 
commitment to post-war reconstruction. Second, even in cases such as the 2003 U.S. 
intervention in Iraq, which included long-term reconstruction efforts, humanitarian justifications 
were used consistently over the course of the intervention and Bush’s emphasis of humanitarian 
appeals did not increase as the U.S. transitioned from the initial invasion to the nation-building 
stage of the operation. Thus, while consistent with the goals of reconstruction efforts and jus post 
bellum, humanitarian justifications are not driven by these aspects of contemporary 
interventions.  
Evaluating the Domestic Coalition Argument 
 The domestic coalition argument outlined in this chapter has theoretical expectations at 
three levels: 1) the pattern of humanitarian justifications in presidents’ addresses to the nation, 2) 
individuals’ responses to humanitarian claims and their perceived misuse, and 3) the political 
objectives of administrations’ communications strategies. To evaluate this argument, the 
remainder of the dissertation employs a multi-method approach to test these expectations against 
alternative explanations. First, I employ content analysis to create a dataset of justifications for 
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all potential interventions, 1990 to 2013, and use this dataset to examine the pattern of 
justifications for military action. Evidence in support of this argument will demonstrate that 
presidents use humanitarian claims often, regardless of the type of intervention, but limit the 
relative emphasis placed on humanitarian explanations in security interventions. The domestic 
coalition expectations are tested against the alternative explanations that presidents either limit 
their use of humanitarian justifications to humanitarian interventions or use and emphasize 
humanitarian claims equally across all interventions. Second, I rely on survey experiments to 
determine how individuals respond to alternative justifications and whether this response is 
influenced by their underlying foreign policy beliefs. In this context, the domestic coalition logic 
expects individuals with cooperative internationalist values to be uniquely responsive to 
humanitarian appeals and sensitive to the deceptive use of humanitarian claims. I evaluate these 
expectations against the alternative explanation that foreign policy beliefs do not condition how 
individuals respond to alternative justifications. Third, case studies of the 1991 Gulf War and 
U.S. policy towards Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 demonstrate that presidents are aware of the 
domestic coalition and design justification strategies to appeal to a broad audience without 
risking backlash. The case studies also allow me to rule out the alternative explanations that the 
White House’s communication strategy is primarily targeted at the international audience or a 
direct reflection of the objectives of military action. The remainder of the project now turns to 
the systematic evaluation of these expectations.  
 
 
 
 
  
 79 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE PATTERN OF HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS 
In the buildup to military action, one of the most important decisions U.S. presidents 
make is how the intervention will be presented to the public. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq 
offers a prime example of the strategy and gravity with which presidential administrations 
approach the choice of justifications for war. Prior to the intervention, Bush asserted that “We 
lead our publics” (Woodward 2004, 296) and to this end developed a justification strategy that 
combined the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with reminders of Saddam 
Hussein’s brutality against his own people. In his radio address, Bush referenced both WMD and 
the Iraqi people, stating, “The burden now is on Iraq’s dictator to disclose and destroy his arsenal 
of weapons. If he refuses, then for the sake of peace, the United States will lead a coalition to 
disarm the Iraqi regime and free the Iraqi people” (G. W. Bush 2003a). Concern for the Iraqi 
people was reinforced by evidence that Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat not only to 
international security, but also to their welfare. After outlining human rights groups’ reports of 
torture and claiming, “The dictator who is assembling the world’s most dangerous weapons has 
already used them on whole villages, leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or 
disfigured,” Bush sent a message to “the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not 
surrounding your country; your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are 
removed from power will be the day of your liberation” (G. W. Bush 2003b). The combination 
of justifications Bush used in the Iraq case was both effective—polls taken days before the 
invasion report that 59 percent of respondents favored taking military action to end Saddam 
Hussein’s rule (Pew 2003)—and controversial, as WMD were not found and critics warned that 
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humanitarian appeals had been misused (Brauman and Salignon 2004; Bellamy 2004; Evans 
2004; Hehir 2008). 
As the Iraq case highlights, the president’s choice of justifications for intervention is 
intentional, important for managing public opinion, and subject to scrutiny and change over the 
course of an intervention. Bush’s use of humanitarian justifications in the context of a 
predominantly security-driven intervention is particularly noteworthy because, as this chapter 
illustrates, it reflects the common and widespread use of humanitarian claims in the post-Cold 
War period. Because justifications are “literally an attempt to connect one’s actions to standards 
of justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of appropriate behavior” (Finnemore 1996a, 
159), conventional wisdom treats humanitarian justifications as synonymous with accepted 
humanitarian interventions. However, Bush’s humanitarian appeal in the context of a military 
operation primarily focused on U.S. security interests demonstrates that the utility of 
humanitarian justifications is not limited to cases of humanitarian intervention. To better 
understand the role that humanitarian justifications play in contemporary U.S. interventions, this 
chapter asks: When do presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications?  
This chapter explains presidents’ justification strategies as a function of the domestic 
audience and composition of potential coalitions of domestic support. I argue that presidents 
have consistently employed justification strategies that appeal a domestic audience with diverse 
foreign policy beliefs. Leaders have an incentive to use humanitarian claims widely to persuade 
cooperative internationalists—the most likely opponents of intervention—but these same 
individuals prevent leaders from over-using humanitarian appeals. This pattern runs counter to 
two alternative explanations for presidents’ justification strategies: 1) that presidents have an 
incentive to use humanitarian claims as often as possible to persuade an emotional and 
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inattentive public (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1922; Mearsheimer 2011), and 2) the expectation 
that national security threats are the most effective means of rallying support from a prudent 
public (Brody 1991; Drezner 2008a; Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992).   
 To evaluate these explanations and illustrate the pattern of justifications in post-Cold War 
interventions, the remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of 
the process through which presidents develop justification strategies to bolster public support and 
presents two alternative hypotheses for the use and emphasis of humanitarian claims. Second, I 
outline the incentives the domestic coalition creates for presidents to use humanitarian claims 
widely while limiting their emphasis. Third, I present criteria for constructing a dataset that 
captures the pattern of humanitarian and security justifications in all potential U.S. interventions 
of the post-Cold War period. A fourth section presents the results and highlights the use and 
emphasis of humanitarian claims over time. Content analysis of national addresses shows that the 
example of Bush’s rhetoric in Iraq is not unique—presidents have used humanitarian 
justifications in every military intervention of the past twenty-five years. However, presidents 
also appear to exercise discretion when using humanitarian claims in security-driven 
interventions, taking care to present national security as the dominant explanation for action. 
Combined, these results provide evidence that the pattern of justifications in the post-Cold War 
period is consistent with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument.  
The Importance of Effective Justifications 
In the buildup to military action, U.S. presidents must decide how to sell the intervention 
to the public and use their platform to make the case that military action is necessary. Presidents 
who undertake military action without public support risk political punishment, either in the 
following election or in their ability to pursue other items on the domestic agenda or through 
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tightened institutional constraints that make it more difficult for leaders to pursue their political 
agendas (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Larson and Savych 
2005; Tomz and Weeks 2013, 850). These constraints influence when and how the U.S. pursues 
military action and presidents have strong incentives to use their informational and first-mover 
advantages to bring public opinion in line with their policy decisions (Berinsky 2009; Druckman 
and Jacobs 2011; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Kernell 1997; Reiter and Stam 2002; Valentino, 
Huth, and Croco 2010; Western 2005, 17).  
Effective justifications are thus a key mediator of the relationship between the president 
and public support for military action—when the public is persuaded by the president’s 
explanation, support for intervention increases and leaders can pursue military action with lower 
political costs. Despite their importance, the content of presidents’ justifications and the 
conditions under which justifications effectively bolster public support remain relatively un-
examined.19 By outlining the pattern and domestic utility of justifications, this chapter sheds light 
on an overlooked link between presidents’ foreign policy choices and public support for 
intervention (Krebs 2015, 15). 
Public Opinion and Justification Strategies 
 Theories of public opinion and military action offer two alternative accounts of how 
presidents develop justification strategies to manage public attitudes towards intervention. First, 
presidents could take an “everything but the kitchen sink “ approach to justifications, using all 
feasible claims as often as possible to placate an impulsive and inattentive public (Almond 1950; 
Carr 1939; Holsti 1992, 440; Lippmann 1922; Mearsheimer 2011; Morgenthau 1951). 
																																																						
19 Krebs (2015) provides a notable exception, but focuses on changes in the overarching grand strategy narrative 
rather than on the effectiveness of different categories of justifications within individual interventions. See also 
(Goddard and Krebs 2015; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007). 
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Alternatively, presidents’ rhetorical choices could be constrained by the facts of the intervention 
and their justifications determined by the specific situation. This explanation is consistent with 
accounts of a prudent public (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998), which would see 
through false justifications, and with the expansion of norms of humanitarian intervention, which 
legitimate military action as a response to humanitarian crises (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 1996a, 
2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 2000). However, these explanations 
are inconsistent with the actual pattern of humanitarian justifications. 
Justifications for an Emotional Public  
Moral appeals are central to arguments that the public does not provide a meaningful 
constraint on military action. Unlike leaders who understand the complexities of foreign policy, 
the public is portrayed as emotional, inconsistent, and easily persuaded by presidential appeals 
(Carr 1939; P. E. Converse 1964; Holsti 1992, 440; Lipset 1988; Morgenthau 1951). From this 
emotional public perspective, presidents are expected to take an “everything but the kitchen 
sink” approach to justifications, using all possible explanations to convince the public to support 
“strategic aims at odds with their own interests rightly understood” (Goddard and Krebs 2015, 
11). Humanitarian justifications are added to security claims because the national interest is 
served by shrewd calculations that do not resonate with the public and force policymakers to 
“camouflage their policies in anti-realist rhetoric” to avoid backlash (Kertzer and McGraw 2012, 
245). Presidents thus consistently use humanitarian appeals to manage public opinion because 
the public always responds positively to these claims. This approach generates the following 
hypothesis about the use of humanitarian justifications: 
H3.1: Presidents use and emphasize humanitarian justifications consistently across all 
potential interventions.  
 
 
 84 
Justifications for a Prudent Public 
 Contrary to an impulsive public that accepts any justifications, presidents could instead 
face an attentive and prudent public. When faced with a potential intervention, this public will 
weigh the costs of action relative to the likelihood of success and the legitimacy of the 
operation’s principle policy objectives (Brody 1991; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 
2009; Geys 2010; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Kriner and Shen 2014). The 
prudent public will respond only to claims that provide additional information about the 
prospects of the intervention and will see through false claims. Humanitarian claims that do not 
reflect conditions on the ground will thus be ineffective and unattractive to presidents outside of 
cases of humanitarian intervention. The prevalence of humanitarian justifications in 
contemporary interventions is thus expected to reflect the increased practice of humanitarian 
intervention following the end of the Cold War (Finnemore 1996a, 2003; Welsh 2004; Wheeler 
2000), in line with the following hypothesis: 
H3.2: Presidents limit their use of humanitarian justifications to interventions with policy 
objectives that are primarily humanitarian.  
 
Justifications for a Diverse Domestic Coalition 
 
The kitchen sink and situational determinants explanations assume that presidents’ 
justifications are designed to reach a single U.S. public that considers the costs and benefits of 
intervention in a uniform way. However, studies of partisanship and foreign policy beliefs 
demonstrate that rather than an “undifferentiated whole” (Berinsky 2007, 977), the U.S. public is 
a diverse audience with foreign policy preferences that vary systematically based on individuals’ 
views of when and how the U.S. should engage in international affairs (Holsti and Rosenau 
1988; Kertzer et al. 2014; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1994; Wittkopf and 
Maggiotto 1983). Connecting presidents’ justification strategies to evidence of heteorgeneity in 
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the domestic audience, I argue that the pattern of presidents’ justifications for military action 
reflects their need to build a broad coalition of approval from a public with diverse foreign policy 
beliefs. Security justifications alone are often insufficient for this coalition building process. 
Instead, presidents also employ humanitarian appeals to persuade the individuals who are most 
likely to form a costly political opposition. Therefore, the combination of security and 
humanitarian explanations evident in Bush’s justifications for the Iraq war is common in 
presidential speeches because it maximizes the potential for domestic support. In security 
interventions, this combination appeals to both individuals with militant internationalist values—
the most consistent supporters of military action—and individuals with cooperative 
internationalist values—those otherwise most likely to actively oppose military action. The 
importance of cooperative internationalists’ support and their response to humanitarian appeals 
creates an incentive for presidents to use humanitarian claims in security and humanitarian 
interventions, which is reflected in the pattern of justifications.  
The Consequences of Coalitions 
 The domestic coalition argument contends that the importance of persuading individuals 
with cooperative internationalist values both requires and constrains the use of humanitarian 
justifications in contemporary interventions. As a result of their broad appeal, presidents should 
have an incentive to use humanitarian claims in security and humanitarian interventions. 
However, the same individuals that make humanitarian claims necessary also constrain their use. 
In particular, cooperative internationalists are sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian appeals as 
a cover for security goals. When humanitarian justifications are stretched beyond their role as 
supplementary explanations for security-driven interventions, they can generate backlash from 
the same individuals they are intended to persuade. The implication for leaders’ justification 
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strategies is that more is not always better when it comes to humanitarian appeals. While 
including humanitarian claims helps build a coalition of domestic support for security-driven 
interventions, their benefits are only realized if security justifications remain prominent. 
Therefore, presidents have an incentive to use humanitarian claims widely but limit their 
emphasis in security interventions. The pattern of justifications in the post-Cold War period is 
expected to reflect this incentive: 
H3.3: Presidents regularly use humanitarian justifications to justify security-driven 
interventions; however, they limit their emphasis of humanitarian appeals in these cases. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes each of the alternative explanations for the pattern of presidents’ 
justifications alongside the observable implications.  The following section presents a research 
design that uses content analysis of presidential speeches to differentiate between the three 
hypotheses and further examine the pattern of humanitarian claims in contemporary 
interventions. 
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Table 3.1 Observable Implications for the Pattern of Justifications 
Explanation  Hypothesized Justification Pattern Observable Implications 
Emotional 
Public 
 
H3.1: Presidents use and 
emphasize humanitarian 
justifications consistently across 
all potential interventions. 
 
 
Humanitarian justifications are used 
and emphasized equally across all 
types of interventions. 
Prudent  
Public 
 
H3.2: Presidents limit their use 
and emphasis of humanitarian 
justifications to interventions with 
policy objectives that are 
primarily humanitarian. 
 
 
Humanitarian justifications are 
present and emphasized only in 
potential humanitarian interventions. 
Domestic 
Coalition 
 
H3.3: Presidents use 
humanitarian justifications 
widely, but limit their emphasis in 
security-driven interventions. 
 
 
Humanitarian justifications are 
present across all intervention types, 
but their emphasis is limited in 
security-driven interventions. 
 
Measuring Justifications in Potential Interventions 
Definitions and Scope Conditions 
 As outlined in Chapter 1, justifications are the public and overt rationale leaders use to 
convince their publics that military action is legitimate, necessary, and worthy of support. 
Regardless of the primary motivation for action, presidents may choose to justify interventions in 
terms of national security or humanitarian concerns. National security justifications reference 
threats to the security of the domestic population or the U.S. national interests. In other words, 
these justifications establish the benefits of the intervention for the U.S. By contrast, 
humanitarian justifications refer to the welfare or protection of foreign civilians and establish 
how intervention will benefit citizens of the target state. These categories of justifications are not 
mutually exclusive and presidents can combine claims and change their emphasis of different 
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categories over the course of an intervention. Building on these definitions, the resulting dataset 
is comprised of humanitarian and security justifications used by U.S. presidents to explain 
potential interventions from 1990 to 2013. 
 In some cases, presidents also evoked a third category of ideological justifications which 
refer to the promotion of democratic institutions and U.S. values. These justifications combine 
aspects of humanitarian and security rationales. Cooperative internationalists are likely to 
respond to the implication that democracy will lead to better representation and quality of life for 
the target state’s citizens. Militant internationalists, by contrast, are likely to be persuaded by the 
association of democratic institutions with regional security and stability. This chapter presents 
descriptive data on the pattern of ideological justifications, but these justifications are not 
included in the main analysis for three reasons. First, ideological concerns alone cannot provide a 
legitimate, internationally accepted justification for military action, which reduces their relative 
influence and ability to provide a pretext for intervention. Second, as the descriptive data shows, 
these claims constitute a minor percentage of all justifications and are not a prominent part of 
presidents’ justification strategies. Third, because these claims are not expected to resonate 
differently with cooperative and militant internationalists, they do not provide added insight into 
the relative influence of the domestic coalition.   
Constructing a Dataset of Potential Interventions 
 Evaluating presidents’ justification strategies first requires defining all cases of 
potentially justified interventions. An analysis focused only on justifications for interventions 
that took place would introduce bias by selecting on the success of the justification strategy. In 
other words, cases that ended in the use of military force were sufficiently well justified to 
generate the public support necessary to initiate military action. Alternatively, examining all 
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crises would include cases in which the president never considered military action or the need to 
build a domestic coalition of support. Therefore, to systematically analyze the pattern of 
humanitarian justifications in contemporary interventions, the first step is to create a dataset of 
all potential interventions that could have been justified to the public. This new dataset of 
potential intervention includes only cases in which there was an increased likelihood of military 
hostilities (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984) and the crisis warranted sufficient public attention 
from the president to create the possibility of an official justification for action. It is thus built on 
the assumption of democratic accountability—for a military intervention to take place, the 
president needs public approval, and before the president can ask the public to support 
intervention he or she must first make sure it is aware of the underlying crisis. 
 The starting point for constructing the dataset was all cases listed in either the UCDP 
Armed Conflict (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) or the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) 
datasets (Palmer et al. 2015). I combined crises from these two sources because UCDP provides 
good coverage of low-level internal conflicts, but omits a number of conflicts that escalated from 
international threats, while the MID data captures international crises, but omits states’ threats 
against their own citizens. When taken together, the two sources provide a comprehensive list of 
intra- and interstate crises for the 1990 to 2013 period. To establish which cases received public 
presidential attention, I then searched the Public Papers of the Presidents database for references 
to crises in either the UCDP or MID data. Cases were included in the new dataset of potential 
interventions if they met each of the following three criteria: 1) the crisis was publicly mentioned 
by the president in an official speech or document; 2) the mention addressed a specific and 
immediate crisis in detail; and 3) the mention implied that the U.S. was willing to take coercive 
action to address the crisis.  
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 1. Public Mention by the President 
 For a conflict to be potentially justified, its existence must first be part of the president’s 
public foreign policy agenda. In other words, the president must make sure that the public knows 
about the crisis before he or she can convince it to care about the crisis. The first criterion—that 
the president mentions the crisis in an official statement or document—is designed to limit the 
dataset to cases in which the crisis was sufficiently high on the president’s foreign policy agenda 
to warrant public attention. While the foreign policy agenda is largely events-driven (Wood and 
Peake 1998), the number of crises included in the UCDP and MID datasets suggest that leaders 
have to prioritize the attention they focus on different events. By searching for references to the 
given crisis in all official documents available through the Public Papers of the Presidents, 
including memoranda, letters to Congress, and news conferences, this strategy captures all cases 
that were salient enough to be publically presented. Including new conferences and exchanges 
with reporters in the search ensures that the dataset captures all issues that were salient enough to 
force a response from the president even if the White House would have preferred to keep the 
issue out of the public sphere. 
 2. Detailing a Specific and Immediate Crisis 
 Given the number of crises, many publicly acknowledged conflicts are not addressed in 
sufficient depth to facilitate a justification for U.S. action. For example, presidents often list 
ongoing conflicts to provide an overview of international affairs, as Clinton (1993b) did in his 
remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement: “As we scan today’s bloodiest 
conflicts, from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to Armenia and Sudan, the dynamics of 
the cold war have been replaced by many of the dynamics of old war.” While this speech 
identified a number of ongoing conflicts, it did not outline details or highlight specific aspects of 
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the conflicts that make them worthy of the U.S. public’s attention. This broad reference to 
multiple crises stands in stark contrast to Clinton’s (1993a) detailed discussion of the situation in 
Iraq, in which he explained, “ We continue to keep the situation in Iraq under close scrutiny. We 
have observed no penetrations by Iraqi aircraft of the No-Fly Zone below 32 degrees north 
latitude since Wednesday’s coalition warning.” Unlike the commencement address, this 
statement identifies both the specific source of concern in the Iraq case and commits the U.S. to 
close and continued attention. The second criterion distinguishes between these two types of 
statements to ensure that the reference reflects detailed and specific attention to a crisis. 
Additionally, the crisis must be immediate, reflecting either the escalation of an ongoing conflict 
or a new conflict. This condition is intended to rule out statements on “the continuation of 
national emergencies.” While the dataset includes the initial declaration of a national emergency 
with respect to the target state, I do not consider the continuation alone to provide sufficient 
evidence that the possibility of military hostilities was substantively heightened relative to the 
previous year.  
 3. Threat of Coercive Action 
 Finally, attention to a crisis does not indicate that the U.S. is ready or willing to take 
military action in the given case. Presidents may express concern about conflicts without 
indicating either that the U.S. has a responsibility to respond or that an appropriate response 
would include military force. The third criterion ensures that the response being justified 
includes the potential for coercive action. Coercion is operationalized as action that would take 
place without the consent of the target state. It includes phrases that: 1) identify an outcome 
towards which the U.S. would like the target state to move, such as “we urge” or “we call on,” 
and 2) are coupled with the possibility of U.S. action as a response, such as “we must not permit” 
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or “all options are on the table.” It excludes presidents’ commitments to work with or offer 
support to the government of the target state to address the conflict. The dataset also excludes 
potential interventions against other nuclear powers based on the assumption that nuclear 
deterrence prevents military intervention from being considered in these cases.  
Content Analysis of Justifications 
 Having established the cases of potential intervention for the post-Cold War period, I 
then collected all national addresses that mentioned a target state for a potential intervention in 
the relevant year. National addresses are defined as any prepared statement given by the 
president in an official capacity that either: 1) were given from the White House, or 2) explicitly 
identified the nation as a whole as the immediate audience. These selection criteria exclude the 
non-prepared portions of news conferences and exchanges with the press—i.e., responses to 
questions following the president’s opening statement—as well as remarks given on the 
campaign trail or at events or fundraisers. They also exclude proclamations and memos to 
Congress that were written rather than spoken communications because different language may 
be used for different modes of communications and because these communications target elites 
in Congress rather than the general public. Commonly included statements are State of the Union 
addresses, weekly radio addresses, the prepared portions of news conferences, and statements on 
events or crises.20 The resulting sample contains 801 speeches from George H.W. Bush, Bill 
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama covering the 24 years from 1990 to 2013. While 
this sample does not capture every presidential justification for military force, it holds constant 
the intended audience and factors such as audience partisanship, connections to the military, and 
location that could influence leaders’ choice of justification. Limiting the sample to prepared 
																																																						
20 A detailed description of the type and frequency of presidential statements is provided in the appendix.  
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remarks also ensures that the justifications used are intentional and reflect a political message the 
White House planned to communicate. 
 From the national addresses, I then randomly sampled five speeches from each year to 
read and code justifications for intervention. Based on this manual coding I created lists of words 
associated with each of the three categories of justifications21—security, humanitarian, or 
ideological—searched the sample for occurrences of these words, and calculated the rate at 
which each word correctly corresponded to its justification category. Phrases that consistently 
and correctly identified the relevant justification22 were included in the dictionaries for each 
category.23  I imported the dictionaries into the Yoshikoder content analysis program (Lowe 
2015) to calculate the number of times presidents used each category of justifications in national 
addresses referencing a case of potential intervention. The resulting unit of analysis is a speech 
addressing a potential intervention.  
Automated content analysis is invaluable for systematically examining the pattern and 
consequences of presidents’ justifications for military action because the volume of text in 
presidential speeches makes comprehensive manual coding infeasible; however, the method 
requires strong assumptions. Most significantly, content analysis assumes a stable 
communication process in which words have the same meaning every time they are used (Krebs 
2015, 301). I follow Krebs’ (2015, 301) suggestions for mitigating concerns about instability by 
“analyzing a narrower range of texts—from a single or relatively homogeneous set of speakers, 
from a relatively short time span, from a single country—and by generating search-terms and 
																																																						
21 These categories were also developed inductively from reading the sampled speeches.  
22 The results reported in this paper use dictionaries of all phrases that correctly identified the relevant justification 
category at least 60% of the time. The tradeoff here is between avoiding counting phrases that do not reflect 
justifications and omitting relevant justifications by using dictionaries that are too narrow.  
23 The dictionary for each category and corresponding percentage of correct mentions is included in the appendix.  
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coding rules based on a context-sensitive reading of select tests and secondary literature.” First, I 
focus on four presidents of a single country within a 24-year period in which the international 
system and the U.S.’s position in it remained relatively stable. This focus assuages concerns 
about major rhetorical shifts or changing points of reference. In other words, these 
administrations had access to similar toolkits of justifications and addressed voting publics with 
some shared historical experiences. Second, the dictionaries used to measure each justification 
category were created based on a context-sensitive manual coding of a sample of speeches and 
their exclusivity to the given justification category.  
Dependent Variables: The Use and Emphasis of Justifications 
 The domestic coalition argument has implications for two dependent variables: the use 
and emphasis of different categories of justifications. Use captures whether the justification is 
included as part of the official rationale for action in a given speech. To map the use of 
justifications across time and different types of interventions I created a binary “use” variable 
that takes the value of one if the given speech includes at least one justification from the relevant 
category and zero otherwise.  
 Emphasis captures the relative prominence of a justification within the speech. It is 
measured as the percentage of all justifications in a given speech that are from the relevant 
category. For example, to calculate the emphasis placed on humanitarian justifications in a 
particular speech, I divided the number of humanitarian justifications by the number of total 
justifications. Measuring emphasis as a percentage of all justifications has two benefits. First, 
recognizing that presidents often combine justifications, emphasis can be used to evaluate which 
category of justification provided the primary explanation for action. Second, dividing by the 
number of total justifications accounts for variation in the length of speeches and the propensity 
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of some presidents to give longer addresses. This approach helps standardize the measure over 
time and presents a more accurate illustration of the pattern of justifications across presidents.  
Independent Variable: Intervention Type 
 The domestic coalition argument contends that presidents have an incentive to use 
humanitarian justifications as often as possible, but expects cooperative internationalists to 
constrain the extent to which leaders can credibly emphasize humanitarian appeals in security-
driven interventions—too few humanitarian justifications will not maximize cooperative 
internationalists’ support; too many humanitarian justifications and this same group will become 
skeptical. If presidents anticipate the need for a broad coalition of support when developing 
justification strategies, they are thus expected to include humanitarian justifications in all cases, 
but to limit their emphasis of humanitarian appeals in security-driven interventions. To this end, 
the main independent variable of interest is the type of potential intervention, either humanitarian 
or security-driven. Drawing on Finnemore’s (2003, 53) definition of humanitarian interventions 
as “deploying military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from 
man-made violence,” potential interventions are coded as humanitarian if U.S. military action 
would address violence that primarily threatened foreign civilians rather than U.S. strategic 
interests. By contrast, security interventions address threats to U.S. national security or regional 
interests.  
 Interventions were sorted into humanitarian or security categories based on news 
coverage of the precipitating crisis prior to the president’s first address.24 This approach ensures 
that the classification of the underlying conflict is both prior and external to the president’s 
choice of justifications. However, the same factor that makes humanitarian justifications worthy 
																																																						
24 A list of the intervention type assigned to each potential intervention is included in the appendix.  
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of study also makes the underlying conflicts inherently difficult to characterize—almost all 
violent conflicts involve a combination of security and humanitarian threats. Here I manage this 
challenge by applying Jentleson and Britton’s (1998) categorization of interventions by primary 
policy objectives to the underlying crisis that precedes intervention. Crises that media coverage 
discusses primarily in terms of threats of cross-border aggression, spillover violence, attacks on 
oil and economic resources, terrorist attacks, or the devolution of power to terrorist groups are 
classified as potential security interventions. Crises discussed primarily in terms of refugees, 
starvation, forced migration, attacks on civilians or civilian areas, human rights violations, or 
threats to democratic institutions are classified as potential humanitarian interventions. If 
justifications are driven by the facts of the crisis, this approach identities the justification strategy 
that represents the path of least resistance and minimizes the president’s risk of being accused of 
using justifications insincerely.  
 Based on these categories, two variables capture the type of intervention referenced in a 
given speech. The “humanitarian case” variable takes the value of one if the speech references a 
potential humanitarian intervention and zero otherwise. Similarly, the “security case” variable 
takes the value of one if the speech references a potential security intervention and zero 
otherwise.  
The Pattern of Justifications 
General Trends 
 The overall pattern of justifications highlights the time and effort U.S. presidents devote 
to publicly justifying potential interventions. On average, post-Cold War presidents gave 33 
speeches addressing potential interventions per year, with a total of 801 speeches over the 1990-
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2013 period, 665 of which include at least one justification for military action.25 However, there 
is variation between presidents and across time in terms of both the quantity of public statements 
and the number of justifications for action. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that George W. Bush both 
gave the largest number of speeches over the course of his presidency and, by extension, also 
offered the most justifications for military action. By contrast—and to be expected given that his 
presidency covered only one term—George H.W. Bush offered the fewest speeches and 
justifications. Between these two extremes, Clinton offered more speeches than Obama, but 
Obama provided more justifications.  
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 Number of Speeches and Justification by President 
 
 The distribution of speeches and justifications among presidents is unsurprising when 
placed in the context of the number of U.S. military interventions that each administration 
oversaw. A closer look at the number of speeches and justifications, offered in Figures 3.3 and 
3.4, reveals that years with the highest number of speeches and justifications map onto incidents 
of major U.S. intervention. In the 1990s, the most speeches were given in 1999 and 1994, 
																																																						
25 There are 136 speeches that referenced a potential intervention but did not justify military action using a phrase 
included in the content analysis dictionaries. Many of these speeches mention the potential intervention briefly, 
without justification, but a small subset of speeches justifies interventions in terms of ideological goals such as 
democracy promotion.  
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respectively. The 1999 spike corresponds with U.S. participation in airstrikes in Kosovo, while 
the 1994 spike corresponds with increasing U.S. involvement in Bosnia, as well as intervention 
in Haiti. In the 2000s, the number of speeches and justifications reached their peak in 2003 when 
the U.S. was involved in ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and began Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. After 2010, the number of speeches and justifications declined, with the exception of 
2011 when the U.S. conducted Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. These descriptive data 
suggest that the dataset of justifications has face validity—both the number of speeches and the 
number of justifications are highest during periods of major U.S. military operations when the 
president is expected to be particularly concerned with providing a public rationale for action to 
maintain public support.  
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 Number of Speeches and Justifications per Year 
 
The Use of Humanitarian Justifications 
Pattern of Humanitarian Justifications 
 Turning to the content of presidents’ statements, the pattern of justifications indicates that 
humanitarian claims make up a substantively significant part of explanations for military action. 
Presidents employed humanitarian claims in more than half—60 percent—of all individual 
speeches justifying a potential intervention. Security justifications were also prevalent across 
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potential interventions. Presidents referenced security concerns in 67 percent of all speeches. As 
Figure 3.5 shows, security justifications were more often the primary explanation for action, but 
presidents have relied on humanitarian appeals in high numbers across the last 25 years. 
Understanding the utility and limits of these justifications thus addresses an important aspect of 
the narrative used to mobilize support for contemporary interventions.  
Figure 3.5 Yearly Trends in the Percentage of Justifications26 
 
While humanitarian claims are present across the post-Cold War period, there is a notable 
dip in their relative emphasis in the early 2000s. However, this decline in emphasis does not 
signal a turn away from humanitarian appeals. Instead, as Figure 3.6 shows, the overall number 
of justifications reached a peak during this period—a reflection of ongoing wars in Afghanistan 
																																																						
26 To illustrate the trend in humanitarian justifications, Figures 3.5-3.7 use a lowess smoother, which takes preceding 
and subsequent values into account for each point. The figures report smoothing with a bandwidth of 0.4, which uses 
40% of the data to smooth each point.  
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and Iraq—and George W. Bush used both security and humanitarian justifications in the greatest 
numbers during 2003. The change in relative emphasis shown in Figure 3.5 thus reflects an 
increase in the presence of security justifications rather than a decrease in the number of 
humanitarian claims.  
 
Figure 3.6 Yearly Trends in the Number of Justifications 
 
 While these patterns indicate that humanitarian justifications were used and emphasized 
across the post-Cold War period, there is also evidence of potentially significant trends over 
time. Explaining time trends in justifications is beyond the scope of this chapter’s focus on 
determining whether the use and emphasis of humanitarian claims is limited to cases of 
humanitarian intervention. It is also not the focus of the broader domestic coalition argument, 
which aims to explain the domestic incentives behind presidents’ consistent use and limited 
emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions rather than the specific amount of 
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humanitarian justifications in a given year. However, the domestic coalition argument contends 
that presidents have an incentive to limit their emphasis of humanitarian claims in security 
interventions and, by extension, can place greater emphasis on these justifications in cases of 
humanitarian intervention. Building on this premise, the argument expects over time variation to 
generally reflect changes in the proportion of potential interventions with primarily humanitarian 
objectives. Figure 3.7 juxtaposes the trend in presidents’ emphasis of humanitarian justifications 
over time with the trend in the percentage of potential interventions each year that would address 
primarily humanitarian concerns. While not an exact match, comparing the two trends illustrates 
that changes in the yearly emphasis of humanitarian justifications roughly corresponds to 
changes in the presence of potential humanitarian interventions.  
Figure 3.7 Trends in Humanitarian Justifications and Potential Humanitarian 
Interventions 
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Use of Justifications by Intervention Type 
 Having established that humanitarian justifications were used throughout the post-Cold 
War period, the question then becomes whether the pattern of these justifications across different 
types of interventions reflects the expectations of the domestic coalition argument. Table 3.2 
summarizes the pattern of justifications by intervention type and confirms that—contrary to the 
prudent public expectation that justifications are determined by the situation—humanitarian 
claims were often used in both humanitarian and security-driven interventions. In fact, presidents 
included humanitarian justifications in the majority of their speeches, regardless of the type of 
intervention. The widespread use of humanitarian justifications in both humanitarian and security 
interventions is consistent with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument. 
Table 3.2 Summary of Included Justifications by Intervention Type 
Speeches Including: Humanitarian 
Interventions 
Security 
Interventions 
Humanitarian 
Justifications 
184 
(71%) 
330 
(57%) 
 
Security  
Justifications 
 
155 
(59%) 
412 
(71%) 
No Justifications 42 
(16%) 
96 
(17%) 
Total 261 579 
Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 because speeches can include both 
humanitarian and security justifications.  
 
The Emphasis of Humanitarian Justifications 
 The common use of humanitarian justifications supports the first expectation of the 
domestic coalition hypothesis and rules out the prudent public alternative. However, the 
domestic coalition argument also expects that the same pressure to persuade cooperative 
internationalists reflected in the widespread use of humanitarian appeals also constrains the 
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emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions. A closer analysis of the emphasis 
placed on humanitarian justifications is required to confirm this hypothesis and rule out the 
emotional public alternative. Table 3.3 shows that, on average, presidents placed considerably 
less emphasis on humanitarian justifications in speeches that addressed potential security 
interventions. Contrary to the emotion public hypothesis which expects the White House to take 
a kitchen sink approach to justifications, presidents do not use humanitarian claims as often as 
possible. Instead, they appear to exercise discretion in their choice of primary justifications based 
on whether the potential intervention was humanitarian or security driven. This pattern is 
consistent with presidents concerned with bringing cooperative internationalists into the 
domestic coalition while avoiding the risk of backlash from these same individuals.  
Table 3.3 Average Emphasis of Justifications per Speech 
by Intervention Type 
 Humanitarian 
Interventions 
Security 
Interventions 
Humanitarian 
Justifications 
0.52 
(0.40) 
0.29 
(0.35) 
 
Security 
Justifications 
 
0.32 
(0.36) 
 
0.54 
(0.40) 
N 261 579 
Note: Table reports the mean percentage of justifications in a 
given speech that reference humanitarian or security concerns. 
Standard deviations reported in parentheses.  
 
 In sum, the pattern of justifications reveals that humanitarian claims are common across 
humanitarian and security-driven interventions, but their emphasis is limited in security-driven 
cases. These findings are consistent with the argument that presidents use humanitarian claims 
because they anticipate the need for a broad coalition of domestic support, but temper their 
emphasis of humanitarian appeals in security interventions to avoid backlash. The results 
indicate that more is not always better when it comes to humanitarian justifications and 
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contradict the expectations of both the prudent and emotional public explanations, as 
summarized in Table 3.1 above.  
Ideological Justifications 
 In addition to humanitarian and security justifications, presidents also use ideological 
explanations—references to the protection or promotion of democracy and U.S. values—to make 
the case for military action. However, as Figure 3.8 illustrates, the prominence of ideological 
justifications falls far short of humanitarian and security appeals. These justifications peaked in 
2005 when the U.S. was engaged in democracy promotion efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
were used in only 35 percent of speeches addressing potential humanitarian interventions and 36 
percent of speeches addressing potential security interventions. Additionally, as Figure 3.9 
shows, even in 2005—their maximum point—ideological justifications accounted for less than a 
quarter of all justifications used to make the case for military action. Ideological claims are thus 
part of the president’s rhetorical toolkit, but are not a central component of justification 
strategies.  
Figure 3.8 Number of Ideological, Humanitarian, and Security Justifications by Year 
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Figure 3.9 Emphasis of Ideological Justifications 
 
Conclusion 
 The pattern of justifications for potential interventions shows that presidents across the 
post-Cold War period spent considerable time and effort presenting military action to the public. 
Additionally, humanitarian justifications are a central and commonly used part of presidents’ 
attempts to make the public case for intervention. Conventional wisdom has assumed that 
presidents have incentives use humanitarian claims in security-driven interventions either always 
or very rarely, but content analysis of national addresses indicates that the actual pattern of 
justifications falls between these two extremes. Presidents employ humanitarian claims in the 
majority of their speeches on potential interventions, but consistently limit the emphasis placed 
on humanitarian appeals in security-driven cases. This pattern of justifications is consistent with 
the domestic coalition argument, which asserts that presidents’ justification strategies are both 
driven and constrained by cooperative internationalists. 
 However, while presidents use humanitarian justifications in a pattern consistent with the 
domestic coalition argument, content analysis of statements cannot determine whether this 
pattern resonates with the public. Instead, a number of questions remain. Do individuals’ foreign 
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policy preferences influence how they respond to justifications for military action? Under what 
conditions do humanitarian justifications have a positive effect on public support for 
intervention? Do individuals impose political costs on leaders who misuse humanitarian claims? 
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, turn to individual-level data collected from survey experiments to 
address these questions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WHO RESPONDS TO HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS? 
In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush explained 
the 2001 U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan as “a sustained campaign to drive the 
terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice” (G. W. Bush 2001). However, 
Bush immediately followed this security rationale with a humanitarian appeal, saying “At the 
same time, we are showing the compassion of America by delivering food and medicine to the 
Afghan people, who are, themselves, the victims of a repressive regime” (G. W. Bush 2001). 
Bush’s use of humanitarian justifications in the Afghanistan case offers yet another example of 
their puzzling presence in contemporary interventions because the operation already had 
unprecedented levels of public support—90 percent of respondents supported military action 
(Cable News Network 2001) even though 82 percent correctly anticipated this was the beginning 
of a long and costly war (ABC News/Washingon Post 2001). The presence of humanitarian 
justifications in popular security interventions like this one is particularly surprising given 
evidence that the U.S. public is more likely to support realist goals that protect U.S. national 
security (Drezner 2008; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Kertzer and McGraw 2012) and "does not 
appear to care enough about human rights to invest significant American resources" (McFarland 
and Mathews 2005, 308). If the public as a whole prefers security rationales, who responds to 
humanitarian justifications?  
 The pattern of U.S. presidents’ justifications outlined in the previous chapter shows that 
humanitarian claims are neither a consistent moral window dressing designed to placate an 
emotional public nor limited to cases of humanitarian crisis in which the U.S. has no clear 
national interests at stake. Instead, presidents appear to use humanitarian appeals as a central part 
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of their justification strategies and to deploy these claims in calculated ways. However, the 
presence of humanitarian justifications alone is insufficient to determine whether these appeals 
affect public support for military action. Leaders could be incorrect in their assessment of public 
opinion—either because concern with foreign civilians resonates more with elites than the public 
(Drezner 2008) or because the salience of humanitarian appeals has declined over time—and use 
humanitarian rhetoric unnecessarily. In this chapter I draw on a series of survey experiments to 
demonstrate that humanitarian appeals play an important role in mobilizing public support—
even in popular security interventions—because these claims resonate with cooperative 
internationalists who are a source of politically costly opposition. The goal of the experiments is 
to investigate whether cooperative internationalists’ response to humanitarian claims makes the 
support of these individuals a feasible explanation for the pattern of justifications outlined in 
Chapter 3.  
 The chapter proceeds by laying out the conventional wisdom on public attitudes towards 
military interventions, which cannot account for the prevalence of humanitarian justifications. It 
then outlines the expectations for how a disaggregated domestic audience responds to alternative 
justifications for war and presents an experimental design to test these expectations. The results 
of the survey experiments show that while there are costs to including humanitarian claims, these 
justifications significantly increase support among individuals with cooperative internationalist 
values who are politically engaged and less persuaded by security rationales. I then consider how 
justifications change respondents’ views of the president and concerns about intervention and 
investigate the relative weight individuals assign to humanitarian claims when they are used in 
combination with security justifications. The following section presents the results of 
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manipulation and robustness checks and the final section outlines the implications of these 
findings for the domestic coalition argument.  
Public Attitudes Towards Military Intervention 
 Gaining the public’s consent for military action is critical in democracies because a 
dissatisfied domestic audience can make it difficult for the White House to pursue its political 
agenda in the short-term and can vote the president and his party out of office in the long-term 
(Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; Tomz and Weeks 2013). To date, studies of public 
attitudes towards the use of force have focused on how individuals respond to details about the 
expected costs and outcomes of interventions. This research demonstrates that, all else equal, the 
public is most likely to support military action when the risk of casualties and financial costs is 
low and the prospect of success is high (Eichenberg 2005; Flores-Macias and Kreps 
forthcoming; Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Geys 2010; Kriner and Shen 2014; 
Mueller 1973). Multilateral approval and the intervention’s primary objectives act as signals that 
allow the public to make inferences about an intervention’s costs and consequences (Jentleson 
1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Grieco et al. 2011; Thompson 2006; Voeten 2001). Gelpi, 
Feaver, and Reifler (2009, 20) synthesize these factors to argue that “support for continuing a 
military operation (or, for that matter, starting such an operation) in the face of mounting combat 
casualties is a function of the interactive effect of two underlying attitudes: expectations about 
the likelihood that the military operation will be a success and belief in the initial rightness of the 
decision to launch the military operation.” 
 Presidents have a unique ability to influence the perceived rightness of interventions; 
however, less attention has been paid to how the public responds to presidents’ efforts to frame 
their decision to take military action (Aldrich et al. 2006, 496; Berinsky and Druckman 2007; 
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Druckman and Jacobs 2015). Presidents’ public justifications provide frames for the intervention 
that encourage the public to emphasize humanitarian or security concerns when evaluating 
military action (Chong and Druckman 2007, 637). Presidents’ information advantages on matters 
of foreign policy make their frames especially important and give leaders considerable leeway to 
set the terms of the debate about the costs and benefits of using military force (M. Baum and 
Groeling 2010; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). In particular, successful justification strategies bolster 
public support and stifle dissent by leaving “opponents without access to the rhetorical materials 
needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal” (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 36). As a result, 
understanding how humanitarian and security justifications for action bolster or undercut public 
support is central to the study of how leaders prepare domestic audiences for war. 
 Consistent with the alternative explanations outlined in Chapter 3, accounts of public 
attitudes towards military action also provide competing expectations for how individuals 
respond to justifications that frame intervention in humanitarian terms. On one hand, 
humanitarian justifications can evoke impulsive and emotional concerns about foreign civilians 
and generate high levels of public support that give leaders an incentive to use this frame as often 
as possible. Alternatively, if public support for interventions is driven by concerns about U.S. 
national security, the absence of clear security threats in humanitarian frames will make them 
less effective than security explanations.  
The Emotional Public’s Humanitarian Impulses 
 Early accounts of public opinion present the public as an inattentive mass that responds 
impulsively and positively to the emotions evoked by humanitarian and moral appeals (Almond 
1950; Carr 1939; Lippmann 1955; Morgenthau 1951, 1978). This emotional response is used as 
evidence that the public cannot be trusted with complex foreign policy decisions and is the 
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individual-level implication of the emotional public hypothesis tested in Chapter 3. In the post-
Cold War environment, increased international and media attention to humanitarian crises 
heightened fears that the public’s humanitarian impulse could push the U.S. into ill-advised 
conflicts. In particular, technological changes coupled with the development of norms of 
humanitarian intervention raised the prospect of a CNN effect in which “real-time 
communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and 
political elites to global events” (Robinson 1999, 301). Concern with the public’s emotional 
response to humanitarian crises peaked following U.S. actions to protect the Kurds in northern 
Iraq in 1991 and intervention in Somalia in 1993, as both cases “appeared to involve graphic and 
emotive media reporting of suffering people influencing policy-makers to conduct humanitarian 
interventions” (Robinson 2011, 3). Taken as a whole, this view implies that the public responds 
both uniformly and positively to humanitarian claims, consistent with the following hypothesis: 
H4.1: In the aggregate, public support is highest in response to humanitarian 
justifications. 
 
The Prudent Public’s Realpolitik Preferences 
 The view of the public as impulsive and sensitive to emotional appeals is challenged by 
evidence that the U.S. domestic audience holds realpolitik preferences, often associated with 
realist elites, that emphasize the protection of U.S. national security interests (Drezner 2008; 
Kertzer and McGraw 2012). Drezner (2008, 63) contends that when it comes to the use of force, 
the U.S. public is “leery about liberal-style interventions” and “consistently place realist foreign 
policy objectives—the securing of energy supplies, homeland security—as top foreign policy 
priorities.” These findings are in line with evidence that support is higher for interventions in 
pursuit of national security objectives than for humanitarian missions (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 
63). A public with realpolitik preferences for U.S. foreign policy is the individual-level iteration 
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of Chapter 3’s prudent public hypothesis and is expected to consent only to interventions that 
protect U.S. national security and promote U.S. national interests. These limits to the availability 
of public consent act as a check on the president’s ability to pursue aggressive or ill-advised 
foreign policies (Jentleson 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Reiter 2012; Russett 1993). A public 
focused on protecting the national interest will be most convinced by justifications that reference 
threats to U.S. national security. By contrast, from this perspective humanitarian claims should 
do little to bolster public support for military action. This account of public attitudes presents the 
following hypothesis:  
H4.2: In the aggregate, public support for humanitarian justifications is lower than 
support for security justifications.  
 
Justifications for a Diverse Domestic Coalition 
 Despite their divergent expectations about the public’s response to humanitarian appeals, 
both of the previous accounts are based on the implicit assumption that the public reacts 
uniformly to the presidents’ claims and, as a result, they cannot explain the pattern of 
justifications outlined in Chapter 3. By contrast, the domestic coalition argument implies that 
there is no such thing as a one-size-fits all justification. Instead, individuals’ underlying foreign 
policy beliefs systematically influence how they respond to humanitarian and security 
justifications for the use of force. Outlined in detail in Chapter 2, studies of foreign policy beliefs 
divide the public into three categories—militant internationalists, cooperative internationalists, 
and isolationists—based on individuals’ attitudes towards U.S. engagement in international 
affairs and preferences for the form this engagement should take (Kertzer et al. 2014; 
Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Wittkopf 1986, 1994; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). As 
Chapter 2 argues, cooperative internationalists are the key target audience for presidents’ 
justifications. These individuals can sustain long-term support for intervention, but are skeptical 
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of the use of military force. As a result, presidents will have to work to persuade cooperative 
internationalists that military action is necessary and prudent. This group stands in contrast to 
militant internationalists who offer consistently high support for intervention in pursuit of either 
security or humanitarian objectives. Militant internationalists thus form the base of support for 
intervention and are expected to be easily persuaded by any type of presidential justification. 
Alternatively, isolationists do not offer long-term support for military action, regardless of the 
justification, but also are not a politically costly source of opposition. Taking foreign policy 
beliefs into account, the importance of persuading cooperative internationalists raises the 
question: under what conditions do justifications resonate with these individuals? 
 Cooperative internationalists are defined by their support for active engagement in 
international affairs and their preference for the diplomatic or multilateral pursuit of 
humanitarian objectives (Wittkopf 1990). These beliefs capture “the distinction between the self 
and other in international affairs” (Kertzer et al. 2014, 829). As a result, individuals with 
cooperative internationalist values are more likely to respond to foreign policy objectives 
presented in terms of concern for others, the mechanism that underlies support for humanitarian 
interventions more broadly (Kreps and Maxey Forthcoming). Building on these value 
dimensions, I expect that in the absence of an overwhelming threat or direct attack security 
justifications, which emphasize the protection of one’s own security and interests, will have 
limited resonance with cooperative internationalists. By contrast, humanitarian justifications 
focus on the protection and promotion of the welfare of foreign civilians and therefore directly 
evoke concern with harm done to others. I thus expect humanitarian claims to most effectively 
bolster support for intervention among individuals with cooperative internationalist values.  
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 Humanitarian claims are a particularly attractive rhetorical choice because they allow 
presidents to mobilize cooperative internationalists while still appealing to militant 
internationalists. Militant internationalists favor an active role for the U.S. in the world and view 
military force as an effective means for pursuing foreign policy objectives (Kertzer et al. 2014, 
830). Based on their belief that military strength facilitates foreign policy success, these 
individuals will consistently support leaders’ efforts to solve international problems—either 
security or humanitarian—with military action. I therefore expect both security and humanitarian 
justifications to bolster the support of individuals with militant internationalists beliefs. Taken as 
a whole, their ability to resonate with both cooperative and militant internationalists indicates 
that humanitarian justifications mobilize the broadest plausible coalition of domestic supporters.  
 While humanitarian justifications have the potential to influence all internationalists, 
neither humanitarian nor security claims consistently persuade isolationists. Isolationists are 
defined by their preference for disengagement from international affairs, “a tendency manifested 
in opposition to both foreign military interventions and the projection of American force 
constitutive of MI [militant internationalism], as well as hostility to globalist policies such as 
humanitarian aid and multilateral cooperation characteristic of CI [cooperative internationalism]” 
(Kertzer et al. 2014, 831). Because they do not approve of intervention in pursuit of any foreign 
policy objectives, I expect isolationists to offer the lowest levels of support for both humanitarian 
and security justifications. Regardless of the president’s justification strategy, unless the U.S. is 
immediately and obviously under attack, isolationists are thus an unlikely and unsustainable 
source of support for intervention. However, because these individuals are also expected to be 
the least politically engaged and “are not so much opposed as they are nonsupportive” 
(Schneider 1983, 43), the absence of their support poses few political costs.  
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 In sum, the domestic coalition argument expects individuals’ underlying foreign policy 
beliefs to systematically influence how they respond to alternative justification strategies. 
Security justifications influence militant internationalists, but humanitarian justifications 
maximize support from both militant and cooperative internationalists. Presidents’ widespread 
use of humanitarian claims across humanitarian and security interventions, illustrated in Chapter 
3, thus bolsters the potential support of internationalists and helps build a stable domestic 
coalition. This argument presents the following hypotheses: 
H4.3a: Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of humanitarian justifications 
than security justifications.  
 
H4.3b: Militant internationalists offer high levels of support regardless of the type of 
justification. 
 
H4.3c: Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of the type of justification. 
 
H4.3d: Cooperative internationalists are more politically engaged than isolationists.  
 
Gauging the Public’s Response: Research Design 
 The analysis of presidents’ justifications for potential interventions in Chapter 3 clarifies 
the pattern of official rhetoric and indicates that leaders speak as though they have an incentive 
to use humanitarian claims in all potential interventions. However, the analysis of national 
addresses does not consider whether humanitarian appeals are successful or work the way the 
domestic coalition argument expects. Here, I employ survey experiments to provide a more 
direct test of how individuals respond to humanitarian claims and investigate the extent to which 
individuals’ foreign policy beliefs influence the justifications they find persuasive. The 
experiments vary both the justifications used to explain a hypothetical intervention and whether 
experts agreed with or disputed the president’s rationale for action. An experimental approach is 
necessary in this case because it controls the information respondents receive about a potential 
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intervention and separates support for different types of justifications from respondents’ approval 
of the current president. While observational data collected in the context of ongoing 
interventions is invaluable for measuring public support for specific conflicts, existing survey 
and polling data cannot account for the full range of justifications and intervention frames to 
which respondents have been exposed.  
Measuring Foreign Policy Beliefs 
Before receiving information about the hypothetical intervention, respondents answered a 
series of demographic questions and an item that probed the foreign policy beliefs theoretically 
expected to influence how individuals respond to justifications. The indicators for cooperative 
and militant internationalism are drawn from the standard measures of foreign policy orientations 
validated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix) and the measure of isolationism is drawn from the 
Chicago Council Survey questions used by Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979, 42–43).27 
Previous studies rely on a battery of foreign policy questions that are then collapsed into 
measures of internationalism or isolationism. However, in the experimental context, asking 
extended batteries of questions in addition to the treatment has significant shortcomings. First, 
presenting respondents with multiple questions about foreign policy can prime their approach to 
intervention and bias responses to the treatment scenario (J. M. Converse and Presser 1986, 39–
40). Second, requiring respondents to answer a long series of questions, before or after the 
treatment scenario, increases the likelihood that they will satisfice and give non-meaningful 
responses to either the treatment or the foreign policy questions (McDermott 2011, 33).  
Instead, building on the items evaluated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix, 3–4), I 
developed three indicators that gauge whether respondents identify most with cooperative 
																																																						
27 The measure of isolationism is also consistent with the ANES question used by Kertzer (2013) in his study of 
isolationists and foreign policy mood. 
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internationalist, militant internationalist, or isolationist beliefs. Individuals were coded as holding 
cooperative internationalist beliefs if they thought “It is essential for the United States to work 
with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.” 
Respondents with militant internationalist values agreed that “It is important for the United 
States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace” and those with isolationist beliefs 
selected “It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs.” The survey 
randomized the order of these response options.  
To mitigate the risk of priming individuals’ responses to the experimental treatments, the 
foreign policy belief question was included with other demographic items at the beginning of the 
survey. Additionally, the question wording probed general beliefs about the role of the U.S. in 
the world rather than specific beliefs about military interventions. Measuring foreign policy 
beliefs at the beginning of the survey also ensured that respondents’ treatment assignment did not 
influence their reported foreign policy preferences.   
Treatment Conditions: Justifications for Intervention 
 Following the demographic and foreign policy questions, the survey experiment 
randomly assigned respondents to read quotes in which a hypothetical president advocated for 
intervention using one of three categories of justifications—humanitarian, security, or a 
combination of humanitarian and security claims—summarized in Table 4.1. First, the survey 
informed participants that the scenario was hypothetical, but “reflects actions taken by presidents 
from both political parties and is NOT about any specific country in the news today.” In each 
condition respondents were then told that “Over the last few months, a violent conflict has 
developed in the country of Numar” and that they were reading excerpts from a hypothetical 
president’s address to the nation about this conflict. In the humanitarian condition, the president 
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called for intervention because the foreign regime posed a threat to “its own civilians, including 
innocent women and children” and had “killed thousands of its own people and directly targeted 
civilians.” In the security condition, the president called for action against a foreign regime that 
posed a threat to “the security of the United States, including the American people” because it 
had “created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States.” The quotes for the 
combined condition reported that military action was necessary because the foreign regime 
presented a threat to “its own civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a 
safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people.”28  
Table 4.1 Experimental Treatments 
 
Condition: 
Numar poses a grave 
threat to… It has… The safety of… 
Humanitarian 
…its own civilians, 
including innocent 
women and children. 
…killed thousands of 
its own people and 
directly targeted 
civilians. 
…Numar’s civilians 
is at stake and we 
must act. 
Security 
…the security of the 
United States, 
including the 
American people. 
…created a safe 
haven for terrorists 
and threatened the 
United States. 
…the United States is 
at stake and we must 
act. 
Combined 
…its own civilians 
and the security of 
the United States. 
…created a safe 
haven for terrorists 
and killed thousands 
of its own people. 
…Numar’s civilians 
and the United States 
is at stake and we 
must act.  
 
The content of the quotations was designed to mirror the rhetoric used by all four post-
Cold War presidents to make the case for interventions in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Libya. Drawing on the rhetoric used in past interventions increases the external validity 
of the treatments. It helps ensure that the quotes reflect common rhetorical conventions and 
justifications presidents have actually used to explain military actions. Additionally, combining 
																																																						
28 See the appendix for the full text of the quotes and the survey instrument, as well as findings from a control 
scenario. The design is loosely based on Tomz (2007), Tomz and Weeks (2013), and Trager and Vavreck (2011). 
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the claims of Democratic and Republican leaders makes it more difficult for respondents to 
associate the justifications with a particular political party.  
Information from Experts 
 Following the hypothetical president’s statement, respondents were told that experts 
either publicly agreed or publicly disputed the president’s reasons for intervention. Bullet points 
then summarized both the president’s justification for action and the extent to which it 
corresponded with or diverged from the experts’ account. The combination of presidential and 
expert explanations creates the ten experimental conditions summarized in Table 4.2. Including 
expert opinions acknowledges that individuals receive information about interventions from 
multiple sources and that the president’s account of an intervention must compete with elite and 
media discourse. In this chapter, I focus on the sincere conditions in which experts agreed with 
the president’s explanation for action to evaluate support for alternative justifications. However, 
the experiment also included insincere and illegitimate conditions. In the insincere condition, 
experts disagreed with the president’s public justification for action but believed he had a 
legitimate reason for intervention. Respondents in the illegitimate condition were told that 
experts both disagreed with the president’s justification and thought action would only promote 
the president’s own political interest. Chapter 5 further leverages the insincere and illegitimate 
treatments to investigate the extent to which humanitarian justifications can be used as a false 
pretense to bolster support for security-driven or illegitimate interventions.  
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Table 4.2 Experimental Conditions (President’s Justifications/Experts’ Explanation) 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere Humanitarian/ Humanitarian 
Security/  
Security 
Security and Humanitarian/ 
Security and Humanitarian 
Insincere Humanitarian/ Security 
Security/ 
Humanitarian 
Security and 
Humanitarian/ 
Security 
Security and 
Humanitarian/ 
Humanitarian 
Illegitimate 
Humanitarian/ 
President’s Political 
Agenda 
Security/ 
President’s Political 
Agenda 
Security and 
Humanitarian/President’s Political 
Agenda 
 
After providing information about the president’s justifications and experts’ explanations, 
the survey probed participants’ support for the hypothetical intervention and their willingness to 
take action to express their opinion about the use of force. Along with additional demographic 
questions and measures of expected intervention outcomes, the follow-up questions included a 
manipulation check (Mutz and Pemantle 2015; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidnko 2009) that 
examined respondents’ ability to recall how the president justified the intervention.  
The experiment was fielded using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to a sample of 
1,571 U.S. adults in July 2016. MTurk samples are not nationally representative—respondents 
are on average more educated, liberal, and likely to be female than the general population 
(Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). However, in addition to evidence that MTurk samples can 
produce treatment effects roughly comparable to national samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 
2012; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014), the same characteristics that are shown to be 
over-represented in MTurk samples are also more likely to be associated with cooperative 
internationalist values. In the context of this study, this platform helped ensure the group of 
interest—cooperative internationalists—was sufficiently represented in the sample to facilitate 
subgroup analysis.  
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Respondent Demographics: Who Are the Cooperative Internationalists? 
 Respondents’ self-reported foreign policy beliefs confirm that individuals with 
cooperative internationalist values made up the largest proportion of the sample. Of the 1,517 
participants, 56 percent reported cooperative internationalist beliefs, 28 percent chose the 
militant internationalist indicator, and 16 percent expressed isolationist sentiments. The 
percentage of cooperative internationalists in this sample is in line with the average number of 
Chicago Council Survey respondents who selected cooperative internationalists policies as “very 
important” foreign policy goals (see Chapter 2).  
 Compared to militant internationalists and isolationists, the group of cooperative 
internationalists contained more women, liberals, Democrats, and individuals with at least a 
college education. By contrast, the militant internationalist group included a higher number of 
conservatives, Republicans, and religious individuals than the other foreign policy orientations. 
The isolationist category consisted of more men and individuals without a college degree. Table 
4.3 summarizes the demographic information for each category of foreign policy beliefs. 
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Table 4.3 Demographic Information by Foreign Policy Belief  
 Cooperative 
Internationalist 
Militant 
Internationalist Isolationist 
All 
Respondents 
Gender 
(0=Female; 1=Male) 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.44 
Education 
(0=Less than 
College; 1=College) 
0.55 0.51 0.46 0.52 
Religion 
(1=Not Important; 
5=Very Important) 
2.80 3.68 2.74 3.03 
Ideology 
(1=Conservative; 
7=Liberal) 
4.96 3.26 4.14 4.36 
Party ID 
(1=Republican; 
7=Democrat) 
4.94 3.44 4.14 4.39 
N 850 419 243 1510 
 
Political Engagement 
 In addition to the standard demographic questions, the survey also gauged respondents’ 
levels of political engagement. The domestic coalition argument contends that cooperative 
internationalists are an important target audience for presidents’ justifications because these 
individuals are both skeptical of military action and politically engaged. This combination of 
skepticism and engagement suggests that cooperative internationalists are the most likely source 
of vocal and politically costly domestic opposition to military action. Like cooperative 
internationalists, militant internationalists are also expected to be politically active, but their 
consistent support for military action makes them an unlikely source of dissent. Alternatively, 
isolationists do not support interventions, but their lack of political engagement makes them a 
low-risk opposition. The theory thus implies that cooperative and militant internationalists are 
more politically engaged than isolationists (hypothesis 4.3d). To evaluate this observable 
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implication, the survey included three questions related to individuals’ level of engagement with 
politics and foreign policy decisions. 
First, to determine how likely individuals were to become vocal opponents of 
intervention, the survey presented respondents with a list of activities and asked them to select 
any actions they would be willing to take to express their opinion about the intervention. The 
order of the response options was randomized and included: 1) use social media to express my 
opinion about the military action; 2) sign a petition about the military action; 3) write a letter to 
the editor of my local newspaper expressing my opinion about the military action; 4) contact my 
Member of Congress to express my opinion about the military action; 5) participate in a rally 
about the military action; and 6) none of the above. I then used the total number of actions each 
individual selected to create an additive index of potential opposition that ranges from zero to 
five. When they opposed the hypothetical intervention, individuals with cooperative 
internationalists values, on average, were willing to take a significantly higher number of actions 
to express their opposition than militant internationalists or isolationists.29 Cooperative 
internationalists were willing to take an average of 1.69 actions to express their opposition, 
compared to 1.35 actions for militant internationalists and 1.49 actions for isolationists. 
Similarly, the modal response for cooperative internationalists was two actions, compared to zero 
actions for militant internationalists and one action for isolationists. Substantively these results 
indicate that the average individual with cooperative internationalist beliefs takes one more 
action to express his or her opposition to intervention than the average militant internationalist or 
isolationist. However, the findings for this measure of political engagement do not support the 
hypothesis that militant internationalists are more vocal in their opposition than isolationists. 
																																																						
29 For the difference between cooperative and militant internationalists, p=0.01. For the difference between 
cooperative internationalists and isolationists, p=0.08.  
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Instead, militant internationalists reported the lowest level of willingness to express their 
opinions about intervention. Table 4.4 below outlines the percentage of respondents willing to 
take each type of action based on their foreign policy beliefs.   
 
Table 4.4 Opposed and Willing to Take Action by Foreign Policy Belief 
 Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
All 
Respondents 
Social 
Media 
47% 39% 47% 46% 
 
Petition 
 
 
55% 
 
42% 
 
51% 
 
52% 
Letter to 
the Editor 
 
10% 13% 10% 11% 
Contact 
Member of 
Congress 
 
38% 31% 27% 34% 
Rally 
 
18% 11% 15% 16% 
None of the 
Above 
 
24% 32% 26% 26% 
Index Score 1.69 1.35 1.49 1.58 
N 483 141 195 820 
Table reports the percentage of respondents who opposed intervention that were 
willing to take each type of action. The index score reports the average number 
of actions individuals who opposed intervention were willing to take.  
 
 In addition to taking action to oppose intervention, the survey also probed respondents’ 
levels of political engagement with measures of attention to politics and past voting behavior. As 
before, the domestic coalition argument expects that internationalists are more attentive to 
politics and more likely to have voted in the past election than isolationists. Participants’ 
responses offer support for these expectations. On average, both militant and cooperative 
internationalists reported keeping track of politics several times a week or daily, while the 
average isolationist paid attention to politics a few times a week or less. Internationalists also 
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reported voting in the last general election in significantly higher numbers than isolationists. 
More than 70 percent of cooperative and militant internationalists voted in 2012, compared to 
only 57 percent of isolationists. Table 4.5 presents the results for individuals’ attention to the 
news and past voting behavior.  
Table 4.5 Attention to News and 2012 Vote by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
How often would you say 
you get news about politics 
from TV, radio, 
newspaper, or online 
outlets? 
Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
All 
Respondents 
 A couple of times a 
month or less (1) 
 
6% 6% 7% 7% 
 Once a week (2) 
 
12% 11% 11% 11% 
 2-3 times a week (3) 
 
22% 22% 23% 23% 
 Daily (4) 
 
39% 37% 37% 37% 
 Several times a day (5) 
 
22% 24% 21% 21% 
 Average 3.58 3.61 3.34 3.55 
Did you vote in the 2012 
general election?     
 Yes 
 
71% 73% 57% 69% 
 No 29% 27% 43% 31% 
N 850 419 243 1,512 
 
Taken as a whole, the findings indicate that both militant and cooperative 
internationalists are engaged in politics; however, militant internationalists are unlikely to oppose 
military action and do not pose a threat to stable domestic coalitions. Isolationists are more likely 
than militant internationalists to actively oppose intervention, but these individuals are less 
attentive politics and their lower voting rate suggests their discontent is unlikely to become a 
problem at the polls. By contrast, cooperative internationalists are willing to take action to 
express their opposition in the highest numbers and are sufficiently attentive to politics to react 
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quickly to potential interventions and threaten leaders’ prospects for reelection. This unique 
combination of traits makes their support critical for managing the political costs of military 
action and sustaining interventions and is consistent with the argument that cooperative 
internationalists are the most important target audience for presidents’ justifications. 
Justifications and Support 
 Having established cooperative internationalists as a key source of costly domestic 
dissent, the question then becomes: what types of justifications help presidents bolster support 
for intervention among these individuals? The domestic coalition argument produces two sets of 
expectations for how individuals will respond to alternative justifications based on their foreign 
policy beliefs. First, the combination of humanitarian and security justifications is expected to 
generate support from both cooperative and militant internationalists. Second, the inclusion of 
humanitarian justifications should have the greatest influence on support among cooperative 
internationalists who otherwise offer lower levels of approval for military interventions. These 
hypotheses stand in contrast to alternative explanations that assume a homogeneous public and 
expect individuals to offer either consistently higher or lower support for humanitarian 
justifications, regardless of their underlying foreign policy beliefs. Table 4.6 summarizes the 
hypotheses associated with each explanation that are tested in the following subsection. 
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Table 4.6 Expected Public Responses to Justifications 
Explanation Hypothesis 
Emotional Public 
 
H4.1: In the aggregate, public support is highest in response to 
humanitarian justifications. 
 
Prudent Public 
 
H4.2: In the aggregate, public support for humanitarian 
justifications is lower than support for security justifications. 
 
Domestic Coalition 
 
H4.3a: Cooperative internationalists are more supportive of 
humanitarian justifications than security justifications. 
 
 
H4.3b: Militant internationalists offer high levels of support 
regardless of the type of justification. 
 
 
H4.3c: Isolationists offer low levels of support regardless of the 
type of justification. 
 
 
The Magnitude of Support 
 Comparing levels of support across the three sincere categories of justifications—
humanitarian, security, and combined—Figure 4.1 reveals that the combination of humanitarian 
and security justifications received the highest support. However, all three sincere categories of 
justifications generated a majority of support and there are no statistically significantly 
differences in the level of approval.30 The consistency of the magnitude of support across 
justification categories contradicts the hypotheses based on the public’s humanitarian impulses 
or realpolitik preferences. Additionally, this uniformity of support reinforces the puzzle of 
																																																						
30 59 percent of respondents supported the intervention justified in humanitarian terms, 54 percent the security 
intervention, and 62 percent the intervention justified with a combination of humanitarian and security appeals.  
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humanitarian justifications: Why do leaders consistently use these claims alongside security 
explanations if security justifications alone are sufficient?  
Figure 4.1 Mean Percentage of Support by Justification Category 
 
Presidents’ widespread use of humanitarian appeals is particularly surprising when the 
seemingly minimal changes in support are combined with evidence that adding humanitarian 
claims to security justifications increases expectations of humanitarian outcomes. After gauging 
respondents’ level of support for the hypothetical intervention, the survey also probed 
participants’ thoughts and expectations for the outcome of an intervention. Respondents were 
asked, “If the U.S. takes military action in this case, how likely do you think each of the 
following outcomes will be: 1) Civilians in Numar will be safe. 2) The U.S. will be more 
secure.” The results indicate that the content of the president’s justifications significantly 
influenced respondents’ expected outcomes. As Table 4.7 shows, participants in the combined 
condition who received both humanitarian and security justifications expected that civilians 
would be safe in significantly higher numbers than respondents who read only security 
justifications. A significantly higher number of individuals in the combined condition also 
expected the U.S. would be more secure compared to individuals in the humanitarian-only 
condition. These findings suggest that presidents’ justifications are not empty rhetoric. Instead, 
0
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how the president speaks about the necessity of military action shapes public expectations about 
the intervention’s outcome. Adding humanitarian justifications to security claims thus raises the 
bar for success and is a politically costly decision. On the surface, unnecessarily increasing the 
stakes of a security intervention by including humanitarian justifications appears risky and ill-
advised.  
Table 4.7 Expected Intervention Outcomes by Treatment Condition 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Civilians in Numar 
will be safe. 
0.64 
(0.04) 
0.36*** 
(0.04) 
0.58 
(0.04) 
 
The U.S. will be 
more secure.  
 
0.44 
(0.04) 
 
0.64*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.60*** 
(0.04) 
N 153 151 154 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each 
category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
The Effects of Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 The domestic coalition argument explains the widespread use of humanitarian 
justifications in the face of political costs by asserting that presidents need not only a majority of 
support, but a majority that includes both cooperative and militant internationalists. 
Humanitarian justifications are necessary to persuade cooperative internationalists because they 
appeal to concern with harm done to others and emphasize humanitarian goals. Disaggregating 
the survey respondents by their foreign policy beliefs provides evidence consistent with this 
explanation. As Table 4.8 shows, the results confirm that cooperative internationalists offer 
lower support for security justifications than militant internationalists.31 The analysis also 
demonstrates that cooperative internationalists are the only group whose support increases 
																																																						
31 See the appendix for a similar disaggregation of support based on party identification. As expected, the results 
speak to the connections between partisanship and foreign policy beliefs, but are not identical. In particular, 
independents do not map smoothly onto the pattern of support among isolationists.  
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significantly when humanitarian justifications are added to security justifications. When the 
hypothetical president justified intervention using only security justifications, a minority of 
cooperative internationalists supported intervention. By contrast, when the hypothetical president 
used only humanitarian justifications or combined humanitarian and security appeals, a majority 
of cooperative internationalists supported intervention. Gaining the support of these individuals 
is thus the benefit that presidents receive for including humanitarian claims in security-driven 
cases.  
Table 4.8 Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Intervention 
 Security Combined Difference 
Cooperative 
Internationalists 
 
0.48 
(0.05) 
0.60 
(0.05) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
Militant 
Internationalists 
 
0.82 
(0.06) 
0.83 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Isolationists 0.33 
(0.10) 
0.31 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
N 153 151  
Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
More specifically, disaggregating respondents by their foreign policy beliefs reveals that 
adding a humanitarian appeal to security justifications increased support for intervention among 
cooperative internationalists by 13 percent, a statistically significant change. By contrast, the 
inclusion of humanitarian claims did not significantly affect the average levels of support among 
individuals with militant internationalist or isolationist beliefs. As expected, militant 
internationalists offered consistently high levels of support, well above the majority threshold, 
for all hypothetical interventions. Isolationists, on the other hand, did not offer a majority of 
support for intervention, regardless of the justifications the president used to make the case for 
military action.  
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This pattern of support is also consistent with respondents’ approval of intervention when 
the president offered only humanitarian justifications, outlined in Table 4.9. Cooperative 
internationalists supported the president’s description of a humanitarian intervention at a 
comparable level to support for the combined justifications and a significantly higher level than 
the security-only justifications (p=0.09)—61 percent supported the humanitarian-only 
justification. As expected, cooperative internationalists are thus persuaded by humanitarian 
claims in either humanitarian or security interventions but are less convinced by security 
rationales. Similarly, isolationists are not convinced by humanitarian claims in any context, with 
only 21 percent offering their support for the humanitarian-only category. The conditional 
support of cooperative internationalists and non-support of isolationists stands in contrast to 
militant internationalists who offered consistent levels of support across all types of 
justifications—78 percent for humanitarian, 82 percent for security, and 83 percent for combined 
justifications. These results are consistent with the domestic coalition hypotheses which expect 
that adding humanitarian claims to security justifications is key for gaining the support of 
cooperative internationalists but has little effect on the support of individuals with alternative 
foreign policy beliefs.  
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Table 4.9 Support for Humanitarian Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 
Humanitarian 
Difference from 
Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Cooperative Internationalists 0.61 
(0.05) 
 
 
Militant Internationalists 0.78 
(0.06) 
 
0.17* 
(0.08) 
Isolationists 0.21 
(0.08) 
0.40*** 
(0.10) 
N 153  
Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Motivations and Mechanisms: How Humanitarian Justifications Influence Support 
 The experimental results provide strong evidence that humanitarian justifications increase 
support among cooperative internationalists, but two questions remain: 1) How do justifications 
influence respondents’ perceptions of intervention? 2) How do respondents weight humanitarian 
and security claims when these justifications are used in combination? In terms of the first 
question, the addition of humanitarian appeals could increase support by changing how 
respondents think about the president’s motivation for action and/or by changing what factors 
participants themselves thought about when deciding to support or oppose intervention. In terms 
of the second question, when presented with both humanitarian and security justifications, 
respondents can assume the president is equally motivated by each concern or privilege one set 
of objectives over the other. Similarly, in this scenario respondents themselves may think equally 
about humanitarian and security threats or their decision may be guided primarily by one set of 
concerns. Understanding how respondents weight humanitarian and security justifications in the 
combined scenario lays the foundation for determining whether the perceived sincerity of 
presidents’ rhetoric influences support. To address these questions and investigate the 
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mechanisms through which humanitarian claims bring cooperative internationalists into the 
domestic coalition, the survey asked respondents about the president’s motivation for action and 
about how they made the decision to support or oppose intervention. 
The President’s Motivations for Action 
 First, the survey gauged how respondents perceived the president’s motivation for action. 
Participants were asked: “Which of the following do you think is the most important reason the 
President decided to take military action?” Response options were presented in random order and 
included protecting the civilians of Numar, upholding international standards, protecting U.S. 
security, demonstrating that the U.S. is a strong country, and protecting the president’s own 
political agenda. The response options gauged the relative resonance of humanitarian and 
security concerns, but did not use the same language as the treatments. This approach is intended 
to force respondents to pause and think about the president’s underlying motivation in addition to 
what he said in the national address. Motivations focused on protecting civilians and upholding 
international standards are in line with the international norms of humanitarian intervention and 
related doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 1996a; ICISS 
2001; Wheeler 2000). A president motivated by concerns about protecting U.S. security and 
demonstrating the U.S. is a strong country would builds on the demonstrated importance of U.S. 
national security and maintaining a reputation for resolve (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Huth 
1997; Kertzer 2016; Kertzer, Renshon, and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Finally, the president’s desire to 
protect his own domestic political agenda is designed to correspond to the expert information in 
the illegitimate treatment conditions and draws on evidence that “Politicians particularly cannot 
afford to be seen as calling for war in order to reap personal electoral benefits” (Gaubatz 1999, 
17). 
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Based on these options, if respondents believe that justifications are informative 
expressions of the president’s motivations for action, protecting civilians or upholding 
international standards should be associated with humanitarian justifications. Similarly, 
protecting U.S. national security and demonstrating U.S. strength will be linked to security 
justifications. Protecting the president’s own political interests is not expected to resonate with 
respondents in the sincere conditions, but captures individuals who assume the president always 
has an ulterior motive for action. Most importantly, this question provides insight into how 
respondents privilege humanitarian or security justifications when these claims are combined. 
Respondents can either assume that the president is equally concerned with humanitarian and 
security objectives or that humanitarian goals are less important in a security-driven intervention. 
The former case implies that presidents should use humanitarian claims cautiously to avoid 
muddying the security narrative. The latter suggests that humanitarian justifications broaden the 
domestic coalition even when humanitarian objectives are not the central aspect of the 
intervention. 
 As expected, the findings reveal that significantly more respondents in the humanitarian 
category believed that the president’s motivation was to protect civilians or uphold international 
standards. Additionally, a significantly higher number of individuals in the security condition 
reported that the president’s most important motivation was to protect U.S. national security. 
Results from the combined condition indicate that, on average, individuals presented with both 
humanitarian and security justifications believe the president’s primary motivation is to protect 
U.S. national security. As Table 4.10 illustrates, compared to the humanitarian-only condition, 
the combination of humanitarian and security justifications significantly increased the number of 
respondents who thought the president was primarily concerned with protecting national 
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security. However, the combined condition did not augment the president’s perceived concern 
with the civilians of Numar compared to the security-only category. The absence of a significant 
increase in perceptions of the president’s concern with civilians holds when respondents are 
broken down by their foreign policy beliefs.32 Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that 
humanitarian claims influence individuals’ perceptions of the president’s motivation for action, 
but are assumed to be less important than security objectives when combined with security 
appeals. The president thus appears to reap the benefits of including humanitarian justifications 
alongside security claims even if he does not convince that target audience—cooperative 
internationalists—that his motives are primarily humanitarian.   
 
Table 4.10 President’s Motivation for Action by Justification 
Most important reason 
for the president’s 
decision: 
Humanitarian Security Combined 
Civilians 
 
 
0.44 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
International  
Standards 
  
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
U.S. Security 
 
 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.58*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.08) 
U.S. Strength 0.13 
(0.03) 
 
0.15 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
Political Agenda 0.09 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.03 
0.12 
(0.03) 
N 153 151 154 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each 
category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
																																																						
32 For cooperative internationalists, 7 percent in the security condition and 12 percent in the combined condition 
thought the president was primarily motivated by concern for the people of Numar (p=0.2723). For militant 
internationalists, 15 percent in the security condition and 17 percent in the combined condition believed this was the 
president’s motivation (p=0.8752). For isolationists, 17 percent in the security condition and 4 percent in the 
combined condition thought Numar’s people were the main motivation for action (p=0.1311).  
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Individual Motivations 
 In addition to shaping perceptions of the president’s motivations, justifications also prime 
respondents to think differently about supporting or opposing an intervention. Thus, even if 
respondents in the combined condition assume the president cares primarily about national 
security concerns, they may still consider the protection of civilians or the need to uphold 
international standards in their own assessments of the conflict. To investigate how the 
president’s justifications affected respondents’ thoughts about intervention, the survey asked: 
“Which of the following did you think about most in your decision to support or oppose the 
military action?” Response options were again presented in random order and included concern 
about harm done to civilians in Numar, upholding international standards, threats to U.S. 
security, and demonstrating the U.S. is not a weak actor. As before, humanitarian justifications 
are expected to heighten concerns about harm to civilians and upholding international standards 
while security justifications augment concerns about threats to U.S. security and appearing weak. 
In addition to determining how participants thought about humanitarian and security 
justifications, this question also probes the objectives that respondents privileged when presented 
with a combination of claims.  
 In line with expectations, Table 4.11 reveals that humanitarian justifications significantly 
increased respondents’ concern with harm done to civilians and upholding international 
standards, while security justifications led to significantly more thoughts about threats to U.S. 
national security. Unlike the president’s motivation, there is also evidence that the combination 
of humanitarian and security justifications increased individuals’ humanitarian concerns. In the 
security condition, 18 percent of respondents reported that concern about harm done to civilians 
influenced their decision to support or oppose intervention and only seven percent considered the 
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importance of upholding international standards. Adding a humanitarian claim alongside the 
security justification significantly increased individuals’ attention to these concerns to 26 and 12 
percent, respectively (p=0.087 and p=0.089, respectively). However, the largest percentage—58 
percent—of respondents in the combined condition reported that they thought about threats to 
U.S. national security when deciding to support or oppose the intervention. The dramatic 
increase in thoughts about U.S. national security suggests that when presented with humanitarian 
and security justifications, respondents consider humanitarian objectives but privilege security 
concerns. 
 
Table 4.11 Motivations behind Respondent Support by Justification 
Most important reason: Humanitarian Security Combined 
Civilians 0.47 
(0.04) 
 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.04) 
U.S. Security 0.29 
(0.04) 
 
0.70*** 
(0.04) 
0.58*** 
(0.04) 
U.S. Strength 0.07 
(0.02) 
 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
International Standards 0.17 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
N 153 151 154 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each 
category of justification to the humanitarian baseline. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 Further disaggregating respondents’ motivations based on their foreign policy beliefs, 
reported in Table 4.12, reveals that all groups thought the most about security concerns in the 
combined category. However, for individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs, adding 
humanitarian claims to security justifications significantly increased their concern with the 
welfare of civilians and significantly decreased their focus on military strength. Among the 
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foreign policy groups, cooperative internationalists also reported significantly higher concern 
with civilians and lower concern with U.S. security than the other groups.33 
 
Table 4.12 Motivations behind Respondent Support by FPB 
Most important 
reason: Humanitarian Security Combined 
Civilians 
     CI 
     MI 
     ISO 
 
 
0.55 (0.05) 
0.49 (0.07) 
0.17 (0.08) 
 
0.20 (0.04)*** 
0.15 (0.06)*** 
0.13 (0.07) 
 
0.36 (0.05)** 
0.12 (0.05)*** 
0.15 (0.07) 
U.S. Security 
     CI 
     MI 
     ISO 
 
 
0.19 (0.04) 
0.27 (0.07) 
0.67 (0.10) 
 
0.68 (0.05)*** 
0.67 (0.08)*** 
0.79 (0.08) 
 
0.50 (0.05)*** 
0.71 (0.07)*** 
0.65 (0.09) 
U.S. Strength 
     CI 
     MI 
     ISO 
 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
0.13 (0.05) 
0.13 (0.07) 
 
0.02 (0.02) 
0.15 (0.06) 
0.04 (0.04) 
 
0.01 (0.01) 
0.07 (0.04) 
0.04 (0.04) 
International 
Standards 
     CI 
     MI 
     ISO 
 
 
0.24 (0.05) 
0.11 (0.05) 
0.04 (0.04) 
 
 
0.09 (0.03)*** 
0.03 (0.03) 
0.04 (0.04) 
 
 
0.13 (0.04)* 
0.10 (0.05) 
0.15 (0.07) 
N 153 151 154 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each 
category of justification to the humanitarian baseline within each foreign 
policy group. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. CI=cooperative internationalist; MI=militant internationalist; 
ISO=isolationist. 
 
 Responses to the presidential and individual motivation questions indicate that when 
participants are presented with a combination of humanitarian and security justifications they 
both assume that presidents are primarily motivated by security concerns and privilege these 
																																																						
33 The lower concern with U.S. security is only statistically significant in comparison to militant internationalists; 
however, there is a substantive difference of 15 percent between cooperative internationalists and isolationists.  
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concerns in their own assessments of the conflict. It is therefore unlikely that including 
humanitarian claims bolsters the support of cooperative internationalists by convincing them that 
military action will really be a humanitarian intervention. Instead, the evidence suggests 
humanitarian appeals win over cooperative internationalists by increasing their relative focus on 
humanitarian concerns and decreasing their focus on and skepticism towards security goals. 
Humanitarian justifications prime respondents to think about the need for intervention in terms 
of harm done to civilians and upholding international standards, even when individuals do not 
believe the president’s motive is primarily humanitarian. Among cooperative internationalists, 
the inclusion of these justifications also decreases individuals’ focus on security objectives. The 
following chapter builds on these findings to investigate how far presidents can stretch the 
sincerity of humanitarian justifications before they become ineffective.  
Robustness and Manipulation Checks 
 The experimental design presented in this chapter directly manipulates the variable of 
interest—presidential justifications—and controls the information respondents receive about 
military action to shed new light on the importance of humanitarian claims. However, 
experimental findings are sensitive to factors such as question wording, respondents’ attention to 
and understanding of the treatment, and baseline assumptions. To examine the robustness of the 
results, the survey also included questions that rule out potential confounders, a manipulation 
check, and a pretest of a control scenario to establish respondents’ baseline support for a 
publically acknowledged intervention. Additionally, not all potential security interventions 
include connections to terrorism, which may present a particularly salient and effective security 
threat. To investigate whether the scope of the findings is limited to cases with a terrorist threat, I 
designed an additional experiment to examine responses to humanitarian claims in the context of 
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a more traditional foreign policy restraint scenario which involves “efforts to affect the external 
behavior of another state that aggressively threatens the United States, its citizens, or its allies,” 
similar to the 1991 Gulf War (Jentleson 1992, 53).  
Potential Confounders: Success, Casualties, and Costs 
 The previous section shows that both cooperative and militant internationalists offer high 
levels of support for humanitarian justifications and that these justifications are key to 
persuading cooperative internationalists. However, rather than being moved by the humanitarian 
appeal itself, respondents could support the hypothetical intervention because they associate 
humanitarian claims with other strategically desirable factors. In particular, respondents could 
assume interventions justified in humanitarian terms are more likely to be successful, less likely 
to involve U.S. military casualties, or less likely to incur high financial costs than interventions 
presented only in terms of security objectives. In this case, presidents could replace humanitarian 
appeals with credible information about the costs and consequences of intervention to gain the 
support of cooperative internationalists and build a stable domestic coalition.  
To rule out this alternative explanation for the influence of humanitarian justifications, 
the survey asked respondents whether they agreed that if the U.S. took military action: 1) the 
operation would be successful; 2) the U.S. would suffer many military casualties; and 3) the 
operation would cost the U.S. a lot of money. Because the scenario was hypothetical and 
provided relatively little information about the intensity of the conflict, respondents were 
instructed to answer this question based on their “best guess and what you’ve read about the 
situation in Numar.” While not a direct measure of how individuals respond to costs, these 
questions can determine whether individuals make systematically different assumptions about 
the success and costs of interventions justified in humanitarian terms and whether these 
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assumptions account for the different levels of support. If assumptions about success, casualties, 
and costs are behind the increase in cooperative internationalists’ support, their expectations of 
success should be significantly higher and expectations of casualties and costs should be 
significantly lower in the combined and humanitarian categories. Table 4.13 presents 
respondents’ expectations for each justification category.  
Table 4.13 Expected Success and Costs by Justification 
 Humanitarian Security Combination 
Success    
     Cooperative  0.71 
(0.05) 
 
0.63 
(0.05) 
0.64 
(0.05) 
     Militant  0.84 
(0.05) 
 
0.79 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.05) 
     Isolationist 0.71 
(0.09) 
0.50 
(0.10) 
0.58 
(0.10) 
Casualties    
     Cooperative 0.66 
(0.05) 
 
0.68 
(0.05) 
0.64 
(0.05) 
     Militant 0.51 
(0.07) 
 
0.44 
(0.08) 
0.48 
(0.08) 
     Isolationist 0.58 
(0.10) 
0.63 
(0.10) 
0.85** 
(0.07) 
Financial Costs    
     Cooperative 0.94 
(0.03) 
 
0.93 
(0.03) 
0.95 
(0.02) 
     Militant 0.91 
(0.04) 
 
0.82 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.05) 
     Isolationist 0.83 
(0.08) 
0.88 
(0.07) 
0.96 
(0.04) 
N 153 151 154 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare each 
category of justification to the humanitarian baseline within each foreign 
policy group. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
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 The results outlined in Table 4.13 reveal few significant differences in the expected 
success, casualties, or costs of intervention based on the type of justification. In particular, 
cooperative internationalists did not report significantly higher expectations of success or 
significantly lower expectations of casualties or costs when presidents employed humanitarian 
appeals. There is thus no evidence that these factors confound cooperative internationalists’ 
significantly higher support for interventions justified with humanitarian claims.  
More generally, the majority of respondents assumed the intervention would be 
successful, involve military casualties, and incur high financial costs, regardless of their foreign 
policy beliefs or the justifications used. The results suggest that justifications’ heterogeneous 
effect on support operates through mechanisms other than changing individuals’ perceptions of 
the likely success and costs of intervention. Additionally, the findings are consistent with my 
contention that humanitarian appeals are uniquely capable of convincing cooperative 
internationalists intervention is worthwhile and cannot be easily replaced by information about 
the prudence of military action. 
Manipulation Check 
 In addition to confounders, online survey experiments also raise the concern that 
respondents will skim or skip the text of the hypothetical scenario and fail to internalize the 
intended treatment. In this case, the differences in support would not be directly linked to the 
experimental manipulation. To evaluate and guard against this possibility, the survey included a 
manipulation check at the end of the main questionnaire (Mutz and Pemantle 2015; 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidnko 2009). The manipulation question asked participants: “To 
the best of your recollection, what points did the president use to explain the military action in 
Numar?” Response options included: 1) Only humanitarian: the quotes talked about protecting 
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the civilians of Numar; 2) Only security: the quotes talked about the safety of the United States; 
3) Both humanitarian and security: the quotes talked about protecting the civilians of Numar and 
the safety of the United States; and 4) Neither humanitarian nor security: the quotes didn’t 
mention protecting the civilians of Numar or the safety of the United States. Table 4.14 outlines 
responses to the manipulation check. 
Table 4.14 Recollection of the President’s Justifications by Treatment  
To the best of your recollection, 
what points did this president use 
to explain the reasons for military 
action? 
Humanitarian 
Treatments 
Security 
Treatments 
Combined 
Treatments 
Humanitarian 71 % 4 % 10 % 
Security 7 % 72 % 7 % 
Combined 20 % 21 % 81 % 
None of the Above 2 % 3 % 2 % 
N 456 451 605 
Table reports percentage of respondents for each response option. Correct 
answers shown in bold. 
 
 In each treatment condition, the majority of respondents correctly identified the 
justifications the presidents used to explain military action. The most common mistake for 
individuals in the humanitarian and security conditions was to incorrectly report that presidents 
had used both justifications. If respondents made this mistake systematically, it would bias the 
findings against the domestic coalition argument and the significantly higher support for 
combined justifications reported in Table 4.8 above. In the combined condition, respondents 
mistakenly remembered the humanitarian versus the security justification in roughly equal 
numbers. This distribution of responses suggests that individuals understood and internalized the 
treatments, increasing confidence that the differences in support for intervention are a result of 
the experimental manipulation.  
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Control Condition: Establishing a Baseline of Support 
 A common challenge for survey experiments involving international relations scenarios is 
the absence of a plausible baseline. In the context of this study, the absence of justifications is an 
implausible point of comparison because there is no case of overt military action in the post-Cold 
War period in which the U.S. president asked the public to support intervention without 
explaining why the crisis was important. Instead, a pretest of the experimental design fielded to 
147 U.S. adults via MTurk in May 2016 approximated a baseline of support by including a 
control condition in which respondents read the text of the president’s speech without the 
specific justifications for action. Participants were told that as part of an address to the nation, the 
president said: “My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in 
Kundu—why it matters and where we go from here. This is not a world we should accept. For 
generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be 
the world’s police force, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must 
respond to this crisis with military action.”  
After reading the control scenario, only 39.6 percent of respondents supported 
intervention. Support for this control condition can be interpreted as individuals’ willingness to 
support military action based only on the information that the president thinks intervention is 
necessary. The low level of approval is consistent with the expectation that the president must 
actively persuade the public to support intervention by explaining why action is both legitimate 
and necessary.  
However, in the absence of explicit justifications individuals are likely to assume the 
president has an unexpressed motivation for intervention. In addition to the standard support 
question, respondents in the control pretest were also asked why they thought the U.S. was 
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taking action in this scenario. As Table 4.15 shows, absent a clear justification, the largest 
percentage of respondents assumed the president was motivated by humanitarian concerns, i.e., 
to protect the people of Kundu. By contrast, only 11 percent of respondents thought the 
intervention addressed U.S. national security. About 21 percent of respondents, respectively, 
assumed the military action would protect U.S. economic interests or promote democracy.  
 
Table 4.15 Assumed Motivations for Intervention in the Control Scenario 
Which of the following best explains why the U.S. is 
taking action in this situation? 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
To protect U.S. national security. 
 
11.6 % 
To protect the people of Kundu. 
 
45.6 % 
To protect U.S. economic interests. 
 
21.8 % 
To promote democracy around the world. 21.1 % 
N 147 
 
The results from the control scenario increase confidence in the robustness of the main 
experimental findings in two ways. First, the low level of approval for the un-justified scenario 
compared to all categories of justifications indicates that presidents’ public explanations for 
action have a substantively important effect on support for intervention. Second, evidence that 
some respondents assume an intervention involves humanitarian objectives even when presidents 
do not use humanitarian justifications should work against the significant effect of explicit 
humanitarian justifications found in the main experiment. That the addition of humanitarian 
claims significantly increases support among cooperative internationalists—even if some of 
these respondents assume humanitarian motives absent any justification—increases confidence 
that explicit humanitarian justifications are a substantively important signal.  
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Support for Alternative Security Scenarios 
 The security justifications presented in both the security and combined conditions of the 
main experiment told respondents that the conflict in Numar demanded a response because its 
regime had “created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened the United States.” Given ongoing 
U.S. military operations against ISIS and the salience of the war on terror in the overarching 
national security narrative (Krebs 2015), references to terror may have a unique effect on support 
for intervention that limits the generalizability of the results. Theoretically, any bias introduced 
by references to terrorism should work in the opposite direction of the significant effect of 
humanitarian claims reported above—all groups should be most likely to offer support for 
security justifications when the security threat evokes both salient examples such as the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 and the potential for an imminent attack on U.S. soil. However, to 
investigate whether the results hold across alternative security scenarios, I conducted a 
preliminary experiment to compared support for alternative security justifications and examined 
the effect of humanitarian justifications in the context of a foreign policy restraint scenario. This 
experiment was fielded in June 2016 to a sample of 607 U.S. adults, again using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. In each condition, respondents again received excerpts from a hypothetical 
president’s address to the nation, this time about an ongoing violent conflict in Kumar. Table 
4.16 summarizes the justifications respondents received for each of the experimental 
conditions.34 Unlike the main experiment, these prompts did not provide respondents with 
information about experts’ opinions.  
  
																																																						
34 The full text of the survey experiment is included in the appendix.   
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Table 4.16 Treatment Conditions for Alternative Security Justifications 
 The regime in Kumar has… The safety of… 
Humanitarian 
…killed thousands of its own 
people and poses a threat to 
its civilians 
…thousands of civilians is at 
stake…when the safety of 
thousands of civilians is at 
risk, we must act.  
Terror 
…created a safe haven for 
terrorists and its actions pose 
a threat to U.S. military 
security. 
…the United States is at 
stake…when the safety of the 
United States is at risk, we 
must act.  
Foreign Policy Restraint 
…invaded its neighboring 
state and its actions pose a 
threat to U.S. military 
security. 
…the United States is at 
stake…when the safety of the 
United States is at risk, we 
must act. 
Combined (Humanitarian & 
Foreign Policy Restraint) 
…invaded its neighboring 
state and killed thousands of 
civilians. 
…the United States is at 
stake…when the safety of 
thousands of civilians is at 
risk, we must act.  
  
The results from this preliminary experiment, presented in Figure 4.2, demonstrate that 
respondents did offer significantly higher support for an intervention justified with references to 
terrorism while justifications focused on restraining foreign aggression received low levels of 
approval. Aggregate support for the humanitarian and combined conditions remained high. 
Figure 4.2 Support for Alternative Security Justifications 
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 These results indicate that justifications focused on restraining foreign aggression elicit a 
significantly different response that justifications focused on terrorism. However, the main effect 
of interest for the domestic coalition argument—increased support from cooperative 
internationalists when humanitarian claims are added to security justifications—is also present in 
the foreign policy restraint scenario. As Table 4.17 shows, adding a humanitarian claim to the 
foreign policy restraint explanation increased the support of cooperative internationalists by 15 
percent (p=0.0328). This increase is also substantively significant because it moved cooperative 
internationalist from a majority of opposition to a majority of support. As before, the presence of 
humanitarian justifications did not significantly influence the support of militant internationalists 
or isolationists. A majority of militant internationalists supported the intervention regardless of 
the type of justifications used, while support from isolationists remained low across all 
justification categories. Combined, the results of this preliminary experiment indicate that while 
references to terrorism are particularly effective security justifications, the effect of humanitarian 
justifications on cooperative internationalists’ support is consistent across alternative security 
rationales.  
Table 4.17 Comparison of Alternative Security Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Humanitarian Terror FPR 
Combined 
(Humanitarian & 
FPR) 
Cooperative 
Internationalists 
0.53 
(0.43, 0.64) 
0.49 
(0.39, 0.60) 
 
0.38 
(0.28, 0.47) 
0.53 
(0.43, 0.63) 
Militant 
Internationalists 
0.67 
(0.49, 0.84) 
0.72 
(0.52, 0.93) 
 
0.58 
(0.36, 0.80) 
0.72 
(0.52, 0.93) 
Isolationists 0.15 
(0.04, 0.27) 
0.31 
(0.17, 0.45) 
0.26 
(0.12, 0.40) 
0.36 
(0.21, 0.50) 
N 154 151 150 152 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals reported 
in parentheses to facilitate comparisons across and within columns.  
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Conclusions 
 Humanitarian justifications are both commonplace in U.S. interventions and influence the 
president’s ability to mobilize domestic support for the use of military force. The experimental 
findings presented in this chapter highlight the importance of humanitarian justifications by 
demonstrating that these claims are uniquely capable of generating a majority of support from 
cooperative internationalists. Cooperative internationalists are a key target audience for 
presidential justifications because they are skeptical of security claims, willing to actively oppose 
intervention, and politically engaged. The importance of persuading these individuals accounts 
for the consistent use of humanitarian appeals in contemporary interventions. 
 The experimental findings also confirm that militant internationalists are the most reliable 
supporters of military action. Regardless of the type of justification used, individuals with these 
values consistently offered the highest level of support for intervention. This result is in line with 
the domestic coalition argument that militant internationalists are politically engaged but a low 
risk source of dissent because of they almost always approve of the use of force as a means to 
solving international problems. Responses to the survey experiment also confirm that 
isolationists are less politically engaged than internationalists and offer little support for 
interventions justified in either humanitarian or security terms. This group is thus an inefficient 
target for presidents’ justifications because they are unlikely to be persuaded regardless of the 
explanations used.  
 The experimental findings also shed light on how respondents weight humanitarian and 
security claims when these justifications are used in combination. First, there is evidence that 
justifications influence both how individuals perceive the president’s motivations for action and 
what concerns they themselves consider when deciding to support or oppose intervention. 
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Interventions justified in humanitarian terms increased both respondents’ thoughts about harm 
done to civilians and upholding international standards and their belief that the president was 
motivated primarily by these concerns. Similarly, justifications that emphasized security 
increased thoughts about threats to U.S. national security and the perception that the president 
was mainly concerned about guarding against these threats. However, when humanitarian and 
security justifications are combined, respondents assumed the president privileged security 
concerns. Despite the primary status given to security claims, the findings also show that even in 
combination the presence of humanitarian appeals effectively primes respondents’ concern with 
harm done to civilians and upholding international standards. The effect of humanitarian 
justifications on the reasons respondents decided to support or oppose intervention was 
particularly important among cooperative internationalists.  
 Evidence that humanitarian justifications influence individuals’ perceptions of 
intervention even when security objectives are primary raises concerns about the misuse of 
humanitarian claims. To the extent that humanitarian claims still bolster support when they do 
not match the intervention’s principle objective, presidents can use these appeals to provide a 
false pretense for otherwise unpopular military actions. Additionally, the common misuse of 
humanitarian claims can undermine their effectiveness in cases of actual humanitarian crisis and 
create obstacles to preventing mass atrocities (Bellamy 2004; Evans 2004). The following 
chapter addresses these questions in depth by examining how far presidents can stretch the 
sincerity of humanitarian appeals and how respondents’ foreign policy beliefs shape their 
sensitivity to insincere claims.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
  
DECEPTION, BACKLASH, AND THE MISUSE OF HUMANITARIAN 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The previous chapter demonstrates that humanitarian justifications play a critical role in 
mobilizing domestic support for military action. When they are effective, humanitarian claims 
persuade cooperative internationalists while still appealing to the militant internationalist base 
and help presidents build the broadest possible domestic coalition. The broad appeal of these 
justifications should give leaders an incentive to highlight humanitarian claims equally, if not 
more often than security justifications, which raises concerns about their potential misuse. To the 
extent that individuals respond to humanitarian claims, regardless of whether they match the 
intervention’s objectives, presidents may use these appeals to circumvent constraints on military 
action and provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular interventions. Furthermore, the over-use of 
humanitarian claims could make the public skeptical of future humanitarian efforts and hinder 
responses to mass atrocities (Bellamy 2005). 
 The pattern of justifications outlined in Chapter 3 assuages the most severe pretext 
concerns and the limited emphasis placed on these claims in security interventions suggests that 
presidents exercise discretion in their use of humanitarian appeals. To better understand the 
domestic incentives behind this pattern and shed light on the limits of humanitarian appeals, this 
chapter asks: Under what conditions are humanitarian justifications effective? To what extent do 
individuals punish the president for deceptive justifications? I contend that the importance of 
including cooperative internationalists in the domestic coalition both requires and constrains 
leaders’ use of humanitarian appeals. Because they are attuned to politics and concerned with 
humanitarian objectives, cooperative internationalists are particularly sensitive to the misuse of 
humanitarian justifications. As a result, attempts to extend humanitarian claims beyond their role 
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as supplementary explanations in security interventions will generate backlash from the same 
individuals they are intended to persuade. In line with the pattern of justifications outlined in 
Chapter 3, presidents thus face domestic incentives to use humanitarian claims broadly, but also 
to limit their emphasis—more is not always better in terms of maximizing the effectiveness of 
humanitarian appeals.  
 To evaluate the political backlash I expect to deter the president from misusing 
humanitarian justifications, the chapter first outlines ongoing debates about the opportunities for 
and costs of deception in democracies. These sections demonstrate that justifications are a most 
likely site for deception and that the misuse of humanitarian claims carries additional, negative 
consequences. The following section outlines the domestic coalition argument’s expectations 
about the effects of sincerity and contends that the importance of including cooperative 
internationalists limits deceptive humanitarian claims. Building on the survey experiment 
introduced in Chapter 4, I detail how this experimental design varies the sincerity of 
justifications to test the limits of humanitarian claims. The results indicate that presidents incur a 
variety of political costs in response to deceptive justifications. Additionally, the source of the 
backlash varies based on the content of the deceptive justification—cooperative internationalists 
impose political costs for the misuse of humanitarian claims, while militant internationalists 
impose political costs for the misuse of security explanations. On the surface, evidence that 
leaders face significant backlash for deceptive rhetoric appears to have positive implications for 
democratic accountability for the use of force. However, the findings also reveal that presidents 
can avoid these costs by telling “half-truths” and there is no evidence that backlash against one 
intervention affects the president’s reputation in the long-term.  
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Deception in Democracies 
Defining Deceptive Justifications 
Presidents have multiple pathways to deception. They can secretly provoke adversaries to 
create an impetus for escalation or begin diversionary wars to rally support and overcome 
domestic discontent (Brody 1991; Gelpi 1997; Oakes 2012; Reiter 2012). Additionally, 
presidents can exercise their information advantage to disseminate propaganda and “frame issues 
in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and 
otherwise skew the public debate in advantageous directions” (Schuessler 2015, 3).35 Here, I 
focus on the president’s ability to obscure the character of an intervention in official 
justifications for the use of force. Justifications are a most likely case for deception because, as 
the next sub-section details, they represent the arena in which the president’s first-mover and 
information advantages on matters of foreign policy are strongest (Howell, Jackman, and 
Rogowski 2013; Kernell 1997; Neustadt 1980; Western 2005).  
In his comprehensive account of deceit in war, Schuessler defines deception as 
“deliberate attempts on the part of leaders to mislead the public about the thrust of official 
thinking” (Schuessler 2015, 8). Deception includes outright lies about the nature and aim of 
military action, but also encompasses leaders’ attempts to spin or conceal problematic 
information from international and domestic audiences (Mearsheimer 2011, 15). In the context of 
public justifications for military action, the president’s true motivations for action cannot be 
																																																						
35 In his overview of leaders’ lies, Mearsheimer (2011) further divides propaganda strategies into seven different 
categories of lies: 1) fearmongering, 2) strategic cover-ups, 3) nationalist mythmaking, 4) liberal lies, 5) social 
imperialism, 6) ignoble cover-ups, and 7) inter-state lies. The deceptive use of security justifications falls most 
closely into the category of fearmongering because it attempts to “motivate the public to take the threat seriously 
and make the necessary sacrifices to counter it” (Mearsheimer 2011, 22). The deceptive use of humanitarian 
justifications falls most closely into the category of liberal lies because, to the extent that it frames the use of 
military force in terms of protecting the welfare of foreign civilians, it is “designed to cover up the behavior of states 
when it contradicts the well-developed body of liberal norms” (Mearsheimer 2011, 22).  
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directly observed and thus cannot be compared with official statements to create an objective 
measure of deception. Given these limitations, deception here captures cases in which the 
president’s public justification is perceived to diverge from the true impetus for military action 
by a consensus of experts. This definition follows the approach of Krebs and Jackson (2007, 42) 
who argue that “it does not matter whether actors believe what they say, whether they are 
motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment. What is important is that they can 
be rhetorically maneuvered into a corner, trapped into publicly endorsing positions they may, or 
may not, find anathema.” In other words, to understand the conditions under which deception 
limits the effectiveness of humanitarian justifications, it matters less if a president believes he is 
lying to the public than if his words can be presented as lies and used to inflict political costs. 
When experts perceive the president’s justification to sincerely and accurately reflect the 
rationale for action, they do not dispute his public explanation and there is no evidence of 
deception. Alternatively, when experts perceive that the president is offering an insincere—and 
thus deceptive—justification for action, they will publicly dispute this explanation and offer an 
alternative account of the conflict. This approach to deception reflects the process through which 
elite discourse casts doubt on presidents’ accounts of military action and recognizes the role that 
elite consensus plays in rallying or muting public support (Brody 1991, 66–67). 
Deception and the President’s Information Advantage 
 In the international arena, the high stakes and iterative nature of international politics 
make deception risky and rare. State leaders are inherently skeptical of their counterparts and 
work to verify each other’s claims, increasing the likelihood that deception will be exposed. 
Presidents perceived as insincere lose credibility with other leaders and undercut their ability to 
maintain functioning diplomatic relationships (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). It is thus difficult for 
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presidents to effectively lie to other leaders and the potential benefits of international deception 
do not outweigh the costs (Mearsheimer 2011, 28).  
 By contrast, at the domestic level presidents have an information advantage on matters of 
foreign policy that makes deception a more feasible and attractive strategy. The complexity of 
collecting and interpreting information related to foreign policy decisions makes the public 
particularly dependent on elite information (Western 2005, 15). In the context of military 
interventions, the president holds a “near-monopoly control over information” (Kernell 1997, 
183) and a first-mover advantage that allows him to respond directly and decisively to 
international crises, setting the terms of the debate that follows (Schuessler 2015, 6; Western 
2005, 17). The presidency is also “endowed with the public trust,” which increases the likelihood 
that public opinion will be responsive to presidential appeals (Western 2005, 17). Combined, 
these advantages make the presidency the leading national security institution and primary 
source of justifications for military action (George 1980; Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski 2013; 
Kernell 1997; Meernik 1994; Neustadt 1980). This information advantage gives leaders an 
incentive to manipulate public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000), but declines over the course 
of a conflict as elite discourse and media coverage help the public close the information gap 
(Baum and Groeling 2010; Baum and Potter 2008, 48). The risks and limits of deception are thus 
best evaluated at the domestic level where both the incentives for misleading rhetoric and the 
president’s information advantage are greatest.  
The Costs and Benefits of Deception  
 Despite widespread recognition of the incentives for deception, scholars remain divided 
over the extent to which presidents can get away with deceiving their publics. Many realist 
accounts view the public as ill-informed and susceptible to misinformation, making deception 
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both effective and low in risk. As Mearsheimer argues, “It is reasonably easy for policymakers to 
lie to their publics” and, because policymakers can manipulate both the content and flow of 
information, “most people will be inclined to trust what their leaders tell them unless there is 
hard evidence that they are being deceived” (Mearsheimer 2011, 58). From this perspective, 
deception allows leaders to circumvent democratic constraints on leaders’ ability to go to war 
and “deception will backfire only in the event that a war goes badly” (Schuessler 2015, 17). The 
expected benefits of deception thus outweigh the costs as long as the intervention is successful. 
As a result, leaders will often decide domestic deception is worth the risk.  
 An alternative, liberal institutionalist view contends that democratic processes prevent 
deception by increasing the likelihood that deception will be exposed and leaders will face costly 
political backlash (Reiter 2012). This account “allows that even elected leaders may be 
motivated to deceive in order to provide themselves more freedom of action in foreign policy. 
However, elected leaders are deterred from engaging in deception, especially deception over 
high salience matters like the initiation of war” (Reiter 2012, 595). Similarly, in his review of 
historical cases of deception, Alterman concludes that presidents cannot lie about matters of war 
and peace without inflicting significant damage (Alterman 2004, 314). From this view, attempts 
to deceive the domestic audience will be quickly exposed and leaders punished. The costs of 
deception thus outweigh the benefits and by imposing these costs democratic institutions 
effectively prevent leaders from deceiving their publics. 
 These ongoing debates draw on evidence from historical cases to investigate how 
presidents perceived and responded to the political costs associated with deception. However, 
these accounts do not consider how the public responds to being deceived—the central 
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mechanism of democratic accountability. Extending these accounts to the level of public support 
generates the following alternative hypotheses:  
H5.1: Deception works. The public responds positively to deceptive claims and leaders 
do not face political backlash.   
 
H5.2: Deception is not effective. The public responds negatively to deceptive claims and 
leaders face political backlash. 
 
Deception and Humanitarian Claims  
 The deceptive use of humanitarian justifications warrants increased attention because 
these claims carry two additional and negative consequences. First, to the extent that 
humanitarian claims bolster public support for action (Boettcher 2004; Eichenberg 2005; 
Jentleson and Britton 1998), they can provide a pretext for otherwise unpopular interventions. 
For example, critics of the 2003 Iraq war raised the concern that the Bush administration misused 
humanitarian appeals to sustain support for the intervention and confuse the public when the 
weapons of mass destruction rationale became untenable (Bellamy 2004; Fisher 2003). 
Humanitarian justifications are particularly susceptible to this type of misuse because violent 
conflicts inevitably threaten the wellbeing of civilians, which makes allusions to humanitarian 
crises feasible in a wide range of cases. Additionally, because humanitarian justifications do not 
require proof of a tie to U.S. national security interests (Finnemore 2003, 52), they can be used to 
make the case for military actions such as preventative war that would otherwise have 
questionable status under international law (Evangelista 2008, 21). 
Second, the widespread use of humanitarian claims in the absence of humanitarian 
objectives can create public skepticism and undermine the credibility of future appeals (Bellamy 
2005). Declining public acceptance of humanitarian claims is especially problematic to the 
extent that it prevents action to address mass atrocities. Summarizing this concern in the context 
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of the 2003 Iraq war, Gareth Evans, one of the foremost R2P norm entrepreneurs, asserted that, 
“to the extent that the invasion was based on Saddam Hussein’s record of tyranny over his own 
people—but again, poorly and inconsistently argued, and with the Council bypassed—we have 
seen almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm justifying 
intervention on the basis of the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’” (Evans 2004, 6). 
Justifications in general and humanitarian justifications in particular are therefore a most 
likely case for deception. However, to date studies of deception in foreign policy have been 
limited by the implicit assumption that all individuals are equally important to the domestic 
coalition and respond to deceptive claims in a uniform way. The following section uses foreign 
policy beliefs to disaggregate public opinion towards deception. It contends that the constraining 
power of democratic publics is exercised primarily by individuals with cooperative and militant 
internationalist values. Recognizing diversity in the public’s foreign policy beliefs highlights the 
conditions under which leaders face political backlash for their use of deceptive justifications. It 
also demonstrates that the composition of the domestic coalition explains the limited emphasis of 
humanitarian justifications outlined in Chapter 3.  
Deceptive Justifications and the Domestic Coalition 
 Deception, like justifications, resonates differently with individuals based on their 
underlying foreign policy beliefs. The domestic coalition argument outlined in Chapter 2 
contends that individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs possess a unique set of 
characteristics that makes them particularly sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian claims. First, 
these individuals are primarily concerned with humanitarian objectives and inherently skeptical 
of military action. As Chapter 4 shows, the majority of cooperative internationalists are not 
convinced by security justifications and offer significantly higher support military intervention 
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when it is cast in humanitarian terms. Therefore, when experts cast doubt on the validity of the 
president’s humanitarian appeals, it increases cooperative internationalists’ skepticism and 
decreases their support for military action.  
Second, because individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are attuned to and 
engaged in politics they are more likely to be exposed to contradictory accounts of the 
intervention. Their heightened political engagement also gives these individuals the skills needed 
to create an active opposition and impose political costs when humanitarian claims are misused. 
As a result, when the president stretches humanitarian justifications beyond their role as 
supplementary explanations in security-driven interventions, he generates backlash from 
cooperative internationalists—the very group humanitarian justifications are intended to 
persuade. In the short-term, the backlash of cooperative internationalists negatively influences 
both individuals’ support for intervention and their approval of the president. In the long-term, 
the misuse of humanitarian claims makes cooperative internationalists skeptical of the 
president’s humanitarian rhetoric and less likely to support humanitarian efforts in the future.  
However, the difficulty of conclusively disproving humanitarian appeals and the complex 
nature of contemporary interventions give presidents leeway to tell “half-truths”—i.e., 
emphasizing insincere humanitarian justifications alongside sincere security justifications. 
Demonstrating that an intervention contains no valid humanitarian objectives presents a 
significantly higher bar for critics than suggesting that humanitarian objectives are not the 
primary rationale for military action. Among cooperative internationalists, these half-truths do 
not create sufficient skepticism to significantly lower support for intervention or impose political 
costs on leaders.  
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Taken as a whole, the conditions under which cooperative internationalists are persuaded 
by humanitarian justifications explain the seemingly mismatched pattern of widespread use and 
limited emphasis illustrated in Chapter 3. The role of cooperative internationalists in imposing 
political costs for the misuse of humanitarian justifications presents the following hypothesis: 
H5.3a: Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs are most sensitive to 
deceptive humanitarian justifications.  
 
In contrast to cooperative internationalists, individuals with military internationalist or 
isolationist foreign policy beliefs are less influenced by deceptive justifications. Unlike 
cooperative internationalists, militant internationalists offer broad support for military 
interventions and focus on security objectives. As a result, these individuals are less sensitive to 
deceptive humanitarian justifications and are more likely to give the president the benefit of the 
doubt in his pursuit of military action. However, this tolerance for insincerity does not extend to 
security justifications, which evoke the objectives that most concern militant internationalists. 
Instead, a president who employs a false security explanation will face political backlash from 
the base of the domestic coalition—individuals with militant internationalist beliefs.  
Alternatively, isolationists are unlikely to support military intervention, regardless of the 
category or sincerity of the justifications used. Evidence of deception can further decrease 
isolationists’ support for intervention, but because their baseline level of approval is low, the 
effect of deception will be muted by a floor effect. These characteristics of militant 
internationalists and isolationists generate the following hypotheses for their reactions to 
deception: 
H5.3b: Individuals with militant internationalist beliefs are sensitive to deceptive security 
justifications, but are not sensitive to deceptive humanitarian justifications. 
 
H5.3c: The attitudes of individuals with isolationist beliefs are not significantly 
influenced by the presence of deception. 
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Measuring Reactions to Deception: Research Design   
 
 The experimental results presented in Chapter 4 examine variation in the president’s 
justifications for military action to determine which individuals respond to humanitarian claims. 
In addition to the type of justification, the survey experiment also varied the extent to which 
experts agreed with the president’s official explanation for military action to measure support at 
different levels of deception. Together, variation along these two dimensions—type of 
justification and sincerity of justification—creates ten experimental conditions, summarized in 
Table 5.1. In this chapter, I compare public attitudes between each level of sincerity (i.e., down 
the columns of Table 5.1) to investigate the effects of increasing deception.36  
Table 5.1 Experimental Conditions (President’s Justifications/Experts’ Explanation) 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere Humanitarian/ Humanitarian 
Security/  
Security 
Security and Humanitarian/ 
Security and Humanitarian 
Insincere 
Humanitarian/ 
Security 
Security/ 
Humanitarian 
Security and 
Humanitarian/ 
Security 
Security and 
Humanitarian/ 
Humanitarian 
Illegitimate 
Humanitarian/ 
President’s Political 
Agenda 
Security/ 
President’s Political 
Agenda 
Security and 
Humanitarian/President’s Political 
Agenda 
 
 As before, all respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which “Over 
the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar” and told they 
were reading an excerpt from the president’s address to the nation about this conflict.37 
Participants assigned to the humanitarian category read a statement in which the president said, 
“Numar poses a grave threat to its own civilians, including innocent women and children.” In the 
																																																						
36 The sample for this survey is the same as that described in Chapter 4. As before, the survey was fielded to 1,517 
U.S. adults in July 2016 using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
37 To mitigate the influence of current events, all respondents were also explicitly told that “The situation reflects 
actions taken by presidents from both political parties. It is NOT about the current president or president-elect and it 
is NOT about any specific country in the news today.” 
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security category, respondents read that “Numar poses a grave threat to the security of the United 
States, including the American people,” and in the combined category the president said, “Numar 
poses a grave threat to its own civilians and the security of the United States.” Following the 
president’s explanation, respondents were then presented with information from experts who 
either publicly agreed with or disputed the official justifications for military action. Comparing 
levels of support between conditions in which experts agreed and conditions in which experts 
disputed the president’s explanation captures the effect of perceived deception on attitudes 
towards military intervention. 
Operationalizing Deception 
 Justifications are a most likely case for deception because, given the president’s 
information advantages, the burden of proof required to demonstrate that an intervention did not 
contain the stated policy objectives is high. This characteristic of deceptive justifications also 
presents a challenge for designing accurate and valid experimental manipulations. Providing 
respondents with smoking gun evidence that the president lied about the impetus for intervention 
would be unrealistic in this context and undermine the experiment’s external validity. 
Additionally, explicitly informing respondents that the experts’ account of the intervention was 
accurate while the president’s account was deceptive would prime on a key dependent variable—
trust in the accuracy of the president’s explanation. To avoid these pitfalls, this experiment 
investigates the limits of deception by gradually casting doubt on the sincerity of the president’s 
justifications for action and evaluating how changes in sincerity influence individuals’ attitudes.  
 The survey experiment manipulates the sincerity of justifications by providing expert 
information because this is the mechanism through which studies of democratic constraints 
expect institutions to deter deception. These accounts contend that the presence of a free press 
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and media coverage of interventions amplify elite discourse to expose deception (M. A. Baum 
and Potter 2015; Berinsky 2007; Reiter 2012; Saunders 2015). Upon hearing experts undermine 
the president’s justification for action, the public is then expected to impose political costs that 
punish the president for his deceptive claims. Presenting participants with the president’s 
justification for action alongside the response and alternative account of experts reflects this 
hypothesized process. 
Additionally, the scenario tells respondents that “most experts” have publicly agreed with 
or disputed the president’s explanation for military action. Presenting an expert consensus 
reduces the risk that respondents will assume disagreement is part of a partisan strategy that 
includes only the president’s political opponents. Respondents are also presented with experts’ 
alternative explanations for military action to separate disagreement about the rationale for action 
from opposition to the intervention itself. For example, in the insincere humanitarian category, 
respondents are told that experts believe the president is concerned with national security rather 
than foreign civilians, but are not told whether experts approve or disapprove of the security-
driven intervention. This approach helps distinguish the effects of the president’s deception from 
the effects of expert opposition.  
Levels of Deception 
Within this framework, I measure the effects of deception at three levels, summarized in 
Table 5.2. First, the sincere justification conditions capture the effect of the president’s 
explanation for military action when there is no perceived deception. In this case, respondents 
receive information that most experts publically agreed with and reiterated the president’s 
rationale for action. By contrast, the insincere and illegitimate justification categories introduce 
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the prospect of deception by telling respondents that most experts said the president’s official 
explanation did not reflect the real impetus for military action.  
Table 5.2 Expert Information by Treatment Condition 
Experts thought… 
 Humanitarian Security Combo 
Agree 
(1)…military 
action would 
mainly protect 
Numar’s civilians.  
(2)…military 
action would 
mainly protect 
U.S. security.  
(3)…military action would 
mainly protect Numar’s 
civilians and U.S. security.  
Disagree, 
legitimate 
(4)… instead of 
concern for 
civilians, the real 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was to 
protect U.S. 
security. 
(5)… instead of 
concern for U.S. 
security the real 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was to 
protect Numar’s 
civilians.  
(6)… instead 
of concern for 
civilians the 
only 
motivation of 
the U.S. 
action was to 
protect U.S. 
security. 
(7)... instead of 
concern for 
U.S. security 
the only 
motivation of 
the U.S. action 
was to protect 
Numar’s 
civilians. 
Disagree, 
illegitimate 
(8)… protecting 
Numar’s civilians 
was a story to 
cover up the 
President’s own 
political agenda. 
(9)… protecting 
U.S. security was a 
story to cover up 
the President’s 
own political 
agenda.  
(10)… protecting Numar’s 
civilians and U.S. security was a 
story to cover up the President’s 
own political agenda. 
 
Although both include perceived deception, the insincere and illegitimate categories are 
distinguished by the legitimacy of the explanation experts presented as the president’s real 
motivation for action. An intervention is considered legitimate if it falls within the parameters for 
legal military action established by international law. The United Nations Charter establishes a 
general prohibition on the use of force with exceptions for states’ right to self-defense and threats 
to international peace and security recognized by the Security Council (United Nations 1945).38 
																																																						
38 The prohibition on the use of force can be found in Article 2(4), which states: “All members [of the United 
Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.” The exception for self-defense is presented in Article 51: “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of an individual or collective self-defense.” The response to threats to 
international peace and security is established in Chapter VII, Article 39: “The Security Council shall determine the 
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In practice, the right to self-defense outlined in Article 51 has been interpreted to include 
anticipatory self-defense, which allows states to lawfully use force to address immediate threats 
to their security before an armed attack takes place (Arend and Beck 1993, 79). Similarly, the 
Chapter VII provision for addressing threats to international peace and security and related 
agreements such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 2005 World Summit resolutions 
legitimate the use of military force to protect foreign civilians (Bellamy 2006; Finnemore 2003, 
79). Within this framework, both humanitarian and security justifications can thus provide 
legitimate rationales for military action. However, the use of military intervention to promote a 
leader’s own domestic political agenda, in line with theories of diversionary war, violates the 
prohibition on “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state” and is an illegitimate rationale for intervention (United Nations 1945, Article 2(4)). 
Building on these definitions, the insincere categories present respondents with a scenario 
in which experts disputed the president’s justifications for the military action but thought there 
was a legitimate explanation for intervention. These conditions are in line with conflicts in which 
leaders attempt to spin a military action they believe will be necessary but unpopular 
(Mearsheimer 2011, 16). In the insincere humanitarian condition, the president emphasizes 
humanitarian concerns while experts claim the intervention is primarily motivated by threats to 
U.S. national security. Similarly, in the insincere security condition, the president justifies 
intervention based on threats to U.S. national security while experts claim military action would 
primarily address humanitarian concerns. For the combined justification categories, the 
experiment varies the sincerity of one justification at a time. In the insincere humanitarian 
combination, the president uses humanitarian and security justifications while experts claim the 
																																																						
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
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intervention would only address security objectives. The insincere security combination reverses 
this pattern and respondents are told that while the president used both humanitarian and security 
justifications, experts claim the intervention would only address humanitarian objectives. The 
insincere combination conditions represent cases in which the president tells half-truths by 
including one deceptive justification alongside an accepted explanation for military action.  
In contrast to the insincere conditions, in the final three conditions experts claim the 
president employed deception to cover up an otherwise illegitimate military action. For each 
category of justifications—humanitarian, security, and combined—respondents were told that 
most experts said the president’s explanation “was a story to cover up the President’s own 
political agenda.” These scenarios represent the most severe cases of deception and prime the 
possibility that the president is pursuing a diversionary war. The illegitimate scenarios are in line 
with concerns that the salience of humanitarian appeals creates an incentive for leaders to use 
these claims as a pretext for otherwise illegitimate and unpopular interventions (Goodman 2006). 
Measuring Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 In addition to support for the treatment scenario, the survey experiment also measured 
individuals’ foreign policy beliefs using the questions detailed in Chapter 4. As before, the 
indicators for cooperative and militant internationalism are drawn from the standard measures of 
foreign policy orientations validated by Kertzer et al. (2014, Appendix) and the measure of 
isolationism is drawn from the Chicago Council Survey questions used by Mandelbaum and 
Schneider (1979, 42–43). Based on their responses, individuals can be divided into three groups: 
cooperative internationalists, militant internationalists, and isolationists.39 
																																																						
39 The foreign policy beliefs question asked respondents to choose from a randomized list: “Which of the following 
best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the world.” Cooperative internationalists selected: “It 
is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and 
pollution.” Militant internationalists chose: “It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to 
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The Consequences of Deception 
 After providing information about the president’s justifications and experts’ responses, 
the survey asked a series of questions to investigate the extent to which leaders are punished for 
deception and the long-term consequences of insincere justifications. I consider three dimensions 
along which leaders can face political backlash as punishment for deception: support for the 
intervention, support for the president, and trust in the president. To gauge whether increasing 
deception undermines public consent for military action, the survey first asked respondents 
whether they supported the hypothetical intervention. Alongside questions about the mechanisms 
of individual support and expected intervention outcomes, respondents were then presented with 
questions designed to measure the influence of deception on the president’s reputation. The first 
gauged the potential electoral costs of deception by asking: “If the hypothetical president were 
running for reelection, how likely would you be to vote for him?” The second captured whether 
deception decreased trust in the president relative to experts, asking: “To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the following statement: The president described the situation in Numar 
accurately.” 
 In addition to short-term political costs, the survey also probed the long-term 
consequences of deception by asking respondents to consider and report their support for a future 
humanitarian crisis. This scenario was designed to evaluate whether the misuse of humanitarian 
claims undermines the public’s commitment to preventing future mass atrocities. All respondents 
were first told that they would read about “another situation this hypothetical president faced 
about a year after taking military action in Numar.” They were then presented with a statement 
from the hypothetical president that combined the rhetoric used to condemn genocides in 
																																																						
ensure world peace.” Isolationists reported that: “It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world 
affairs.” See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of these indicators, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.   
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Rwanda and Bosnia and more recent humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria. As in the original 
scenario, the quotes were designed to mirror the language used by presidents from both parties in 
response to past conflicts. In his address to the nation about this future crisis, the hypothetical 
president said:  
…tonight I have received gruesome evidence that genocide is taking place in 
Rundu. Innocent civilians, including women and children, are being massacred in 
their homes by neighbors who support Rundu’s government. The United States 
cannot be the world’s police force, but when we can stop children from being killed 
in their own homes, we have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful 
deliberation, I have determined the United States must respond to this crisis with 
military action. 
 
Following this statement, respondents were asked if they would oppose or favor U.S. military 
action in this situation.  
 Probing current and future attitudes in a single survey limits the external validity of the 
findings—respondents are less likely to remember the details and critiques of a previous 
intervention when years rather than minutes have passed. In light of this challenge, the results for 
future interventions should be interpreted as a most likely case for capturing negative effects of 
deception. If information about deceptive justifications is not salient enough to influence 
respondents’ attitudes towards humanitarian efforts moments later, it is unlikely to undermine 
humanitarian efforts that occur weeks, months, or years in the future.  
 Taken as a whole, the survey experiment uncovers the conditions under which presidents 
are punished for deceptive justifications and highlights the short and long-term consequences of 
deceptive claims. The experimental design also tests the domestic coalition argument’s 
expectation that the misuse of humanitarian claims is constrained by the same individuals they 
are intended to persuade. The follow sections present the results and evaluate the hypotheses 
related to each of these questions. 
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 The Political Costs of Deception 
 Before examining how foreign policy beliefs shape responses to deception, the first step 
is to determine the extent to which the public punishes leaders for their use of deceptive claims. 
To distinguish between the ongoing debates over the role of deception in democracies, this 
section presents results for the public’s aggregate response to deceptive claims. The findings 
illustrate the short-term and long-term political costs of deceptive rhetoric. Table 5.3 summarizes 
the relevant hypotheses and their observable implications in the context of official justifications 
for military action.  
Table 5.3 Alternative Explanations for the Aggregate Effects of Deception 
Hypothesis Observable Implications 
H5.1: Deception works. The public responds 
positively to deceptive claims and leaders do 
not face political backlash. 
• Support for intervention does not 
significantly decline as deception 
increases. 
• Support for the president’s reelection 
does not significantly decline as 
deception increases. 
• Belief that the president described the 
situation accurately does not 
significantly decline as deception 
increases. 
 
H5.2: Deception is not effective. The public 
responds negatively to deceptive claims and 
leaders face political backlash. 
• Support for intervention significantly 
declines as deception increases. 
• Support for the president’s reelection 
significantly declines as deception 
increases. 
• Belief that the president described the 
situation accurately significantly 
declines as deception increases. 
 
 
Backlash and Support for Intervention 
The first and most immediate dimension along which deceptive claims can generate 
backlash is by diminishing support for the intervention justified in insincere terms. Findings that 
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show support is not significantly reduced would provide evidence for hypothesis 5.1 (deception 
works), while evidence that support declines significantly would be consistent with hypothesis 
5.2 (deception is not effective). Table 5.4 outlines the proportion of respondents who supported 
intervention in each condition. The results indicate that deception creates a negative backlash in 
support for the intervention, but this effect is not consistent across all categories of justifications.  
 
Table 5.4 Aggregate Support by Level of Deception 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.59 
(0.52, 0.67) 
0.54 
(0.46, 0.62) 
 
0.62 
(0.54, 0.69) 
Insincere 0.36 
(0.28, 0.44) 
0.42 
(0.34, 0.50) 
 
0.55# 
(0.47, 0.63) 
0.51## 
(0.43, 0.59) 
Illegitimate 0.30 
(0.23, 0.37) 
0.35 
(0.27, 0.42) 
0.33 
(0.25, 0.40) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
Compared to both types of deceptive claims—insincere and illegitimate—sincere 
justifications received consistently and significantly higher support. Individuals also consistently 
offered the lowest levels of support when experts reported that the underlying intervention was 
illegitimate. However, the difference between support for insincere and illegitimate justifications 
was only statistically significant in the combined categories, which suggests leaders face 
comparable levels of backlash for deceptive justifications regardless of the legitimacy of the 
alternative rationale experts provide for the underlying intervention. Additionally, comparing 
support across rows fails to provide evidence of a significant difference in the costs associated 
with deceptive humanitarian versus security justifications—deception carries the same costs 
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regardless of its content. This pattern is consistent with the expectations of liberal institutionalist 
arguments, summarized in hypothesis 5.2, which expect deceptive justifications to be ineffective 
and thus rare among democratic leaders.  
Despite the overall trend, the combined justification categories highlight the conditions 
under which presidents can reap the benefits of deceptive justifications without facing a 
significant backlash against the intervention. In the insincere combined categories, the president 
employed half-truths, combining either a sincere security justification with a deceptive 
humanitarian claim or a sincere humanitarian justification with a deceptive security claim. The 
results show that support did not significantly decrease when experts believed the president used 
deceptive humanitarian claims alongside sincere security justifications to explain a security-
driven intervention. Similarly, a narrow majority of respondents continued to support 
intervention when experts accused the president of employing deceptive security justifications 
alongside sincere humanitarian appeals. These findings imply that leaders can employ half-truths 
to bolster the support from a broad audience without the risk of backlash.  
Deception and Reelection 
 In addition to backlash against the relevant intervention, a president accused of deception 
also faces backlash against his reelection and reputation.40 First, democratic accountability for 
the use of force is rooted in the public’s ability to vote against leaders who act contrary to its 
interests. To examine the extent to which deceptive claims have electoral consequences, Table 
5.5 reports the proportion of respondents who were likely to vote for the president’s reelection 
based on the level of deception.  
  
																																																						
40 The survey experiment also examined whether deception influenced opinions about how well the president 
handled the crisis. Responses to this question correlate closely with respondents’ willingness to support the 
president’s reelection and are reported in the appendix.  
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Table 5.5 Reported Likelihood of Voting to Reelect the President 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.60 
(0.52, 0.68) 
0.60 
(0.52, 0.68) 
 
0.63 
(0.55, 0.71) 
Insincere 0.41 
(0.33, 0.49) 
0.43 
(0.35, 0.51) 
 
0.53# 
(0.45, 0.61) 
0.57## 
(0.49, 0.65) 
Illegitimate 0.41 
(0.33, 0.49) 
0.39 
(0.31, 0.47) 
0.34 
(0.27, 0.42) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
 The results confirm that democratic leaders risk an electoral backlash if they use 
deceptive justifications. Across all categories of justifications, the majority of respondents 
reported being likely to vote for the president’s reelection when experts confirmed his account of 
military action. However, when experts cast doubt on the president’s rationale for action—either 
by suggesting that the military action was driven by an alternative explanation or was 
illegitimate—the proportion of respondents willing to support the president’s bid for reelection 
declined significantly to include a minority of individuals. These results illustrate that presidents 
who use deceptive justifications risk backlash at the polls and are consistent with the 
expectations of hypothesis 5.2. However, as before, the findings also suggest presidents can 
circumvent political backlash by combining sincere and insincere justifications. In both of the 
insincere combined conditions, presidents who told half-truths received likely votes from a 
majority of participants. The negative effects of deception were further mitigated in the insincere 
security combination where the proportion of respondents likely to vote for the president was not 
statistically different from those who read two sincere justifications.  
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Deception and Presidential Authority 
  The evidence suggests that in the short-term deceptive justifications lower support for 
the intervention and reduce respondents’ willingness to vote for the president. From this 
perspective, leaders are punished for deception and the risk of political costs should provide a 
disincentive for the use of deceptive justifications outside of the context of half-truths. However, 
theories of belief perseverance suggest that deceptive justifications may be worth the risk 
because they allow leaders to set the terms of the debate and influence individuals’ long-term 
perceptions of the conflict. Information advantages magnify these benefits in the case of 
presidents’ justifications for military action. To investigate whether presidents’ authority on 
matters of foreign policy mitigates the short-term risks of deception, Table 5.6 reports the 
proportion of respondents who agreed the president described the situation accurately. These 
findings clarify the weight respondents placed on the president’s account of the situation relative 
to information from experts.  
Table 5.6 Agree the President Described the Situation Accurately 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.82 
(0.76, 0.88) 
0.62 
(0.55, 0.70) 
 
0.78 
(0.71, 0.84) 
Insincere 0.57 
(0.49, 0.65) 
0.46 
(0.38, 0.54) 
 
0.57# 
(0.49, 0.65) 
0.66## 
(0.59, 0.74) 
Illegitimate 0.55 
(0.47, 0.63) 
0.46 
(0.39, 0.54) 
0.49 
(0.41, 0.57) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
 While increased deception significantly decreased the proportion of respondents who 
thought the president described the situation accurately, the decline was less dramatic than the 
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drops in support and votes reported above. Across both the insincere and illegitimate categories, 
almost half of all respondents viewed the president’s explanation as accurate. This evidence is 
consistent with the expectation that the public views the president as the authority on military 
action and suggests that experts must meet a heavy burden of proof to convince the public that 
alternative accounts are correct. Surprisingly, respondents’ trust in the president’s accuracy was 
lowest in the security conditions. While not conclusive, this implies that individuals may require 
more evidence to believe a conflict poses a direct threat to U.S. national security than to believe 
the conflict poses a humanitarian threat to foreign civilians.41  
Combined, the aggregate results suggest that there are immediate and political costs 
associated with deceptive justifications. Leaders who rely on insincere claims risk undermining 
support for military action and losing votes, consistent with the argument that democratic 
institutions constrain the president’s ability to lie to their publics about military action. However, 
the risks associated with deception are not absolute. Instead, the findings also indicate that 
leaders can mitigate these costs by relying on half-truths to bolster support and by using their 
institutional authority to shape long-term perceptions of the intervention. In short, leaders can 
manage the costs of deception as long as insincere claims are accompanied by a grain of truth. 
However, this strategy will only be effective in circumventing domestic dissent if the relevant 
domestic coalition—cooperative and militant internationalists—is persuaded by the half-truth. 
The following section disaggregates public opinion to evaluate the domestic coalition argument 
and investigate this claim in greater detail.  
 
																																																						
41 Alternatively, individuals could infer other information from humanitarian justifications and assume that 
humanitarian interventions will be faster, easier, or cheaper. However, Kreps and Maxey (2017) demonstrate that 
support for humanitarian interventions operates through a sense of moral obligation rather than assumptions about 
the relative costs or consequences of military action. 
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Who Responds to Deception 
In the context of the domestic coalition argument, the aggregate results imply that leaders 
can employ half-truths that combine deceptive humanitarian justifications with sincere security 
claims to build a broad coalition of support. However, as Chapter 4 showed, the composition of 
the domestic coalition matters as much as its magnitude and the use of half-truths will only be 
effective if they persuade cooperative internationalists. Despite the aggregate results, convincing 
cooperative internationalists is not a given—their focus on humanitarian objectives and 
attentiveness to politics make these individuals particularly attuned to the misuse of humanitarian 
claims. Additionally, because cooperative internationalists are also the most likely source of 
active opposition, their dissent can impose political costs that do not appear in the aggregate. To 
more accurately capture the potential for costly backlash, this section examines the extent to 
which individuals’ underlying foreign policy beliefs influence their response to deception. Table 
5.7 summarizes the relevant hypotheses and observable implications.  
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Table 5.7 Hypothesized Effects of Deception by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
Hypothesis Observable Implications 
H5.3a: Individuals with cooperative 
internationalist beliefs are most sensitive to 
deceptive humanitarian justifications. 
Among cooperative internationalists: 
• Support for intervention declines 
significantly when the leader uses 
humanitarian claims deceptively.  
• Support for the president’s reelection 
declines significantly when the leader 
uses humanitarian claims deceptively. 
• Attitudes towards security 
justifications are not significantly 
influenced by deception. 
 
H5.3b: Individuals with militant 
internationalist beliefs are sensitive to 
deceptive security justifications, but are not 
sensitive to deceptive humanitarian 
justifications. 
Among militant internationalists: 
• Support for intervention significantly 
when the leader uses security claims 
deceptively. 
• Support for the president’s reelection 
declines significantly when the leader 
uses security claims deceptively. 
• Attitudes towards humanitarian 
justifications are not significantly 
influenced by deception. 
H5.3c: The attitudes of individuals with 
isolationist beliefs are not significantly 
influenced by the presence of deception. 
Among isolationists: 
• Support for intervention is low but 
does not significantly decline when 
the leader uses deceptive claims. 
• Support for the president’s reelection 
does not significantly decline when 
the leader uses deceptive claims.  
 
 
The Backlash of Cooperative Internationalists 
 To evaluate these hypotheses, Table 5.8 reports the effect of increasing deception on 
individuals’ support for humanitarian justifications based on their underlying foreign policy 
beliefs. In line with the expectations of the domestic coalition argument, cooperative 
internationalists’ support for intervention dropped dramatically and significantly when expert 
information contradicted the president’s humanitarian appeal. Additionally, cooperative 
internationalists are the only group that reported a significant decline in support. While no group 
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approved of the use of humanitarian claims as a cover for illegitimate military action, the support 
of militant internationalists and isolationists did not significantly change when experts suggested 
the humanitarian justification was insincere. Individuals with cooperative internationalist values 
thus appear to be more responsive to the misuse of humanitarian justifications than groups with 
alternative foreign policy beliefs. The reduced support of cooperative internationalists—who are 
key to building stable domestic coalitions—suggests that presidents cannot effectively rely on 
humanitarian claims as the sole pretext for security-driven or illegitimate interventions. Instead, 
leaders who attempt to misuse these claims will face a backlash in support from the very group 
humanitarian justifications are intended to persuade.   
Table 5.8 Effect of Sincerity of Humanitarian Justifications on Support for 
Intervention by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
Sincere 0.61 
(0.05) 
0.78 
(0.06) 
0.21 
(0.08) 
 
Insincere 
 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.73 
(0.07) 
 
0.11 
(0.06) 
 
Illegitimate 
 
0.33*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.42*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
N 254 121 81 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each 
level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 In addition to a backlash against the intervention itself, Table 5.9 provides evidence that 
the backlash in respondents’ willingness to support the president’s reelection bid is driven by 
cooperative internationalists.42 While the misuse of humanitarian justifications made cooperative 
internationalists significantly less willing to support the president’s reelection, the support of 
																																																						
42 Cooperative internationalists’ agreement that the president described the situation accurately also declined 
significantly as deception increases. Full results are reported in the appendix.   
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militant internationalists and isolationists was not significantly changed. Combined, these 
findings imply that cooperative internationalists are both most responsive to and the central force 
that punishes leaders for the deceptive use of humanitarian claims. If cooperative 
internationalists did not play a key role in the domestic coalition, presidents would have more 
leeway to misuse humanitarian appeals.  
Table 5.9 Effect of Sincerity of Humanitarian Justifications on Support for 
President’s Reelection by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
Sincere 0.64 
(0.05) 
0.69 
(0.07) 
0.29 
(0.09) 
 
Insincere 
 
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.70 
(0.07) 
 
0.18 
(0.07) 
 
Illegitimate 
 
0.45** 
(0.05) 
 
0.47** 
(0.08) 
 
0.21 
(0.08) 
N 254 121 81 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each 
level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
The Misuse of Security Justifications 
 Given that cooperative internationalists hold leaders accountable for the misuse of 
humanitarian justifications, the question becomes: are these individuals equally sensitive to all 
deceptive justifications? The domestic coalition argument contends that cooperative 
internationalists are particularly sensitive to the misuse of humanitarian appeals because they: 1) 
care most about humanitarian objectives, and 2) are attuned to foreign policy decisions. This 
same logic suggests that militant internationalists, who are also attuned to foreign policy 
decisions but care most about security objectives, are especially responsive to the misuse of 
security justifications. From this view, there is a division of labor among the groups that impose 
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costs for deception—cooperative internationalists punish leaders for abusing humanitarian 
appeals, while militant internationalists punish leaders for the deceptive use of security 
explanations. Isolationists are consistent opponents but their backlash carries few political 
costs—they offer low levels of support for military action, regardless of the level of deception, 
and are unlikely to become a vocal opposition. 
 In line with these expectations, Table 5.10 reports support for security justifications based 
on both the level of sincerity and individuals’ foreign policy beliefs. The results show that 
cooperative internationalists’ support for the security-driven intervention was consistently low, 
but did not significantly decline when security justifications appeared insincere. Only when 
experts suggested the underlying intervention was illegitimate did cooperative internationalists’ 
support drop significantly. Cooperative internationalists thus appear to be less persuaded by 
security justifications, but also less sensitive their misuse.  
Table 5.10. Effect of Sincerity on Security Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Cooperative Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
Sincere 0.48 
(0.05) 
 
0.82 
(0.06) 
 
0.33 
(0.10) 
 
Insincere 0.40 
(0.05) 
 
0.59** 
(0.07) 
 
0.07* 
(0.06) 
 
Illegitimate 0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.62** 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
N 257 130 64 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at each level 
of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign policy belief. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Alternatively, information that the president used deceptive security claims significantly 
reduced support among militant internationalists by more than 20 points. While the insincere 
condition still received the support of a majority of militant internationalists, the dramatic decline 
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among the most enthusiastic supporters of military action is substantively threatening to the 
stability of the domestic coalition. Additionally, as expected, isolationists offered the lowest 
support for security justifications across all levels of deception. Isolationists’ support 
significantly decreased when experts disputed the president’s justifications, but because the 
decline moves support from very low to extremely low, the substantive consequences of this 
change are negligible.  
Half-Truths and Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Disaggregating responses to deception reveals that cooperative internationalists impose 
costs for the misuse of humanitarian claims, while militant internationalists impose costs for the 
misuse of security claims. When combined, the threat of punishment from both segments of the 
domestic coalition provides a disincentive that prevents deception. To clarify the conditions 
under which internationalists constrain deception, the question then becomes: do half-truths 
allow leaders to mitigate the backlash from these individuals? 
To address this question, Table 5.11 outlines the proportion of respondents who 
supported intervention in conditions where the president combined humanitarian and security 
justifications. The findings imply that presidents can avoid backlash from both cooperative and 
militant internationalists when deceptive justifications are combined with sincere explanations. 
While support decreased slightly, there is no significant difference in cooperative 
internationalists’ support for the sincere combination compared to the combination of deceptive 
humanitarian and sincere security claims. Similarly, the support of militant internationalists did 
not significantly decline when insincere humanitarian claims were used alongside a sincere 
security justification. There was a significant drop in support among militant internationalists in 
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the insincere security combination; however, this condition retained support from the majority of 
militant internationalists.  
Table 5.11 Effect of Sincerity on Support for Combined Justifications  
 Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
Sincere 0.60 
(0.05) 
0.83 
(0.06) 
0.31 
(0.09) 
 
Insincere 
Humanitarian 
 
0.53 
(0.05) 
 
0.86 
(0.06) 
 
0.25 
(0.08) 
 
Insincere 
Security 
 
0.52 
(0.05) 
 
0.67* 
(0.08) 
 
0.30 
(0.09) 
 
Illegitimate 
 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
 
0.43*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.18 
(0.09) 
N 339 168 98 
Table reports results of two-tailed tests of proportions that compare support at 
each level of deception to the sincere baseline within each category of foreign 
policy belief. Standard errors reported in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
 
The Domestic Coalition and Democratic Accountability 
 Overall, these results indicate that insincere or illegitimate justifications alone cannot 
effectively generate support for intervention. Through a variety of political costs, cooperative 
and militant internationalists punish leaders who use deceptive justifications to make the case for 
military action. Cooperative internationalists hold leaders to account for deceptive humanitarian 
claims, while militant internationalists impose costs for the misuse of security justifications. On 
the surface, the findings appear to be good news for democratic accountability for the use of 
force—leaders face significant, immediate, and electoral consequences when caught attempting 
to deceive their publics. However, even internationalists can be persuaded by half-truths. 
Presidents can thus reap the benefits of humanitarian appeals, even in security-driven 
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interventions, as long as these justifications supplement uncontested security claims. These 
incentives and constraints help account for the prevalent use and limited prominence of 
humanitarian justifications in post-Cold War interventions, illustrated in Chapter 3.  
 So far, the experimental results presented here and in the previous chapter indicate that 
adding humanitarian claims to security justifications bolsters the support of cooperative 
internationalists, but the support of these individuals is also particularly sensitive to insincere 
humanitarian claims. Presidents can mitigate backlash from cooperative internationalists by 
employing half-truths that combine sincere security and insincere humanitarian appeals. In this 
case, the support of cooperative internationalists is not significantly different from their support 
for sincere humanitarian claims, but it is also statistically similar to their support for sincere 
security justifications (see Chapter 4, Table 4.8). The similarity of support levels raises the 
question: Can the addition of insincere humanitarian justifications generate more support from 
cooperative internationalists than sincere security justifications alone? The results presented 
above and previously in Table 4.8 cannot speak directly to this question because comparing 
diagonally across the columns in Table 5.1 varies two factors at once: the presence of a 
humanitarian justification and information about experts’ agreement or disagreement with the 
president. Consequently, it is not possible to disentangle the extent to which any differences or 
similarities in cooperative internationalists’ support are driven by the addition of a humanitarian 
appeal versus information that experts think the president could be lying. Thus, while presidents 
have a clear incentive to use humanitarian justifications in a manner that appears sincere or does 
not draw attention to their insincerity—i.e., by limiting their emphasis in primarily security-
driven interventions—the exact threshold at which the benefits of humanitarian half-truths are 
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sufficient to build and maintain a stable domestic coalition remains an open question and an 
important area for future research.  
The Long-Term Consequences of Deception 
 To this point, I have focused on the immediate domestic benefits presidents gain from 
employing humanitarian justifications for military action. Adding a limited number of 
humanitarian claims to a security-driven intervention bolsters public support among the most 
likely opponents of intervention and is key to building a stable domestic coalition. However, the 
consistent use and misuse of humanitarian justifications has the potential to undermine the 
public’s support for humanitarian efforts in the long-term. To evaluate this risk, this section 
details participants’ responses to a second, future intervention scenario justified in exclusively 
humanitarian terms by the same hypothetical president.  
Support for Future Humanitarian Interventions 
Respondents were first asked whether they would favor or oppose U.S. military action in 
response to the future humanitarian crisis. This question gauged the extent to which exposure to 
deceptive justifications in one intervention influences individuals’ willingness to support future 
interventions. The results are outlined in Table 5.12.  
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Table 5.12 Favor U.S. Military Action in Future Humanitarian Crisis by Treatment 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.65 
(0.57, 0.73) 
0.70 
(0.63, 0.77) 
 
0.69 
(0.61, 0.76) 
Insincere 0.56 
(0.48, 0.64) 
0.65 
(0.58, 0.73) 
 
0.68# 
(0.61, 0.76) 
0.70## 
(0.62, 0.77) 
Illegitimate 0.61 
(0.54, 0.69) 
0.65 
(0.57, 0.72) 
0.63 
(0.55, 0.70) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparisons across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
Individuals who read sincere justifications from the president in the first scenario offer 
high levels of support for military action in the future humanitarian crisis. However, this group’s 
support for the future intervention was not statistically or substantively different from individuals 
who initially read insincere or illegitimate justifications. Respondents in the insincere 
humanitarian condition are the exception to this trend. These individuals offered significantly 
lower support for the future military action than respondents in any other treatment condition. 
Surprisingly, support in this condition was also significantly lower than support from individuals 
who received an illegitimate humanitarian justification in the first scenario. The substantive 
significance of this effect is muted by the fact that approval remained high and was not affected 
by the use of humanitarian claims as a pretext for illegitimate interventions—the type of abuse 
that has historically raised the most concern among human rights advocates and critics of 
military action. Therefore, while the misuse of humanitarian claims can reduce support for future 
interventions, this effect only appears when insincere humanitarian claims are used as a cover for 
security-driven interventions and may not be large enough to create a politically costly backlash. 
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Long-Term Effects on the President’s Reputation 
 Given the limited effects of deceptive humanitarian claims on support for future 
interventions, the question then becomes: does deception influence the president’s reputation in 
the long-term? The survey used two questions to gauge whether deception affected confidence in 
the president’s decisions about future interventions. First, respondents were asked if they trusted 
the president’s ability to handle the future humanitarian crisis. The levels of trust outlined in 
Table 5.13 are consistent with the effect of deception on support for the future intervention. 
Individuals’ trust in the president’s ability to handle the future humanitarian crisis is high across 
all categories of justifications. In line with the pattern of future support, individuals in the 
insincere humanitarian condition were the only respondents to offer a significantly lower degree 
of trust, on average, compared to the sincere condition.43 There is no evidence that the 
president’s past use of illegitimate claims significantly reduced trust in his ability to manage 
future military actions. 
Table 5.13 Trust the President’s Handling of the Future Humanitarian Crisis 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.74 
(0.67, 0.81) 
0.67 
(0.60, 0.75) 
 
0.69 
(0.62, 0.77) 
Insincere 0.58 
(0.50, 0.66) 
0.69 
(0.61, 0.76) 
 
0.68# 
(0.60, 0.75) 
0.65## 
(0.57, 0.72) 
Illegitimate 0.65 
(0.58, 0.73) 
0.61 
(0.54, 0.69) 
0.63 
(0.55, 0.71) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
																																																						
43 The difference in trust for the sincere humanitarian category and the insincere humanitarian category has a p-
value of 0.0040. 
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 The second question gauged the long-term effect of deception on the president’s authority 
by asking respondents if they believed the president had described the new humanitarian crisis 
accurately. The results in Table 5.14 indicate that previous evidence of deception did not 
undermine the president’s position as an authoritative source of information about the future 
intervention. Across all treatment conditions, regardless of whether experts disputed the 
president’s previous explanations for action, a strong majority of respondents believed the 
president had described the situation in Rundu accurately. This overwhelming confidence in the 
accuracy of the president’s account includes the insincere humanitarian condition, despite these 
respondents’ lower levels of support and trust in the president’s ability to handle this situation. 
Table 5.14 Agree the President Described the Crisis Accurately 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.81 
(0.75, 0.87) 
0.79 
(0.72, 0.85) 
 
0.82 
(0.76, 0.88) 
Insincere 0.77 
(0.70, 0.83) 
0.81 
(0.74, 0.87) 
 
0.77# 
(0.70, 0.84) 
0.84## 
(0.79, 0.90) 
Illegitimate 0.79 
(0.73, 0.86) 
0.79 
(0.73, 0.86) 
0.81 
(0.75, 0.87) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses to facilitate comparison across rows and down columns. 
#Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere security claim, sincere 
humanitarian claim. 
 
 Combined, the findings indicate that deception carries few long-term consequences for 
either future interventions or the credibility of the president. On the one hand, these results 
assuage the most extreme concerns about the misuse of humanitarian claims—the majority of 
individuals remained willing to support a humanitarian intervention to end mass atrocities even 
after the president used humanitarian justifications as a cover for security-driven or illegitimate 
interventions. On the other hand, the absence of any long-term consequences for the president’s 
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reputation suggests that the political backlash against deception may be short-lived. These results 
also underscore the previous findings that suggest leaders maintain authority over matters of 
foreign policy, even when their claims are disputed, and can use this authority to mitigate the 
political costs of deception.  
Conclusions and Implications 
 Humanitarian justifications are critical to mobilizing domestic support for military 
interventions, but do not given the president free rein to pursue military action. Instead, the 
experimental findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that for humanitarian claims to 
effectively bolster public support, the president must use them sincerely or in combination with 
undisputed security justifications. Presidents who rely on justifications that experts perceive as 
deceptive face immediate political backlash in terms of support for the intervention, their 
prospects for reelection, and confidence in their foreign policy. The negative consequences of 
deception are not limited to humanitarian justifications—leaders face comparable political costs 
for the use of deceptive security claims—but different segments of the public impose these costs 
for different justifications. Individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs punish leaders for 
the misuse of humanitarian justifications, while individuals with militant internationalist beliefs 
hold leaders accountable for deceptive security justifications.  
 Combined, the ineffectiveness of deceptive claims and success of half-truths helps 
explain the pattern of president’s humanitarian justifications outlined in Chapter 3. Leaders use 
humanitarian claims widely to bring cooperative internationalists into the domestic coalition, but 
will face political backlash if they use humanitarian claims as the primary rationale for action in 
security interventions. To avoid this backlash, leaders have a strong incentive to limit their 
emphasis of humanitarian claims in security-driven cases.  
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Taken as a whole, the experimental results presented here and in Chapter 4 demonstrate 
that individuals with cooperative internationalist values respond to humanitarian justifications as 
the domestic coalition argument expects. However, they cannot determine why presidents 
include humanitarian justifications in their communication strategies. Instead of an intentional 
strategy to target cooperative internationalists and build a stable domestic coalition, the support 
of cooperative internationalist could be a positive side effect of a communication plan designed 
for international or elite audiences. The following chapters employ case studies to disentangle 
the motivations behind presidents’ justifications and determine whether the White House 
develops communication strategies with the domestic coalition in mind.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
HUMANITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS, SECURITY GOALS:  
THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991 
 
 The preceding chapters establish that both the president’s pattern of justifications in the 
post-Cold War period and how the public responds to these justifications are consistent with the 
expectations of the domestic coalition argument. The evidence shows that presidents use 
humanitarian claims widely across both humanitarian and security interventions and that the 
inclusion of humanitarian appeals helps bring cooperative internationalists into the domestic 
coalition. However, leaders also limit the emphasis placed on humanitarian claims in security 
interventions and cooperative internationalists impose political costs on the president when 
humanitarian justifications appear insincere. Having illustrated the pattern of justifications and 
the public’s response, what remains to be seen is whether presidents know and care about the 
appeal of humanitarian claims and the sources heterogeneity in the public’s foreign policy 
beliefs. Does presidential rhetoric reflect a strategy aimed at building a domestic coalition among 
a public with diverse foreign policy preferences or is the pattern of humanitarian claims an 
unintentional side effect of strategies developed in response to other concerns?   
 While the intent behind a given strategy cannot be directly observed, this chapter 
employs a case study of the 1991 Gulf War to investigate the extent to which concern about the 
domestic coalition drives the development of presidents’ communication strategies in security 
interventions. I examine speech drafts, press guidance, meeting agendas, and internal memos to 
evaluate the when and why the George H.W. Bush administration included humanitarian claims 
in its public addresses. Within this case I consider: 1) the pattern of justifications, 2) whether 
justifications are part of a coherent communication strategy, 3) whether the administration 
considers the domestic coalition, and 4) how concerns about the domestic audience compare to 
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concern about the international audience and military objectives. The chapter uses the Gulf War 
case to investigate these questions because it represents one of the most consequential security 
interventions of the post-Cold War period.  
 In the remainder of the chapter I outline the case selection and structured questions that 
guide the qualitative analysis. The following section presents the expectations of the domestic 
coalition argument and alternative explanations, before turning to the details of the case. 
Examining the development of the communication strategy over the course of the Gulf War, 
shows that the Bush administration was sensitive to the need for public support, developed a 
coherent strategy aimed at persuading the domestic audience, recognized the diversity of public 
attitudes, and addressed this diversity to avoid backlash and domestic opposition.  
The Domestic Coalition in Context 
 The domestic coalition argument produces empirical expectations at three levels: 1) the 
pattern of justifications for action in national addresses, 2) the public’s response to the 
president’s justifications, and 3) the process through which the presidential administration 
develops its justification strategy. The quantitative evidence consistently supports the domestic 
coalition expectations. Chapter 3 demonstrates that presidents use humanitarian claims widely, 
but limit their emphasis in security interventions. Chapters 4 and 5 show that this strategy is not 
misguided. Humanitarian justifications persuade cooperative internationalists, but leaders face 
backlash from these same individuals if they over-emphasize humanitarian appeals. This chapter 
examines interactions between the president, his staff, and political elites to demonstrate that the 
Bush administration was both aware of and responsive to the importance of maintaining a stable 
coalition of domestic support than includes diverse foreign policy beliefs. It examines the White 
House’s communication strategy in the 1991 Gulf War to demonstrate that the consistent 
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presence of humanitarian claims in security interventions reflects an intentional strategy of the 
White House, directed towards key players in the domestic coalition. 
 The domestic coalition argument has three implications for the process through which 
presidential administrations develop communication strategies for military interventions. First, it 
implies that justification strategies are driven primarily by the administration’s concern with 
generating support from the domestic audience rather than the international audience or political 
elites. Second, the argument suggests that presidents and their staffs recognize that the domestic 
audience holds diverse views about foreign policy and that uniting across these views is 
important for building and maintaining support. While presidents are unlikely to refer to 
individuals as cooperative internationalists, they acknowledge groups that hold the same 
underlying values—a preference for cooperative approaches to conflict and concern with non-
military objectives—will be skeptical of the use of force and develop communication strategies 
that appeal to the broadest possible audience. Third, in addition to recognizing diverse foreign 
policy attitudes, the domestic coalition explanation also expects concern about backlash to 
constrain presidents’ emphasis of humanitarian claims in security interventions. In the 
development of communication strategies, the available justifications are limited by the risk the 
same groups that are skeptical of military action will impose political costs if leaders stretch 
humanitarian claims too far.  
Alternative Explanations 
 If the domestic coalition argument is correct, documents from the Gulf War are expected 
to reveal that the White House considered the domestic audience in the development of it 
justification strategy and aimed to unite across different foreign policy beliefs while avoiding 
backlash against the misuse of humanitarian claims. However, the pattern of humanitarian 
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justifications illustrated in Chapter 3 could be the side effect of three alternative processes: 
attention to the international audience, elite debate, and humanitarian objectives. The domestic 
coalition argument and the first two alternatives are not mutually exclusive—presidents may 
employ humanitarian claims to meet multiple domestic and international goals simultaneously—
however, evidence that the international audience was the primary target of the White House 
communication strategy would falsify the domestic coalition hypothesis. Additionally, evidence 
in support of the humanitarian objective alternative would suggest that humanitarian 
justifications are not part of a strategic communication plan and stand in direct contradiction to 
the domestic coalition explanation. 
First, rather than targeting the domestic audience, humanitarian claims could be intended 
to appease the international audience. International support is critical for facilitating burden-
sharing, maintaining the legitimacy of the operation, and avoiding open-ended commitments of 
troops and resources (Hurd 1999; Kreps 2007; Milner and Tingley 2013; Thompson 2006). 
Humanitarian justifications evoke the international norms of humanitarian intervention and 
reinforce “basic rules of the system about what action is permitted and where the boundaries of 
sovereign control lie” (Finnemore 2003, 2). Given their link to international standards for 
military action, presidents could include humanitarian justifications in an attempt to build 
international support for intervention. If the international audience is the target of humanitarian 
justifications, the president is expected to primarily emphasize humanitarian claims in response 
to international dissent.  
Second, humanitarian justifications could be included to placate other political elites and 
ensure elite cues do not undermine support for intervention (Berinsky 2007, 2009; Brody 1991; 
Western 2005). As Saunders suggests, “the importance of elite cues yields strategic incentives 
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for leaders to bargain with and accommodate key elites, who can impose costs on leaders that 
may influence how democracies use force in ways unanticipated by voter-driven accounts” 
(Saunders 2015, 467). In this case, presidents are expected to emphasize humanitarian claims 
primarily in response to dissent from opinion leaders or to appease skeptical actors within the 
administration. In practice, justification strategies are not mono-causal, and within any given 
intervention humanitarian claims can be used to appeal to all three of these audiences. However, 
the case study demonstrates that concern about the domestic coalition is the primary mechanism 
behind the administration’s use of humanitarian claims.  
By contrast, the final alternative stands in direct opposition to the domestic coalition 
argument. Rather than providing evidence of a strategic appeal to key audiences, this alternative 
suggests that the prevalence of humanitarian claims reflects the prevalence of humanitarian 
objectives in contemporary interventions. The confluence of the unfreezing of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) following the end of the Cold War, expanding definition of 
humanity following decolonization, and evolving human rights norms placed increased attention 
on the treatment of civilians during war (Crawford 2002; Evangelista 2014, 3; Finnemore 
1996a). These changes both enabled humanitarian interventions and increased the salience of 
humanitarian objectives focused on saving strangers (Wheeler 2000). From this perspective, 
humanitarian justifications are evidence of changes in the nature of security interventions rather 
than a strategic effort to bolster support for military action. If humanitarian justifications reflect 
humanitarian objectives, the prominence of these justifications in public addresses should mirror 
their prominence in internal discussions of military strategy.  
Table 6.1 summarizes the expectations and observable implications for the domestic 
coalition argument and each of the three alternative explanations.  
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Table 6.1 Explanations and Observable Implications 
Explanation Observable Implications 
Domestic Coalition 
• Discussions of speeches focus on domestic audience and 
consider how justifications resonate with different groups. 
• Speeches targeted at subgroups with cooperative 
internationalist values rather than the national audience 
place particular emphasis on humanitarian arguments. 
• Humanitarian justifications are present throughout the 
intervention. 
• Officials voice concern about backlash against the overuse 
of humanitarian claims. 
International Audience • Humanitarian claims appear primarily in response to international dissent. 
Elite Debate 
• Humanitarian claims appear primarily in response to 
dissent from opinion leaders or following internal debates 
about the prudence of intervention. 
Humanitarian Objectives 
• The emphasis of humanitarian claims in external speeches 
mirrors the prominence of humanitarian objectives in 
internal discussions. 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
 To evaluate the validity of alternative explanations for the pattern of humanitarian 
justifications, this chapter conducts a case study of the Gulf War. The analysis begins with Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and ending following the withdraw of Iraqi troops and the 
end of coalition attacks on February 28, 1991. It includes both Operation Desert Shield, which 
deployed defensive forces to Saudi Arabia, and Operation Desert Storm, which engaged in 
combat operations against the Iraqi Army.  
Structured Questions 
 To structure the analysis, I rely on set questions to evaluate the theoretical expectations 
outlined in Table 6.1 (George and Bennett 2005; Saunders 2015, 47). Specifically, the case study 
is structured around six sets of questions: 1) What is the pattern of justifications? 2) Are 
justifications part of a coherent communication strategy? 3) Is the administration concerned with 
public opinion? Does it recognize diversity in the public’s foreign policy beliefs? 4) Is the 
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administration concerned with domestic opposition? From what sources? 5) How does concern 
with the domestic audience compare to concern with other audiences? and 6) To what extent 
does the prevalence of humanitarian justifications reflect humanitarian objectives? 
Answers to these questions are based on archival materials collected from the George 
H.W. Bush Presidential Library.44 My data collection efforts focused on files from: 1) the 
communications staff, including drafts of national addresses, press guidance, and internal memos 
and meeting agendas, 2) domestic political advisors, including memos and meetings involving 
the Chief of Staff, election campaign staff, reports from and communications with polling firms, 
and communications with Congress, and 3) diplomatic and military advisors, including memos 
and meetings with the State Department, National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs. 
Documents from communications staff and domestic advisors examine whether humanitarian 
claims are part of an intentional strategy designed to maintain a domestic coalition of support. 
Following Druckman and Jacobs (2011, 2015), internal polling data sheds light on the groups the 
White House considers strategically important. Documents from diplomatic and military 
advisors are used to evaluate the international audience and humanitarian objectives alternatives. 
Comparing communication between the different actors allows me to consider whether 
justifications are a product of internal elite debates. 
Foreign Policy Beliefs in Context 
 As outlined in Chapter 2, I expect the White House to acknowledge and adapt its message 
to appeal across sources of heterogeneity in the public’s foreign policy beliefs. However, I do not 
expect leaders and communications staff to discuss these divisions in the same cooperative and 
																																																						
44 This research and the archival materials presented in Chapter 7 were supported by a National Science Foundation 
Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, No. 155974. 
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militant internationalist language used by political scientists. The unlikely presence of this 
standardized language within the White House presents a challenge for the case studies in terms 
of identifying when attention to specific constituencies reflects a concern with cooperative or 
militant internationalists. To overcome this challenge, I use two strategies to classify groups 
within the cases as cooperative or militant internationalists. First, I consider the issues the group 
raised in its expressions of support or opposition and map these issues onto the value dimensions 
associated with cooperative and militant internationalism. Groups that emphasize a preference 
for diplomatic strategies, the importance of using force only as a last resort, concern that the 
intervention meet just war standards, or hesitancy about the human costs of war are classified as 
holding positions consistent with cooperative internationalist values. Alternatively, groups that 
commend or lobby for overwhelming demonstrations of military force, criticize the White House 
for waiting to take military action, or view diplomacy as a weak, ineffective tool of foreign 
policy are consistent with militant internationalist values. Isolationists may take the form of 
either pacifists who cannot be convinced to support military action as a matter of principle or 
libertarians (Holsti and Rosenau 1996) who believe U.S. efforts to solve international problems 
only make the situation worse.  
 Second, studies of foreign policy beliefs and sample demographics from the surveys 
conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 shed light on the factors correlated with cooperative 
internationalism that are most likely to serve as proxies for this group in White House 
conversations. In their analysis of the structure of public foreign policy attitudes, Mandelbaum 
and Schneider’s (1979, 43) equivalent of cooperative internationalists are shown to be relatively 
young and well educated and less likely to be southerners. Demographic information collected as 
part of the survey experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5 show that women, liberals, and 
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college educated individuals were disproportionately associated with cooperative internationalist 
values. Based on these demographic trends, administrations that collect information about and 
tailor their communication strategy to appeal to students or young professionals, women, or 
liberals can be thought of as targeting the segments of the population most likely to hold 
cooperative internationalist values. The president’s concern with cooperative internationalists is 
thus likely to appear in archival materials as concern with persuading these demographic or 
interest groups. 
Conflict Overview 
 The buildup to the Gulf War began on August 2, 1990 when Iraqi forces invaded and 
occupied Kuwait. In remarks to reporters that afternoon, President George H.W. Bush 
condemned the military invasion and called for “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
all Iraqi forces” (G. H. W. Bush 1990a). At the same time, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) passed Resolution 660, the first of twelve resolutions, to condemn the invasion and 
demand that Iraqi forces withdraw (UNSC 1990a). In response to Iraqi aggression, the U.S. 
deployed defensive forces to Saudi Arabia to begin Operation Desert Shield on August 7, while 
the UN authorized the enforcement of sanctions and the use of “all means necessary” to remove 
Iraq from Kuwait if the government did not comply by January 15, 1991 (UNSC 1990b, 1990c). 
Amidst calls to give sanctions more time to work and pursue further diplomatic options, Bush 
gained the support of Congress and the U.S. launched Operation Desert Storm with airstrikes on 
Iraqi targets on January 19 and a ground invasion that began on February 24 (Clymer 1991). By 
February 27, Bush declared the liberation of Kuwait and on February 28 Iraq formally accepted 
all UN resolutions, marking the end of major U.S. combat operations.  
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Justifications for Action and Rhetorical Themes 
The Predominance of Security Justifications 
 By all accounts, the Bush administration had an “overabundance of acceptable rationales 
for using force” in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (Teeter 1990a). In line 
with this assessment, an Office of Speechwriting memo on Bush’s address to the VFW 
Convention in August 1990 described the:  
spectrum of justifications for our current military operation in the Middle East that 
ranges in persuasiveness from the most persuasive reason: that we are upholding 
world peace and the rule of law by standing up to naked aggression; to the less 
persuasive (though legitimate) argument that we are protecting America’s vital 
interest in preserving the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region to the rest of the 
world (J. Pinkerton 1990). 
 
From the early stages of the conflict, security justifications provided the predominant rationale 
for military action and served as the core theme of the White House’s communications strategy 
(“Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes” 1990). In his first address to the nation following the 
deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush continued the administration’s effort to frame 
U.S. involvement as vital to U.S. national security interests. The address explained that Bush 
“took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland,” which 
was vital to U.S. interests because “There is no justification whatsoever for this [Iraq’s] 
outrageous and brutal act of aggression. A puppet regime imposed from the outside is 
unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should 
doubt our desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront 
aggression” (G. H. W. Bush 1990b). Similar security justifications focused on defending U.S. 
interests in the region and rebuking Iraqi aggression provided the primary rationale for action 
throughout the conflict and were in line with the military objectives “to force Iraqi troops to 
leave Kuwait, to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait to its rightful place, and ensure 
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Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions” (Gear, n.d.). Discussions of national 
security also emphasized the strategic importance of Iraq and its threat to U.S. economic 
interests. For example, Bush explained, “An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the 
economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—
neighbors who control the lion’s share of the world’s remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a 
resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless” (G. H. W. Bush 1990e). 
The Use of Humanitarian Claims 
However, in addition to these security claims Bush’s national addresses and White House 
communications guidance also couched the intervention in moral terms and used humanitarian 
appeals to draw attention to the suffering of innocent citizens in Kuwait and Iraq. For example, 
in the same VFW address where Bush outlined his security rationale, the President began by 
asking the public for “support in a decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn 
what’s wrong” and referenced “the Iraqi government’s history of aggression against its own 
citizens” (G. H. W. Bush 1990b). As Figure 6.1 shows, humanitarian claims remained secondary 
in emphasis when compared to security justifications; however, humanitarian explanations 
appeared in national addresses throughout the conflict.  
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Figure 6.1 Relative Emphasis of Humanitarian and Security Justifications 
 
 
The most common humanitarian appeals centered around three alternative themes. First, 
they referenced Iraq’s treatment of Kuwait and the plight of the Kuwaiti people, asserting “The 
talks of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond 
belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say: This kind of treatment of people must end. 
And those who violate the Kuwait people must be brought to justice” (G. H. W. Bush 1990h). 
Second, Bush highlighted Saddam’s “history of aggression against its own citizens” (G. H. W. 
Bush 1990b) and noted that “We’ve seen him use chemical weapons on his own people” (G. H. 
W. Bush 1990h). Third, the national addresses drew attention to Saddam’s treatment of U.S. and 
other foreign hostages, expressing concern about “innocent people held against their will in 
direct contravention of international law. Then there’s this cynical and brutal policy of forcing 
people to beg for their release, parceling out human lives to families and traveling emissaries like 
so much chattel” (G. H. W. Bush 1990h). These themes contrasted Saddam’s human rights 
violations and use of human shields with assertions that the U.S. was doing everything it could to 
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minimize civilian casualties and allowed Bush to claim, “We have no argument with the people 
of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety” (G. H. W. Bush 
1991d). 
Multilateralism and the New World Order 
In addition to overarching security and humanitarian explanations, the multilateral nature 
of military action and the importance of protecting the nascent new world order dominated 
Bush’s national addresses. First, statements of multilateralism emphasized both the support of 
the international community—especially other Arab states—and burden-sharing in terms of 
financial costs and military risks. For example, in his first public remarks on the conflict, Bush 
noted that “It is important that the international community act together to ensure that Iraqi 
forces depart Kuwait immediately” (G. H. W. Bush 1990a). As the international coalition came 
together, Bush lauded the support of other nations, explaining, “As the deployment of the forces 
of the many nations show and as the votes in the United Nations show, this is not a matter 
between Iraq and the United States of America; it is between Iraq and the entire world 
community, Arab and non-Arab alike. All the nations of the world lined up to oppose 
aggression” (G. H. W. Bush 1990d). This multilateral support demonstrated the legitimacy of 
military action and allowed Bush to announce that “We’re more than willing to bear out [sic] fair 
share of the burden…But we also expect others to bear their fair share” and assert that “The 
United States will also seek burden-sharing for part of our own effort” (G. H. W. Bush 1990d). 
Second, protecting the hard-won new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War 
provided a bridge between Bush’s domestic theme of creating a “kinder, gentler nation” (Porter 
1990a) and the administration’s long-standing post-Cold War “vision thing” for U.S. foreign 
policy (Fitzwater 1989). To this end, Bush (1990d) explained that: 
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The consequences of our not doing so [helping Kuwait] would be 
incalculable because Iraq’s aggression is not just a challenge to the security 
of Kuwait and other Gulf nations but to the better world that we all have 
hoped to build in the wake of the Cold War. And therefore, we and our allies 
cannot and will not shirk our responsibilities. The state of Kuwait must be 
restored, or no nation will be safe and the promising future we anticipate 
will indeed be jeopardized.  
 
This new world order marked a dramatic shift from the Cold War era and was characterized by 
international cooperation, as well as respect for the rule of law and human rights. In the 
President’s words, “Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from 
the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in 
which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the 
strong respect the rights of the weak” (G. H. W. Bush 1990e). The UN also played a central role 
in this new world and the Gulf War provided the first opportunity to show that “We’re now in 
sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders” (G. H. W. Bush 1990e).  
 Combined, Iraq’s international aggression, brutal treatment of innocent civilians, the 
unity of the international coalition, and the threat to the new world order were the dominant and 
recurring themes in Bush’s national addresses during the Gulf War. The repeated use of 
humanitarian justifications in a conflict with no shortage of legitimate security explanations is in 
line with the domestic coalition argument. However, whether these justifications are part of a 
coherent communication strategy, the extent to which different justifications target different 
audiences, and the confluence of justification and military strategy remain open questions. The 
remainder of the case study addresses each of these questions in turn. 
Communication Strategies and the Importance of Public Opinion 
 A foundational assumption of domestic coalition argument is that justifications for 
military action are part of a coordinated and coherent communication strategy designed primarily 
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to influence domestic public opinion. This assumption stands in contrast to scholars who assert 
that the public inherently trusts the president on matters of foreign policy and expect the public 
to accept any justification as legitimate (Mearsheimer 2011). This section tests the assumption of 
a domestic focus and coherent strategy against the alternative by examining the Bush 
administration’s public statements and internal discussions during the Gulf War. Documents 
reveal that developing a coherent communications strategy was a primary focus of the White 
House in the buildup to military action and this strategy was both primarily concerned about and 
responsive to domestic public opinion.  
A Coherent, Consistent Communication Plan 
 First, official statements and addresses about the Gulf War show remarkable consistency 
over time and across sources. The coordination of language and themes is particularly clear in 
statements of military objectives. While National Security Council communications reveal that 
the administration considered multiple paths forward (National Security Council 1990b), the 
same objectives were presented in the same language and order across time and spokesperson. 
For example, “the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,” “restoration of Kuwait’s 
legitimate government,” and “security and stability for the region” appear in the President’s 
September 11, 1990 Address to Joint Session of Congress, Secretary of State James Baker’s 
statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1990, Bush’s 
Christmas Eve message to the troops on December 24, 1990, and press guidance for “January 
Themes and Messages” in 1991 (“Draft 1, Presidential Remarks: Address to Joint Session of 
Congress” 1990; Baker 1990a; “Draft, Christmas Eve Message to the Troops” 1990, “Guidance, 
Gulf Strategy January Themes and Messages” 1991).  
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This consistency reflects the administration’s recognition that to be effective and avoid 
complications, domestic communication themes needed to be highly coordinated and widely 
dispersed. In the early stages of the conflict, a National Security Council memorandum 
recognized that in preparation for military options, “our first task is to match our rhetoric—both 
public and private—with the military reality” and that lines on military and diplomatic options 
“should be used consistently by spokesmen across the government” (National Security Council 
1990a). The need for a consistent message across agencies is also noted in the Office of the 
Public Liaison’s early notes on talking points and public diplomacy (Schaefer 1990) and a 
memorandum to cabinet and agency contacts warned that, “Although we are not trying to mint 
hundreds of foreign policy spokespersons, it is important that those who do speak on behalf of 
the Administration are apprised of recent developments and are able, for example, to articulate 
clearly the four objectives the international community is pursuing in the Gulf” (Jackson 1990).  
To develop and manage a consistent message, the White House crafted a communications 
plan that focused primarily on shoring up support from the domestic audience. In the initial 
outline of its communication plan, the Office of Public Affairs emphasized the domestic 
audience in its claims that the primary objectives was to “strengthen public support for Operation 
Desert Shield. Ultimately, our goal is broad, grass-roots support for the President’s initiative” 
(White House Office of Public Affairs 1990). To standardize this message and maximize 
domestic support, the White House disseminated general and monthly themes that aligned with 
the president’s speech schedule and press plan (Fitzwater 1991d; “Guidance, Gulf Policy 
Themes” 1990, “Guidance, Gulf Strategy January Themes and Messages” 1991).  
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Concern with Public Opinion 
Second, as the objectives of the communications plan indicate, the goal of official 
rhetoric reflected the administration’s primary focus on building and managing domestic 
attitudes towards military action. The administration’s concern with public opinion is evident in 
the extensive collection and review of both external and internal polling. These polls gauged 
public support over the course of the conflict, anticipated factors that would reduce public 
approval, and tested the relative salience of alternative justifications for military action, 
disaggregating responses by a variety of demographic and regional variables (“Collection of 
Documents, Polls/Persian Gulf” 1991; Fabrizio 1990; “Folder, Poll Data - [Gulf War]” 1991; 
Teeter 1990b, 1991). Reports on public opinion trends garnered a response not only from the 
communications and public affairs staff, but from the President himself, who sent a personal, 
handwritten note to Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, requesting that he check a Time Magazine 
story that reported a “Most Precipitous Drop in polls??” (G. H. W. Bush 1991a).45 Similarly, 
following the release of a Wall Street Journal poll, the press asked Fitzwater, “Does the President 
take public opinion into account at all as he factors in his major decisions on going to war, not 
going to war?” Fitzwater assured reporters that the President was primarily guided by what was 
best for the country, but reiterated that “the President is interested in public opinion. And he 
certainly was interested in that same distinguished network’s finding that some 53 percent would 
support military action if that’s the choice he has to make” (Fitzwater 1990b). 
Presidential Speeches as a Tool for Shaping Public Opinion 
Finally, not only did the White House track public opinion during the Gulf War, it 
attempted to shape it through speeches and statements that directly targeted the domestic 
																																																						
45 Style and punctuation from original text.  
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audience. From the early stages of the conflict, the White House Communications Office 
coordinated the communication activities of the President and key senior administration officials 
to strengthen public support for Operation Desert Shield and eventually Operation Desert Storm. 
This plan’s explicit objective was to “reassure the American people as to the objectives and 
purpose of our deployment” (Demarest 1990a) and communicate the president’s message to the 
U.S. audience along two dimensions. First, “Thematically, we need to tell people why we are 
there and what we mean to achieve. Specific information on details of our involvement, purpose, 
international and UN support, etc., should be updated regularly and as events dictate.” Second, 
“As time passes, critics may become more vocal. The message that the President has gone to 
historic lengths to avoid war (economic embargo and ten UN resolutions) and garnered 
unprecedented international support should be a fundamental component of all outreach activity” 
(Demarest 1990b). These discussions indicate that the communications team was both primarily 
concerned with persuading the domestic audience and considered strategies for responding to 
and mitigating opposition in addition to building support.  
The administration’s concern with disseminating its message to the U.S. public is also 
reflected in the stated objectives of individual speeches. Speech drafts both reiterate the 
importance of maintaining public support and identify specific domestic constituencies to be 
targeted. These constituencies include both cooperative and militant internationalists. For 
example, drafts of the President’s address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention outline 
remarks intended “To comment on and solidify support from the VFW and the American public 
for the current deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia” (Metzger 1990a). Similarly, the 
foreign policy section of Bush’s 1991 State of the Union address was identified as an opportunity 
to “convey a tone of prudent decisiveness” and distinguish the Gulf War from the Vietnam 
 207 
experience, which “is still a vivid memory in the minds of most adult Americans. They 
remember the loss of life, the unsatisfactory resolution, and the lack of decisiveness in 
concluding the conflict” (Porter 1990b). Speeches by the President were thus considered an 
important component of the broader communication plan. 
In addition to providing an effective tool for managing public opinion, there is also 
evidence that White House officials recognized official rhetoric carried political costs and had 
the potential to tie their hands in the future. For example, in a draft of presidential remarks to 
religious broadcasters, White House Counsel struck down the claim that U.S. forces would 
remain in the Gulf “not one day more than necessary” because “We cannot foresee the situation 
that will confront us upon the conclusion of the current conflict, and it is possible that an 
extended U.S. military presence will be required. Rhetoric such as this will only complicate the 
hard decisions that may have to be made at that point” (Rademaker 1991). The content of the 
president’s speeches was thus considered both an important tool of persuasion and a potentially 
costly strategic choice.  
Finally, the focus on managing public perceptions of the conflict was not limited to 
communications staff, but included senior officials and the President himself.  In a letter 
explaining his assessment of the conflict to Former President Richard Nixon, Bush (n.d.) wrote: 
In any event, the combination of remarkably candid consultations and explanations 
[of military strategy] we have offered seems to have had a calming effect [on the 
public]. That said, we are under no illusions on this score; managing the 
congressional and domestic account will, as ever, prove one of our major 
challenges. I hope that the statement at my press conference of November 30, the 
Administration’s testimony last week at Congressional hearings, and our stepped 
up public diplomacy efforts will shore up public support.  
 
In sum, the Bush administration’s communication plan for the Gulf War provides 
evidence that the White House developed speeches and communication plans that primarily 
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targeted the domestic audience. This evidence is consistent with the domestic coalition 
argument’s expectation that speeches and justifications are developed strategically with a focus 
on creating a domestic coalition. However, what remains to be seen is whether these 
communication strategies target the aggregate public or reflect White House efforts to build a 
unifying coalition across recognized domestic divisions.  
Acknowledging and Building the Domestic Coalition 
 In addition to its contention that leaders are concerned about public opinion, the domestic 
coalition argument also has three expectations for how presidents view and engage with the 
domestic audience. First, it expects the White House to consider heterogeneity in its attention to 
public opinion. Second, it asserts that leaders work to build domestic coalitions as a means of 
avoiding politically costly opposition and target key constituencies accordingly. Third, the 
communications plan is expected to use humanitarian justifications to appeal to a diverse 
audience, but should also caution against overstating the importance of these claims. Evidence 
from the Bush administration’s communication plan for the Gulf War supports each of these 
three expectations, which this section outlines in turn. 
Heterogeneity in the Domestic Audience 
 While the Bush administration did not explicitly discuss cooperative and militant 
internationalists, they did consistently disaggregate public opinion data and examine substantive 
shifts in the composition of public approval. Official polls—both on the president’s general 
popularity and public perceptions of the Gulf conflict—consistently broke down public opinion 
by not only party identification, but also gender, region, age, race, and a hawk/dove scale (ABC 
News/Washingon Post 1991; CBS News Poll 1990; PA/Opinion Analysis 1991, 1990, Steeper 
1990a, 1990b). As part of its larger political communications strategy, officials recognized that 
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“the time available for the President to cultivate, thank, listen to, highlight, garner support from, 
and reach out to outside groups will be in short supply” and identified key groups that “would be 
given the highest priority for time with POTUS” (Demarest 1990d). These groups included both 
the President’s base and target constituencies and were further divided into political, 
ethnic/demographic, geographic, and issue-oriented categories. Table 6.2 summaries the groups 
identified in this memorandum, which was seen by Chief of Staff John Sununu who noted the 
proposal “seems reasonable” (Demarest 1990d).  
Table 6.2 Presidential Participation with Outside Groups (Demarest 1990d)  
 Base Groups Target Groups 
Political 
• Republicans 
• Conservatives 
• Republican Office Holders 
• Bush Supporters 
• Conservative Democrats 
Ethnic/ 
Demographic 
• Asians 
• European 1st-4th Generation 
• Northern Catholics 
• Younger Voters 
• Blacks 
• Hispanics 
• Seniors 
Geographic 
• California, Texas, Southern States 
• Rocky Mountain States 
• New England (sans R.I.) 
• Industrial Midwest 
Issue-
Oriented 
• Law Enforcement/Drugs/Crime 
Groups 
• Veterans, National Defense Groups 
• Teamsters, Conservative Union 
Members 
• Social Value Groups, i.e. MADD, 
Right-to-Life, etc. 
• Small Business, Entrepreneurs 
• Corporate and Trade Association 
CEO’s 
• Conservationists 
• Evangelicals 
• Anti-Tax Organizations 
• Parents/Students/Teachers/ 
Education Reformers 
• Service Organizations/Points 
of Light Groups/Celebrities 
• Disability Community 
• Farm Organizations 
• Sports/Fitness/Health Groups 
 
 Because this framework was developed in the context of election campaigns rather than 
support for the Gulf War, the administration’s base groups include constituencies generally 
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unassociated with foreign policy beliefs. However, both the target and base columns include 
demographics known to correlate with militant or cooperative internationalist values. Law 
enforcement, veterans, national defense groups, and conservatives likely include significant 
numbers of militant internationalists. Additionally, to the extent that the administration was 
concerned with appealing to young voters, non-southerners, and education reformers its message 
needed to resonate with cooperative internationalist values.  
 In addition to being concerned about general presidential approval, the administration 
was also attentive to the potential for politically costly opposition to the Gulf War. 
Communications staff tracked antiwar protests and demonstrations of support, identified 
potential opposition groups, and collected and responded to statements of opposition (American 
Arab Scientific Society 1991; Battaglia, n.d.; Browning 1991). White House staff also perceived 
and sought to counteract growing isolationist sentiment among conservatives—which both the 
domestic coalition argument and official documents predict would weaken the base of support 
for military action. As more individuals drift into the isolationist category, the potential 
magnitude of support for intervention shrinks. Efforts to persuade and counteract what opinion 
leader Paul Weyrich referred to as “those in the conservative camp who argue that we have no 
vital interests overseas and should retreat into isolationism” appear in notes from initial meetings 
that developed the themes of military action, as well as in speech drafts that caution against 
including quotes from isolationist thinkers (Metzger 1990b; J. P. Pinkerton 1990; Weyrich 
1990). Notably, these efforts focused on preventing individuals from becoming isolationists 
rather than convincing self-proclaimed isolationists to support military action—an effort the 
domestic coalition argument expects to be futile. Taken as a whole, this evidence indicates the 
Bush administration recognized that not all public support was created equal. Acknowledging 
 211 
diversity in the domestic audiences, the White House used its communication plan to avoid 
opposition and target the constituencies that were most important for its continued political 
success. 
Key Constituencies in the Gulf War 
Combining their acknowledgement of a diverse domestic audience and concern with the 
potential for politically costly opposition, White House communications staff focused significant 
attention on three groups: religious leaders, college students, and veterans.46 Religious leaders 
and communities were targeted as critical constituencies because they were part of Bush’s base 
and were divided in their support for military action. On the one hand, religious groups with 
pacifist traditions were unlikely to be convinced to support military action—at best humanitarian 
claims could limit vocal dissent from these constituencies. For example, a statement by the 
American Friends Service Committee outlined their belief that “war could have been averted, 
and we believe now that it must be stopped now, before more blood is shed. It must be ended 
before the imperatives of warfare become fully entrenched” (American Friends Service 
Committee 1991).  
Individuals associated with such pacifist and religious organizations could not be 
convinced to support military action and were not an efficient target audience for White House 
communications. However, leaders from other groups such as Roman Catholic Archbishop 
Roger Mahony “offered qualified support to U.S. action in the Gulf but urged the U.S. to 
consider the moral ramifications” (“White House News Summary” 1990). In a memorandum to 
																																																						
46 This list is not exclusive. The official communication plans also referenced business leaders, Arab Americans, and 
minority groups, but these constituencies appear less frequently in the discussions surrounding presidential speeches. 
Examples focus on these three groups because: 1) each was the sole and explicitly identified target of at least one 
official communication, and 2) the development of this communication was well documented. Additionally, the 
three groups cover the range of potential target audiences—college students were assumed to be a hard sell, 
religious leaders were split in their opinion of the war, and veterans groups were targeted as a base of support.  
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speechwriters and researchers the Office of Public Liaison noted the distinction between 
religious groups, explaining, “We can write off any support from left-of-center religious 
institutions such as Pax Christi USA and the National Council of Churches, but we really do 
need an ongoing and friendly dialogue with conservative and main stream churches” (Fitch 
1990). The former hold a position equivalent to isolationists—they were unwilling to endorse 
military action under any circumstances—while the latter espouse values associated with 
cooperative internationalism, namely a preference for cooperative foreign policies and concern 
with the effect of the conflict on foreign civilians. For example, in his letter to the President 
following a personal meeting, the Bishop of the Episcopal Church expressed his willingness to 
consider support for intervention, saying, “Morally, we must respond to such an outrage, both as 
a member nation of the community of nations and as individuals who seek to respect and uphold 
the human rights of others” (Browning 1991). However, he followed this statement of action 
with hesitancy to support the use of military force, “War for me can never be a moral option 
unless all attempts at a solution short of war are exhausted” and caution against overusing 
humanitarian appeals “While I share your outrage over the atrocities reported from Kuwait, such 
atrocities should not be used as the necessary or sufficient basis for our actions against Iraq when 
we have not acted in a similar fashion towards other nations commiting [sic] abuses of human 
rights” (Browning 1991). These statements reflect the cooperative internationalist concern with 
the wellbeing of foreign civilians, skepticism of the utility of military action as all but a last 
resort, and sensitivity to the overuse of humanitarian appeals. 
In line with the domestic coalition expectation that presidents use humanitarian claims to 
persuade individuals with cooperative internationalist values, the White House relied on 
humanitarian justifications in it communications with religious groups. The same memo from the 
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Office of Public Liaison that distinguished between religious groups noted that to persuade the 
individuals that could be moved “religious leaders feel the President’s language justifying our 
deployment needs to remain consistent, and needs to relate to moral objectives and goals” (Fitch 
1990). In addition to sending personal responses to letters and inviting groups to the White 
House, Bush targeted the religious community’s concerns in an address to religious broadcasters 
that intended to highlight the morality of U.S. action and outline “principles which illustrate why 
it is indeed a ‘just war’(Demarest 1990c; Fitch 1991; Smith 1991).  
 Additionally, the administration focused on college students—whose youth and level of 
education make them more likely to hold cooperative internationalist beliefs—because campuses 
were viewed as likely sites for antiwar mobilization. These concerns were based on comparisons 
with the anti-Vietnam movement and efforts by opposition leaders to spark student dissent. 
While noting that, unlike the anti-war protests of the 1960s, “today’s larger anti-war 
demonstrations (such as one held October 20, 1990 in New York with 20,000 people) have been 
off the campuses,” the Office of Public Liaison warned that “dissent among student bodies 
across the nation is growing and beginning to question the U.S.’s role in the Gulf” (Battaglia, 
n.d.). To persuade students to support the Gulf War, the administration briefed interns to carry 
the White House message back to their campuses and issued an open letter to college students to 
“reach the students of our nation and directly communicate to them the President’s views of the 
situation in the Gulf” (“Guidance, Presidential Letter to the College Students” 1991; Metzger 
1990c). As in the case of the religious community, the White House perceived students to be 
skeptical of military action and concerned with humanitarian objectives such as the suffering of 
civilians—a perspective reflective of cooperative internationalist values.  
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 Finally, in addition to minimizing domestic opposition, the administration also appealed 
to veterans’ groups—more likely to include significant numbers of militant internationalists—to 
activate existing domestic support. These efforts included collecting quotes and letters from 
current soldiers, seeking the endorsement of veterans’ organizations, and an address to the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention. Rather than convincing veterans that military action was 
necessary, communication was intended to “thank these leaders for their continuing support” and 
“solidify support” (Metzger 1990a, 1991). In this case, the target constituency group was 
perceived to have values consistent with militant internationalism—including a belief in the 
efficacy of military force and preference for security objectives—and, as expected, the White 
House identified speeches to veterans as an opportunity to solidify the base of support for 
military action.  
The Utility of Humanitarian Claims 
 Not only did the Bush administration identify key constituencies among the domestic 
audience, it also used humanitarian claims to persuade these groups. To maintain support from 
conservative and mainstream churches, staff reported that “religious leaders feel the President’s 
language justifying our deployment needs to remain consistent, and needs to related to moral 
objectives and goals” (Fitch 1990). To this end, the President’s address to religious broadcasters 
was developed to “illustrate why it [Operation Desert Storm] is indeed a ‘just war’” and drew on 
examples of harm done to Kuwaiti citizens to make this point: 
Every war—every war—is fought for a reason. But a just war is fought for the right 
reasons, for moral not selfish reasons. Let me take a moment to tell you a story, a 
tragic story, about a family whose two sons, 18 and 19, reportedly refused to lower 
the Kuwaiti flag in front of their home. For this crime, they were executed by the 
Iraqis. Then, unbelievably, their parents were asked to pay the price of the bullets 
used to kill them. Some ask whether it’s moral to use force to stop the rape, the 
pillage, the plunder of Kuwait. And my answer: Extraordinary diplomatic efforts 
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having been exhausted to resolve the matter peacefully, then the use of force is 
moral (G. H. W. Bush 1991e).47 
 
Humanitarian claims also played a central role in the administration’s response to other moral 
opinion leaders. For example, in a letter to Coretta Scott King, Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Jack Kemp wrote that he was “deeply troubled by your public comments on 
President Bush’s agonizing decision to implement the United Nations resolutions authorizing the 
liberation of Kuwait” and implored Mrs. King to recognize that, “The Kuwaiti people has been 
visited with untold suffering. Yet it is far too weak to come to its own defense. Is the world 
condemned to stand idly by?” (Kemp 1991). Humanitarian appeals that focused on harm done to 
the Kuwaiti people thus played an important role in the administration’s efforts to persuade the 
religious community that war was moral and just.  
This humanitarian language was also not limited to religious and moral opinion leaders. 
Instead, the administration also drew on humanitarian claims in its appeals to college students, 
among whom cooperative internationalist values are likely to be prominent. For example, the 
President’s open letter to college students, distributed to college newspapers around the country, 
opened with a graphic and detailed description of Saddam Hussein’s abuse of the Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti people:  
The terror Saddam Hussein has imposed upon Kuwait violates every principle of 
human decency. Listen to what Amnesty International has documented. 
“Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi 
forces…arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands…widespread 
torture…imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of 
hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children. Including children. There’s no 
horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good vs. evil (G. H. W. Bush 
1991c).  
 
																																																						
47 Earlier drafts were even more direct: “Some ask whether it is moral to use force to stop the rape, pillage, and 
plunder of Kuwait. My answer: It should be immoral not to use force” (Smith 1991).  
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The humanitarian claims Bush used to appeal to the religious community and college students 
were both more prominent and graphic than the rhetoric used in national addresses. The 
emphasis placed on humanitarian explanations in these cases indicates that—without explicitly 
classifying religious groups and college students as cooperative internationalists—the White 
House recognized that humanitarian justifications could help persuade skeptical audiences 
focused on the human costs of war. 
While useful in foreclosing likely channels of opposition, humanitarian claims were 
notably absent in the President’s primary public communication to veterans’ groups—his address 
to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Annual Conference on August 20, 1990. This change in 
justifications across audiences indicates that the White House recognizes the utility of 
humanitarian claims depends on the target audience. Reflecting the interests of the audience, 
these remarks were primarily designed to emphasize the President’s “commitment to a strong 
national defense” and highlight both “the necessity of standing up to those dictators who attempt 
to deny freedom to others around the world” and “the importance of a national defense policy 
that responds to the security demands of a complex and still precarious world” (Smith 1990).  
Consistent with addresses to other groups, Bush’s speech to the VFW Convention 
asserted, “I acted knowing that our cause would not be easy but that our cause is right” (G. H. W. 
Bush 1990c).  However, in contrast to his addresses to religious leaders and college students, 
Bush made the case that action was right with exclusively security justifications, explaining, 
“while one should not underestimate those who endanger peace, an even greater mistake would 
be to underestimate America’s commitment to our friends when our friends are imperiled or our 
commitment to international order when that, too, is imperiled” (G. H. W. Bush 1990c). The 
speech continued to highlight the innocent foreign civilians trapped in Kuwait, but did not 
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reference Saddam’s history of human rights abuses or mistreatment of Iraqi and Kuwait citizens. 
These appeals are in line with the militant internationalist view that maintaining U.S. national 
security through military strength is the best way to ensure international peace and stability. 
Backlash and Limits to Humanitarian Claims 
 While humanitarian claims had a broad strategic appeal in the Gulf War, there is also 
evidence that the Bush administration recognized and was constrained by the risk of overusing 
humanitarian explanations. Drafts of the president’s open letter to college students provide the 
clearest example of a case in which the administration limited its humanitarian appeals to avoid 
backlash. Early drafts of the letter emphasized exclusively humanitarian concerns, focusing on 
Saddam Hussein’s long and documented history of abusing his own citizens and targeting of 
innocent children in Kuwait (Jackson 1991). However, in their review of the drafts, officials 
warned that the intended audience needed “an appeal to the intellect in addition to the emotional 
appeal” and cautioned that “The almost exclusive focus on human rights arguments is not an 
accurate reflection of what lies behind our involvement. The letter does not adequately treat our 
goals, why we feel a sense of urgency, and why the United States is assuming so much of the 
responsibility of the international response” (Jackson 1991; Sittmann 1990). Ultimately, the 
letter was revised to include counterbalancing references to Iraq’s international aggression, 
attempts at nuclear proliferation, and connections to terrorism (G. H. W. Bush 1991c). This 
revision process suggests that White House officials recognized the risk associated with 
overstating humanitarian claims and aimed to strike the rhetorical balance that Chapter 3 finds in 
post-Cold War justifications—the consistent use and limited emphasis of humanitarian claims in 
security interventions.  
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 In sum, the communications strategy for the Gulf War demonstrates that the Bush 
administration recognized and tracked sources of heterogeneity in public opinion, used this 
heterogeneity to identify key constituencies, and developed speeches and official 
communications to appeal to these groups and minimize the risk of politically costly domestic 
opposition. Of the target groups, those perceived to be on the fence about military action held 
values consistent with cooperative internationalism—a preference for diplomatic engagement 
and a focus on humanitarian objectives.  Humanitarian claims were used to persuade these key 
groups and make the case that military action was moral, just, and could not wait any longer. 
However, officials also recognized that there were limits to the utility of humanitarian appeals 
and expressed concern that over emphasizing these claims was counterproductive. Combined, 
this evidence provides support for each of the domestic coalition argument’s theoretical 
expectations, as outlined in Table 6.1 above.  
Appeasing the International Audience 
 In the Gulf War, humanitarian justifications appear in the Bush administration’s appeals 
to target constituencies and responses to domestic dissent. However, the concern about the 
international audience presents an alternative explanation for the presence of humanitarian 
claims. Specifically, the effect of humanitarian claims on the domestic audience could be a 
positive side effect of strategies designed to build and manage international support. To evaluate 
primary target of communication strategies and rule out this alternative, the question then 
becomes: how does the White House’s concern with the domestic audience compare to its 
concern with the international audience? Evidence from the Gulf War reveals that the 
international audience received significant attention in official communication strategies and was 
the focus of public diplomacy efforts. However, these efforts did not primarily manifest in the 
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form of humanitarian claims. Additionally, rather than detracting from the importance of the 
domestic coalition, the White House aimed to create a symbiotic relationship between domestic 
and international statements and used international approval to bolster domestic public opinion. 
Therefore, maintaining a stable multilateral coalition and support from the international audience 
influenced official statements during the Gulf War, but efforts to gain international approval do 
not undermine the evidence for the domestic coalition argument. 
The Importance of the International Audience 
 The international audience loomed large in the Gulf War for three reasons. First, it 
heralded in the new world order by providing the foremost example of cooperation with the 
Soviet Union and emphasized the success of U.S. diplomatic efforts following the end of the 
Cold War. Second, the intervention was carried out by a large and united multilateral coalition 
that provided both international legitimacy and opportunities for burden-sharing. Third, the 
support of the international community and other Arab states helped counter anti-American 
sentiment and debunk the claims of Saddam Hussein’s disinformation campaign.  
 Throughout the conflict, the Bush administration sought and highlighted the support of 
the international community as evidence of a new world order that was free from the tension of 
the Cold War and governed by U.S. leadership, international cooperation, and commitment to the 
rule of law. Guidance from a press conference following Iraq’s invasion reveals the 
administration’s early desire to emphasize Soviet participation in the trade embargo: “TASS has 
announced that the Soviets intend to stop supplying Iraq. Richard Haass recommends that we 
react very positively and urge other countries to follow the Soviet lead” (“Guidance, Additional 
Notes” 1990). Similarly, drafts of Bush’s September 11, 1990 Address to the Joint Session of 
Congress asked listeners to “Just imagine how different this crisis would be if, as in decades past, 
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a dictator like Saddam has [sic] been able to count upon the Soviet Union and East-West 
confrontation to inhibit an international response to his aggression” (“Draft 1, Presidential 
Remarks: Address to Joint Session of Congress” 1990). Margin comments from this same draft 
encouraged speechwriters to use this section to “Dramatize signal to Hussein/Give Gorb some 
credit” (“Draft 1, Presidential Remarks: Address to Joint Session of Congress” 1990). Similarly, 
comments on speech drafts from advisor Ed Rogers highlighted the broader international theme 
of which Soviet cooperation was only one example: “In every set of remarks re Persian Gulf we 
should include ref. to the Rule of law and/or Iraq violations of International law. This is 
important” (Rogers 1990).48  
 The emphasis on international cooperation and the rule of law was reinforced by the 
multilateral nature of the military action and involvement of the United Nations. By its end, the 
intervention was carried out with the support of a coalition of 28 states and was enabled by 
twelve UN resolutions. U.S. officials worked to build and maintain this coalition, but these 
efforts primarily involved “a quiet diplomatic effort to develop support for the use of force” 
rather than official statements (National Security Council 1990a). For example, in conversations 
with Republican congressional leadership the President urged members that “quick approval of 
the Desert Shield supplemental [funding] is a must,” alongside forgiving Egypt’s FMS debt and 
approving Saudi arms sales, “if we are to keep this coalition intact” (G. H. W. Bush 1990f). The 
administration’s strategy also worked through international organizations and included both 
efforts to “pursue additional non-forceful resolutions at the United Nations—at a pace of roughly 
one a week” and a plan to “focus on the Security Council, in stages” by gaining the support of 
one member at a time (National Security Council 1990a).  
																																																						
48 Punctuation, capitalization, and emphasis from original.  
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Exceptions to this quiet diplomacy included a “Video Address to the Community of 
Nations United Against Iraqi Aggression,” which highlighted the importance of the January 15 
deadline for Iraq’s withdraw (Mcgroarty 1991). Bush also gave an address to the United Nations 
General Assembly to “reflect on the efficacy of UN action on Iraq” (Roy 1990). As a result of 
continued diplomatic efforts, the coalition remained stable and there is no evidence that the 
broader White House communications strategy was primarily driven by the need for coalition 
maintenance.  
Public Opinion in Arab States 
 An exception to the overall stability of the international coalition was the administration’s 
concern with anti-American sentiment in Arab states. Diplomatic communications from the day 
after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait found that the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia 
“felt this was an Arab matter, and that they asked for time to resolve the issue themselves” 
(Fitzwater 1990a). In January 1990, as the diplomatic efforts of Arab states and the international 
community increasingly appeared unsuccessful, Secretary of State James Baker warned the 
President that Iraq’s foreign minister “wants to make it Iraq vs. U.S” (Fitzwater 1991b). The 
following day, Bush spoke with UN Secretary General De Cuellar, emphasizing the multilateral 
nature of the intervention and opportunities to demonstrate that military action was driven by the 
UN rather than the U.S. alone (Fitzwater 1991c). From this point forward, the assertion that 
“This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against 
the world” became a common feature in presidential speeches and official statements (G. H. W. 
Bush 1990e).  
The administration was also careful to separate Saddam Hussein’s government from the 
Iraqi people, claiming that “It is truly Iraq against the world. But I want to make this point clear: 
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We have no argument with the people of Iraq” (G. H. W. Bush 1990d). In addition to making 
this point to the U.S. and international community writ large, the administration also made its 
case directly to the Iraqi people in an address prior to the beginning of the hostilities, which 
explained, “You have been told that this crisis is a struggle between Iraq and America. In fact, it 
is Iraq against the world. / Never before has world opinion been so united against an act of 
aggression” (“Draft Comments, McGroarty/Dooley, Presidential Remarks: Video Address to the 
Iraqi People” 1990).  These addresses reflected a major goal of public diplomacy and 
communication strategies towards the international audiences: to dispel criticism that the U.S. 
was an imperial power engaged in a war against the Arab world. 
 Managing international opinion in Arab states became even more important after the war 
began and Saddam launched a disinformation campaign. This propaganda accused the United 
States of targeting religious sites, while Iraq’s use of human shields drew attention to civilian 
casualties (Rugh 1991a). When polls indicated that these accusations were shifting international 
opinion, the U.S.’s public diplomacy campaign coordinated an effort to contradict disinformation 
as it arose (Rugh 1991b). The themes for this response avoided praising Saddam’s military 
sagacity, emphasized coalition unity, and were promoted by officials from the Department of 
Defense and the USIA rather than the White House (“Memorandum, Summary of Iraq Public 
Diplomacy Meeting” 1991; Rugh 1991b).   
As part of this plan, humanitarian justifications were used to juxtapose Saddam’s history 
of brutality in the region with U.S. concern about protecting civilians: “We deeply regret any 
loss of life, military and civilian, on all sides, and will do everything possible to minimize 
civilian casualties. For much of his career, Saddam Hussein has brutalized his own people” 
(“Cable, Gulf Public Diplomacy During Hostilities,” n.d.). However, humanitarian concerns 
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primarily asserted the coalition’s attempts to avoid hitting civilians and holy sites and were 
designed to lay the groundwork for post-war stability (Dyke 1991a, 1991c). Additionally, while 
U.S. officials noted that a drawn-out war could spark anti-American resentment in allied Arab 
countries, they ultimately concluded that “whether even a relatively long war will or will not 
generate sufficient public pressure to overturn the basic policies or political control of friendly 
Arab governments remains uncertain at this point” (Helman 1991). Given the expeditious end of 
the Gulf War, these concerns did not come to fruition and the coalition remained stable 
throughout the combat operation. Together, these factors indicate that humanitarian claims were 
helpful to, but not primarily an outgrowth of, international public diplomacy campaigns.   
International Support and the Domestic Audience 
 Finally, rather than prioritizing the international audience, the administration also used 
international support to bolster domestic public opinion.49 For example, even the communication 
plan for international public diplomacy aimed to “Look for spinoffs that positively affect 
American public opinion; do not negatively affect American opinion” (Dyke 1990). In this 
regard, the multilateral coalition was particularly helpful in addressing domestic concerns about 
the cost of the war, where internal polling indicated, “The public does believe that the U.S. is 
carrying more than its fair share of the financial costs of the war. This could be a problem for the 
Administration in the aftermath of the War” (Steeper 1991). The public’s perception that allies 
were not paying their fair share was particularly troubling because of its effect on the domestic 
coalition: “People who do not think that the allies are paying enough include some constituencies 
that are very important to the Bush coalition, such as middle class voters (56%), high income 
voters (51%), Republicans (50%), and Southern whites (49%)” (Steeper and Sarvello Jamett 
																																																						
49 This evidence is consistent with the finding that international support and the approval of international 
organizations increase public support through a variety of mechanisms (Grieco et al. 2011; Thompson 2006). 
 224 
1991).  In addition to emphasizing the magnitude of allies’ contributions in official statements, 
the White House went as far as to deploy foreign leaders like the United Kingdom’s Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher to make the case for military action to key U.S. foreign policy 
forums (Demarest 1990c). Therefore, while the Bush administration was attentive to 
international support and implemented a public diplomacy campaign to manage public opinion in 
Arab states, concern for the international audience neither superseded concern with domestic 
politics nor solely accounts for the presence of humanitarian justifications.  
Settling Elite Debates 
 The Bush administration’s international public diplomacy efforts suggest that as long as 
the multilateral coalition remained stable—as was the case for the duration of Operation Desert 
Storm—the White House prioritized domestic politics. However, the elite debate alternative 
implies that the administration’s focus on domestic politics was driven by concern with political 
elites rather than public opinion and that humanitarian justifications were used to settle internal 
debates. As before, evidence that communication strategies responded to political elites only 
undermines the domestic coalition argument if these internal debates appear to be the primary 
driver of humanitarian claims. To evaluate the elite debate alternative, I investigate discussions 
between agencies and with Congress, outline the justifications used in these debates, and 
demonstrate that much of the administration’s concern with Congressional approval stemmed 
from efforts to manage public opinion. 
Sources of Elite Dissent 
 Within the administration and across agencies, early communication efforts reveal broad 
agreement on the themes that should be used to present Operation Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm to the public. Where disagreements arose, they were more often over whether 
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humanitarian claims had been overstated than over a desire to place humanitarian objectives 
front and center. For example, in the second draft of the President’s speech at Hickam Airfield 
on October 28, 1990, official comments reflect a back and forth on whether to mention that Iraq 
“gassed its own people,” with a critic noting “The use of CW [chemical weapons] was years ago. 
It has nothing to do with this crisis and we were mum about it at the time” (McNally and Simon 
1990). Despite these early discussions, the relative consensus on public themes during the 
conflict stands in stark contrast to debates over whether and how to carry out humanitarian 
objectives in war’s aftermath, which created rifts both within the State Department and between 
the State Department and the National Security Council (Dyke 1991e). The discussion of 
humanitarian concerns was thus not without contention within the administration, but the 
addition of humanitarian justifications would have fueled rather than settled these internal 
debates.  
 Instead, the elite dimension of the White House’s communication strategy predominantly 
focused on securing a congressional resolution in support of military action. To build support in 
the House and Senate, the President spoke at congressional meetings, sent letters to 
congressional leadership, and had officials testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Baker 1990a, 1990b; G. H. W. Bush 1991b; McClure 
1991; “Meeting with Bipartisan Congressional Leadership” 1991, “Speech Cards, Republican 
Congressional Leadership” 1990). Communication with Congress primarily emphasized the U.S. 
national interest and the need to send a strong signal against Iraqi aggression. In his letter to 
Congressional leadership, Bush (1991b) explained: 
The current situation in the Persian Gulf brought about by Iraq’s unprovoked 
invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. 
The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the 
chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position 
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adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action 
would underline that the United States stands with the international community and 
on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist 
in the minds of Iraq’s leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act 
decisively in response to Iraq’s continued aggression against Kuwait. 
 
Humanitarian claims appeared in Bush’s meetings with Congressional leadership after 
Operation Desert Storm began—for example, talking points for Republican Congressional 
Leadership on January 24 stated “I will say though that I am outraged by what Saddam is doing 
by targeting innocents with scuds and by his exploitation of POWs. He will be held accountable 
for any and all war crimes committed—but are absent from appeals prior to the passage of House 
and Senate resolutions (“Talking Points, Points to Be Made for Meeting with Republican 
Congressional Leadership” 1991). The White House’s efforts to appease political elites, both 
within the administration and in Congress, thus do not exclusively account for the presence of 
humanitarian claims in official statements over the course of the conflict.  
Congress and the Domestic Audience 
 Additionally, the administration’s efforts to gain congressional approval were driven by 
concern about what support or opposition from Congress would mean for public opinion. White 
House officials were divided over whether to seek a congressional vote authorizing the President 
to enforce UN resolutions. Bush recognized that his “opposition to the war powers resolution is 
well known” (G. H. W. Bush, n.d.) and White House Counsel advised that “there are few legal 
advantages to a declaration of war,” informing the President that he could proceed “without any 
formal congressional approval at all” (Gray 1990). In particular, opponents of a resolution 
argued that “It would be a mistake to ask for a Cong. Vote if they won’t give overwhelming 
support” and the President believed there would be “Nothing worse than hung jury or negative 
vote” (Fitzwater 1991a). From this view, Congress’ failure to unite behind military action would 
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undermine U.S. resolve and send a negative signal to Saddam Hussein. Despite these risks, the 
White House ultimately pursued a resolution to convince Saddam of their commitment 
(Fitzwater 1991a). Internal evaluations of the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief 
outlined the benefits of Congressional approval with reference to public opinion:  
“We believe it is legally sufficient to proceed with no formal congressional 
authorization at all. However, if U.S. forces will be involved in hostilities or 
situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent and you wish to avoid a 
dispute over the War Powers Resolution, or if a congressional endorsement would 
useful [sic] in gaining public support for your action, you should consider seeking 
a joint resolution approving your action” (Gray 1990).  
In line with this advice, polling confirmed that a majority of the public thought the President 
should obtain congressional approval before taking military action in Iraq (Morin 1991; Office of 
Communications 1991). Combined, these discussions indicate that while the White House 
actively sought congressional approval, elite pressure did not primarily drive either the broader 
communications strategy or the use of humanitarian justifications. Instead, concern about the 
public’s reaction contributed to the President’s decision to pursue a congressional resolution of 
support.  
Humanitarian Objectives 
 Finally, while appealing to multiple audiences, the emphasis the Bush administration 
placed on humanitarian claims could simply reflect a military strategy focused on humanitarian 
objectives. Instead, discussions of strategy and humanitarian conditions reveal that while the 
administration had sufficient information to make a humanitarian case for action, humanitarian 
objectives did not become a significant part of U.S. strategy until the post-war period.  
 Throughout the conflict, U.S. officials monitored reports of Saddam Hussein’s past 
human rights abuses, atrocities and potential war crimes committed in Iraq and Kuwait, the status 
of refugees in neighboring states, and the effect of sanctions on Iraq’s food and medical supplies 
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(Alexander et al. 1991; Crowder 1990; “Guidance, Iraq and War Crimes” 1991, “Report, Iraq: 
Impact of the Sanctions” 1990; Rosenblast 1991). To this end, the Office of Speechwriting 
collected a report from Amnesty International that provided detailed evidence, including 
photographs and witness testimony, of the human rights violations committed by Iraq since its 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2. The report concluded: 
Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi forces following 
the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. These include the arbitrary arrest and detention 
without trial of thousands of civilians and military personnel; the widespread torture 
of such persons in custody; the imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial 
execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children (Amnesty 
International 1990). 
 
Similarly, testimony from former U.S. hostages noted that “we have collectively borne 
witness to the full range of human rights violations” and aimed to “describe incidents and 
situations that are representative of these violations. These events are emblematic of the human 
dimension of this terrible and complex crisis” (Alexander et al. 1991). Evidence that Iraq was 
responsible for systematic human rights violations increased over the course of the intervention. 
By February 1991, press guidance reported that “We have anecdotal evidence that morale among 
Iraqi troops in Kuwait is declining and that their behavior toward Kuwaiti citizens is increasingly 
brutal” (“Guidance, Kuwait: Iraqi Atrocities” 1991). This brutality included not only looting and 
torture, but “many reports of executions of innocent Kuwaiti citizens” (“Guidance, Kuwait: Iraqi 
Atrocities” 1991). 
 Despite widespread evidence of Iraq’s human rights violations, military strategy did not 
focus on preventing or ending the suffering of Kuwaiti civilians. Discussions of U.S. military 
options reveal that the White House considered making the case for military action by arguing 
that giving sanctions more time to work “comes into potential conflict with the need to act to 
stop Iraq atrocities and the destruction of Kuwait” (National Security Council 1990b). However, 
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officials’ concern with the stability of Kuwait was connected to its status as a “vital country” 
rather than a response to human rights violations. Instead, the administration pursued the option 
to move from a “Cold Start” on the grounds that “At some point, it could become clear that 
sanctions were simply not working, that we could not conclude with any confidence that at some 
visible point in the future that Iraq would have no choice but to comply with the call to 
withdrawal unconditionally” (National Security Council 1990b). Additionally, throughout the 
intervention, the Department of Defense did not conduct operations to achieve humanitarian 
objectives (Brewington 1991) and the President’s stated goals remained consistent and did not 
mention the welfare of Kuwaiti civilians (“Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes” 1990).50 
Humanitarian objectives were thus not an explicit part of U.S. military strategy during Operation 
Desert Storm. 
Rather than pursing humanitarian objectives as part of the military intervention, 
humanitarian efforts were instead viewed as a tool to promote stability and avoid anti-American 
sentiment in the post-war environment. A memorandum from the National Security Council in 
the final weeks of war noted that, “It is very much in our interest now and after the war to 
demonstrate our humanitarian principles, which have guided us in the past. We are on a good 
track now, which should be continued, in cooperating with international humanitarian 
organizations and in our public sentiments” (Dyke 1991d). These post-war humanitarian efforts 
were developed during the conflict to reverse pro-Saddam Hussein and anti-American sentiment, 
allowing officials to defer immediate humanitarian action and rely on the help of international 
organizations. For example, following accusations by Iraq’s foreign minister that the U.S. was 
																																																						
50 Throughout the war, these goals included: “First, the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq 
from Kuwait. Second, restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government. Third, release of all hostages. Fourth, a 
commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf” (“Guidance, Gulf Policy Themes” 1990). 
 230 
responsible for civilian casualties, officials responded, “This is unfortunate [anti-American 
sentiment], but I believe that in the aftermath of the conflict, the UN can do much to regain 
ground through its humanitarian relief to war victims, continued assistance to the countries 
whose economies are suffering as a result of this war, and other possible conflict resolution roles 
after hostilities end” (Dyke 1991b). In line with this approach, when the end of the war became 
imminent, focus shifted to preparing to work with international organizations to achieve 
humanitarian objectives and staff noted that, “We really need to push on UN and ICRC so they 
are in a position to take this problem [humanitarian assistance in Safwan and Southern Iraq] on 
when we pull out” (Wolfowitz 1991). 
In sum, because the administration’s focus on humanitarian objectives intensified in final 
days of the conflict when the need for public statements explaining intervention ended, it does 
not appear that the presence of humanitarian justifications in the President’s national addresses 
reflected the content of U.S. military strategy. Instead, humanitarian objectives were largely 
confined to the post-war effort, including Operation Provide Comfort in which the U.S. used 
military force  with the explicit aim of protecting Kurds in northern Iraq.  
Conclusion 
 Humanitarian justifications played a common but secondary role in the Bush 
administration’s communication strategy for the 1991 Gulf War. In line with the expectations of 
the domestic coalition argument, archival materials demonstrate that the administration was 
concerned about and made a concerted effort to build domestic support for the use of force. 
These efforts included disaggregating the public into key target groups and using humanitarian 
claims to appeal to skeptics and block potential channels of dissent. In this case, the religious 
community and college students acted as critical constituencies for the Bush coalition, espoused 
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values consistent with cooperative internationalists beliefs, and were the target audiences for 
many of the administrations’ humanitarian appeals. Additionally, the evidence suggests that the 
White House recognized both the utility and limits of humanitarian claims and cautioned against 
their overuse. Combined, the Bush administration’s communication strategy demonstrates that 
the President both knew about the diversity of the domestic audience and developed 
justifications with a broad coalition in mind.  
 The administration’s communication with international and elite audiences demonstrates 
that while these audiences were considered in the development of official statements, they did 
not supersede concerns about domestic public opinion. Internationally, humanitarian claims 
helped counter Saddam Hussein’s disinformation campaign, which accused the U.S. of targeting 
civilians and being at war with the Arab world. However, the international coalition remained 
stable throughout the conflict and the administration sought international support in part to 
emphasize burden-sharing and bolster domestic public opinion. Similarly, the administration 
worked to gain congressional approval, but relied primarily on security justifications to persuade 
political elites. As before, the decision to pursue a congressional resolution was partially 
motivated by its influence on public support for military action. Additionally, humanitarian 
claims did not directly reflect the U.S.’s focus on humanitarian objectives, as humanitarian 
efforts were largely confined to the post-war period. This evidence indicates that White House 
communication strategies balanced efforts to persuade multiple audiences, but the domestic 
audience was the primary concern and a significant driver of humanitarian justifications.  
 Taken as a whole, the evidence from the Gulf War demonstrates that the White House is 
concerned about the domestic coalition and recognizes the utility of humanitarian justifications, 
establishing the external validity of the domestic coalition argument. While this case 
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demonstrates that the domestic coalition logic operates in security interventions, it cannot 
determine whether this same logic drives the use of humanitarian justifications in potential 
humanitarian interventions. To better understand how and why presidents use humanitarian 
claims in the context of humanitarian crises, the following chapter traces the Clinton 
administration’s approach to humanitarian justifications in the 1993-1995 Bosnia conflict, 
covering periods of both non-intervention and the escalation of military action. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
MANAGING DOMESTIC PRESSSURE, MOBILIZING DOMESTIC SUPPORT:  
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA, 1993-1995 
 
 The preceding chapter examined the George H.W. Bush administration’s communication 
strategy during the Gulf War to demonstrate that the White House recognizes the importance of 
building a domestic coalition and that humanitarian justifications are used to create a broad base 
of support. In security interventions, humanitarian claims help persuade skeptical cooperative 
internationalists who could otherwise form a politically costly source of domestic opposition. 
However, security interventions are only a portion of the potential interventions that presidents 
address in their public statements. Chapter 3 indicates that humanitarian claims are used in a 
distinct pattern—widespread use, discriminate emphasis—across potential interventions, 
including those that focus on humanitarian goals or do not end with the use of military force. 
Contrary to security interventions, potential humanitarian interventions have the primary 
objective of protecting or promoting the welfare of foreign civilians threatened by violence and 
often respond to egregious human rights abuses such as genocide. In this case, humanitarian 
justifications provide the primary rationale for military action and their presence could simply 
reflect the severity of the ongoing humanitarian crisis rather than a communication strategy 
designed to build a domestic coalition. Similarly, when presidents respond to humanitarian crises 
with policies short of intervention, the burden of justification may be lower and the public is 
unlikely to push the president to take military risks when there is not an imminent threat to the 
U.S.  
Given these differences, this chapter examines the Clinton administration’s 
communication strategy for the Bosnian conflict from 1993 to 1995 to consider the question: 
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Does the domestic coalition logic extend to communication strategies for humanitarian 
interventions and for U.S. involvement short of military action? The Bosnian conflict represents 
one of the worst humanitarian crises of the post-Cold War period, making it a key case for 
understanding how the White House develops communication strategies and considers 
humanitarian justifications in the face of overwhelming harm to civilians. Additionally, the 
conflict contains within-case variation in U.S. strategy, from an emphasis on reaching a 
negotiated solution to the threat and eventual implementation of airstrikes to the deployment of 
U.S. troops to enforce the Dayton Accords. Here, I leverage this variation to evaluate when 
establishing a stable domestic coalition becomes a relevant concern and to demonstrate that 
cooperative internationalists remain the target audience for the president’s communications 
during periods of non-intervention.  
This chapter traces shifts in the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia, 
communication strategy, and concern with the domestic coalition from Clinton’s inauguration in 
1993 to the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. It first outlines the domestic coalition 
expectations for periods of non-intervention and introduces the structured questions used to 
evaluate this argument. Guided by these questions, the analysis shows that even during periods 
of non-intervention the Clinton administration’s communication strategy consistently attempted 
to manage pressure and support from a coalition of internationalists. When the administration 
pursued a policy of non-intervention, communication plans emphasized humanitarian 
accomplishments alongside the human costs of military action to appeal to cooperative 
internationalist concerns. As the U.S. military strategy escalated to include airstrikes and the 
deployment of U.S. troops, the administration again targeted cooperative internationalists in an 
effort to assemble a domestic coalition of support. Taken as a whole, the Bosnian case 
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demonstrates that cooperative internationalists are a critical source of support and the drivers of 
justification strategies regardless of the type of intervention or the content of U.S. policy. 
Domestic Coalitions for Non-Interventions 
The domestic coalition argument expects humanitarian justifications to appeal to both 
cooperative and militant internationalists—an expectation borne out in the experimental tests 
conducted in Chapter 4. For individuals with cooperative internationalist values, humanitarian 
justifications increase their belief that intervention is necessary to achieve to humanitarian 
objectives, which helps override their skepticism towards the use of military force. Alternatively, 
individuals with militant internationalist beliefs support the use of force to achieve both military 
and humanitarian objectives because of their view that demonstrating military strength is the best 
way to maintain peace and security. Militant internationalists are thus comparably persuaded by 
both humanitarian and security justifications. In the buildup to security interventions, Chapter 6 
shows that presidents employ humanitarian claims to communicate with groups with cooperative 
internationalist values, convince them that military action will achieve humanitarian objectives, 
and avoid domestic dissent. In this context, humanitarian claims are a key part of domestic 
mobilization for military action. 
However, when mobilization for military action is not the White House’s short-term goal, 
the content and objectives of humanitarian justifications shift while the importance of 
cooperative internationalists remains consistent. Absent an attack on or direct threat against the 
United States, the domestic audience is unlikely to pressure the president to take military action 
if the White House argues that the conflict can be resolved with a less risky strategy. In this case, 
building on the preferences of different groups established in Chapter 4, cooperative 
internationalists’ skepticism towards the use of force and preference for non-aggressive 
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approaches combines with isolationists’ disapproval of foreign engagement to create a majority 
that supports non-intervention. Militant internationalists, by contrast, are unlikely to be satisfied 
with the non-aggressive policy but should be less likely to become a vocal opposition if the crisis 
is cast as a non-vital U.S. interest. Given these dynamics among the domestic audience, if the 
humanitarian crisis is short-lived—either because of changing conditions on the ground or 
because peace and aid efforts resolve the problem—presidents can pursue a policy of non-
intervention with little need for public explanation and few political consequences. With a ready-
made coalition of support for non-intervention and in the absence of domestic pressure, the 
White House has an incentive to avoid drawing attention to the crisis. Support from cooperative 
internationalists can be taken for granted at this stage because the policy exactly aligns with their 
preferences—non-aggressive means used to achieve humanitarian ends. Avoiding public 
emphasis of the crisis is also consistent with the contention that the U.S. does not have a vital 
national interest at stake and avoids stoking the active opposition of militant internationalists. 
Reduced public attention also minimizes any concern from isolationists regarding the ways in 
which the U.S. is engaged in the crisis. As a result, I expect the Clinton administration to offer 
few public statements on the Bosnia conflict in the early stages of its involvement with the crisis. 
However, if the humanitarian crisis continues and worsens—as it did in the Bosnian 
case—over time humanitarian justifications for military intervention will begin to appear in elite 
and media discourse, regardless of the White House’s communication plan. Exposure to 
evidence that the humanitarian toll of the crisis is rising and to arguments that the use of force is 
the only way to end the suffering creates domestic pressure for action. As shown in Chapters 4 
and 5, humanitarian explanations for military action elicit support from both militant and 
cooperative internationalists. In particular, when faced with evidence of egregious human 
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suffering such as genocide, cooperative internationalists’ concern with ending a humanitarian 
nightmare is likely to outweigh their preference for non-combative means. Left unchecked, 
mounting evidence that grave human rights abuses are being allowed to continue creates pressure 
from both militant and cooperative internationalists to escalate U.S. involvement to end the 
crisis. Growing domestic discontent with the administration’s foreign policy decisions is 
problematic both for its short-term effect on the president’s approval ratings and ability to pursue 
other items on his political agenda and for its potential long-term consequences on the 
president’s prospects for reelection. When the White House does not intend to escalate its 
military involvement—as was the case for U.S. policy towards Bosnia until 1995—the president 
will need to offset this pressure by offering humanitarian justifications for non-intervention.  
The objective of the presidents’ justifications for non-intervention is to manage domestic 
pressure by dismantling the coalition in favor of increased military engagement. Cooperative 
internationalists remain the most efficient target for this strategy because, unlike militant 
internationalists, they can be convinced that military force is not the best way to resolve the 
conflict. To maintain the support of cooperative internationalists in light of ongoing mass 
atrocities—such as the Serb army’s campaign of ethnic cleansing—presidents will need to make 
the case that involvement short of intervention is the best way to achieve humanitarian 
objectives. To this end, speeches are expected to emphasize humanitarian accomplishments and 
focus on military action as risky and inefficient. Additionally, the president is expected to have 
an incentive to avoid drawing attention to the crisis or escalating human rights violations that 
would contradict the message that non-confrontational means are working. As long as 
cooperative approaches such as diplomacy or aid appear capable of achieving the humanitarian 
objectives, cooperative internationalists are expected to be an easy sell. Their patience with non-
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military options will prevent the formation of a unified coalition of opposition to the president’s 
foreign policy. 
However, opposition from militant internationalists carries political costs even if these 
individuals are neither a majority of the public nor easily persuaded to support non-intervention. 
Active opposition casts doubt on the prudence of the president’s foreign policy and complicates 
efforts to persuade cooperative internationalists, but the president is unlikely to be able to 
convince militant internationalists that a stronger military response is not necessary. Instead, the 
White House can mitigate dissent and pressure from militant internationalists by arguing that the 
crisis does not affect U.S. national security—their core concern. Combined, the policy 
preferences of cooperative and militant internationalists and the importance of managing 
domestic pressure for escalation suggest that justifications for inaction should highlight 
humanitarian achievements and downplay the importance of the crisis for U.S. national interests.  
Alternatively, if White House policy changes to include military action, the 
communication strategy is expected to capitalize on this pressure to further mobilize cooperative 
internationalists in support of intervention. As in the Gulf War case, humanitarian justifications 
will be used to persuade any cooperative internationalists who remain skeptical of the utility of 
military action. Militant internationalists, who have pushed for military action all along, will be 
easily convinced to support this policy change. However, the president is expected to abandon 
his previous efforts to convince this group that the crisis is not a vital U.S. interest and to instead 
argue that the intervention supports U.S. strategic and security goals. Table 7.1 summarizes the 
theoretical expectation and observable implications of this argument in the context of the 
Bosnian conflict. 
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Table 7.1 Theoretical Expectations and Observable Implications 
Expectation Observable Implications 
During the early periods of non-intervention, 
little public attention is given to the crisis.   
• Limited public acknowledgement of the 
crisis during the early stages.  
• Little domestic pressure for action. 
• Any speeches that are given emphasize the 
success of diplomacy and aid in 
accomplishing humanitarian goals.  
As the crisis continues, domestic pressure 
builds and justifications are needed to prevent 
the formation of a coalition in favor of 
escalation. 
• Officials become concerned with domestic 
pressure for action. 
• Speeches emphasize humanitarian 
accomplishments. 
•  Communications target groups espousing 
cooperative internationalist values. 
• Crisis is presented as non-vital to the U.S. 
national interest and security. 
When strategy changes to include military 
action, humanitarian justifications targeting 
cooperative internationalists remain, but their 
content shifts. 
• Speeches emphasize that military means are 
now necessary to meet humanitarian ends. 
• Administration remains concerned with 
constituencies with cooperative 
internationalist values. 
• Action is presented as important to U.S. 
national interests and security. 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
Case Selection 
This chapter uses a case study of U.S. policy towards the Bosnian conflict from 1993 to 
1995 to evaluate these expectations and demonstrate that the cooperative internationalist logic 
extends both to humanitarian interventions and periods of non-intervention. The analysis begins 
with Bill Clinton’s inauguration in 1993 and ends with the announcement that the U.S. would 
send troops to implement the Dayton Accords in December 1995. While the early stages of the 
conflict took place during the George H.W. Bush administration, the analysis focuses on the 
Clinton administration to hold constant both the president—accounting for differences in 
rhetorical style—and the key decisionmakers and speechwriters—accounting for both personal 
and personnel differences in the White House’s approach to foreign policy. Additionally, while 
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the violence in Bosnia included conflicts between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and 
Bosnia Croats, the analysis primarily focuses on the war between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Muslims. This dimension of the conflict captures the most grievous and consistent violations of 
international humanitarian law, including ethnic cleansing, the siege of Sarajevo, and attacks on 
UN peacekeepers. 
Structured Questions 
 As in the previous chapter, I rely on a set questions to structure the analysis of the 
conflict and evaluate the theoretical expectations outlined in Table 7.1. This case is structured 
around eight sets of questions. To gauge the gravity assigned to the humanitarian crisis and 
strategy in the early months of the Clinton administration, I ask: 1) To what extent did the 
president emphasize humanitarian concerns and seek to draw attention to the humanitarian 
crisis? 2) To what extent did the White House express concern about domestic pressure for 
action? 3) To what extent did the White House connect the conflict to vital national and security 
interests?  
To evaluate the extent to which the White House aimed to manage domestic pressure for 
escalation when it arose, I consider: 4) Was the White House concerned about opposition and 
public pressure for action? If so, from which actors? 5) Did discussions of humanitarian efforts 
emphasize accomplishments or the need for continued action? 6) In discussions of military 
action, did the White House primarily focus on the benefits or the risks of the use of force? 
Finally, to determine the extent to which the White House communication strategy 
focused on the domestic coalition across different stages of the conflict, I ask: 7) Who was the 
target audience of the communication strategy? Did this target change over time? 8) Did the 
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content of justifications shift when U.S. strategy changed to include military action? Table 7.2 
summarizes these questions alongside the expectations they are designed to evaluate.  
Table 7.2 Structured Questions to Evaluate Theoretical Expectations 
Expectation Structured Questions 
Early Stages: 
Acknowledgement of 
Humanitarian Crisis  
1) To what extent did the president emphasize humanitarian concerns 
and seek to draw attention to the humanitarian crisis?  
 
2) To what extent did the White House express concern about 
domestic pressure for action? 
 
3) To what extent did the White House connect the conflict to vital 
national and security interests? 
Prolonged Non-
Intervention: 
Utility of Diplomacy 
4) Was the White House concerned about opposition and public 
pressure for action? If so, from which actors? 
 
5) Did discussions of humanitarian efforts emphasize 
accomplishments or the need for continued action?  
 
6) In discussions of military action, did the White House primarily 
focus on the benefits or the risks of the use of force? 
Mobilizing for 
Military Action 
7) Who was the target audience for the communication strategy? How 
did this target change over time?  
 
8) Did the content of justifications shift when U.S. strategy changed to 
include military action? 
 
Answers to these questions are based on archival materials collected from the William J. 
Clinton Presidential Library as well as the text of official statements and presidential speeches 
collected from the Public Papers of the Presidents database. My data collection efforts focused 
on files from: 1) the communications staff, including drafts of national addresses, press guidance, 
and internal memos and meeting agendas, 2) domestic political advisors, including memos and 
meetings involving the Chief of Staff, election campaign staff, reports from and communications 
with polling firms, and communications with Congress, and 3) diplomatic and military advisors, 
including memos and meetings with the State Department, National Security Council, and Joint 
Chiefs. Documents from diplomatic and military advisors are used to track how U.S. strategy 
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and objectives for the Bosnian conflict changed over time. I use documents from 
communications staff and domestic political advisors, as well as texts from the Public Papers of 
the Presidents, to evaluate how and why the communication strategy shifted over time. 
Documents from these sources also shed light on the White House’s concern with and attempts 
to manage domestic pressure for military action.  
Foreign Policy Beliefs in Context 
 As outlined in Chapter 6, White House discussions of foreign policy beliefs are unlikely 
to rely on the foreign policy belief terminology to reference divisions in the domestic audience. 
However, as evidence from the Bosnian case presented below suggests, the Clinton 
administration was attentive to internationalist and isolationist sentiment writ large, in addition to 
hawk and dove measures. Together, these concepts and the demographics and interest groups 
correlated with cooperative internationalist values, described in Chapter 6, provide proxies for 
foreign policy beliefs in the context of the Bosnian conflict.  
Conflict Overview 
 The Bosnian conflict had its origins in the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
Slovenia was the first to declare its independence, followed by Croatia—whose declaration led to 
seven months of war with the Yugoslav National Army and the establishment of the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep the peace in February 1992—and Macedonia 
(Albright 2003, 178). In the midst of this violence, the United Nations Security Council imposed 
an embargo on weapons deliveries to the region, including Bosnia, which froze in place an 
uneven balance of forces (Power 2002, 249). Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Ambassador to the 
UN, outlined this uneven impact, writing, “The Serbs in Bosnia had ample arms and could be 
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resupplied when necessary from Belgrade. The Croats had help from Zagreb in circumventing 
the embargo. The Muslims were relatively defenseless” (Albright 2003, 179).  
Bosnia held its independence referendum in March 1992 against the vocal opposition of 
its Serb population which preferred to unite with the Republic of Serbia and boycotted the vote 
(Daalder 1998). The U.S. and the European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well 
as Croatia and Slovenia, as sovereign independent states in April 1992, asserting that, “The 
United States views the demonstrated commitment of the emerging states to respect borders and 
to protect all Yugoslav nationalities as an essential element in establishing full diplomatic 
relations” (G. H. W. Bush 1992). At independence, Bosnia was a multiethnic state made up of 
three main ethnic groups: Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. Following the independence vote, war 
broke out as Bosnian Serbs, opposed to the separation and aided by Yugoslav national forces 
under the direction of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, began a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing that drove Bosnian Muslims and Croats from their homes (Christopher 2001, 253). As 
part of this campaign, Serbian forces laid siege to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, systematically 
destroyed Muslim cultural and religious sites, and began targeting civilians in a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing that included murder and rape as well as the imprisonment of Bosnian Muslims 
in concentration camps. 
In July 1992, the UN, with the help of the U.S., United Kingdom, and other member 
states, began airlifts of humanitarian aid to the besieged Sarajevo in an operation that would 
become the longest running airlift in history (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
1996). As Serb forces continued to attack and block humanitarian convoys, the United Nations 
Security Council expanded its mandate to include the use of “all necessary measures” to ensure 
the delivery of humanitarian aid. While the George H.W. Bush administration consistently stated 
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its unwillingness to involve the American military in the conflict, by the time Clinton took office 
in January 1993 NATO had agreed to enforce a no-fly zone and peace efforts, focused on the 
Vance-Owen Plan, were stalled. The Clinton administration rejected the Vance-Owen Plan and 
in May 1993 attempted to convince allies to lift the UN arms embargo and use air strikes to help 
protect Bosnian Muslims as they rearmed (Albright 2003, 180; Daalder 1998). Allies rejected 
this proposal because of concerns that their peacekeeping forces on the ground could become 
targets and the White House was unwilling to expend the political capital necessary to force an 
agreement. Albright  (2003, 181), perhaps the strongest proponent of U.S. military involvement 
within the administration, outlines her view of the administration’s policy moving forward: 
At this stage, with a new President, a wary Secretary of State, a negative Pentagon, 
nervous allies, and crises in Somalia, then Rwanda and Haiti blowing up, we 
weren’t prepared to run the risks of leadership in Bosnia…Throughout the next two 
years our goal was a negotiated solution, but we never applied the credible threat 
of force necessary to achieve it. Instead we employed a combination of half-
measures and bluster that didn’t work. We brokered cease-fire agreements that were 
violated within days. We proposed a resolution in the Security Council to lift the 
arms embargo but were blocked when nine members, including Britain, France, and 
Russia, abstained. We vowed to strengthen six Muslim “safe areas,” but 
reinforcement couldn’t travel to those areas without Bosnian Serb consent. We 
vowed to cut off arms shipments to the Bosnians Serbs from Belgrade, but 
Milosevic refused to allow UN border monitors on Yugoslav territory. We voted to 
enforce no-fly zones, but the Serbs violated them hundreds of times without paying 
a significant price.  
 
 As a result of perceived international and domestic political constraints, throughout 1993 
and 1994 the Clinton administration pursued a policy of non-intervention and remained 
committed to achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict. By 1995, both the conflict and the 
United States’ willingness to use military force began to shift. The year began with a winter truce 
negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter, which lasted four months. However, the Serbs 
responded to the end of the cease-fire by shelling Sarajevo and in the summer of 1995 attacked 
the UN-declared safe areas in Zepa and Srebrenica. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (2001, 
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254) describes these attacks and the evidence of the systematic and mass killing of men and boys 
as a turning point for the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia:  
The slaughter of thousands of Muslim residents of these towns, widely covered by 
the press, galvanized world opinion and convinced the key NATO allies that the 
time had come to do whatever was necessary to halt the slaughter before it reached 
the next apparent target of the Bosnian Serbs, the safe area of Gorazde. President 
Clinton, deeply engaged and strongly spurred on by the vice president, insisted that 
we find a way to stop the killing.  
 
In a meeting with allies in London in July 1995, the U.S. and NATO committed to 
respond to future attacks on safe areas with airstrikes and relaxed the requirements for dual key 
authorization from the UN. When Bosnian Serbs shelled a Sarajevo marketplace on August 28, 
NATO, including U.S. forces, put the London agreement into action with intensive strikes on 
Serb targets that continued until September 14 (Christopher 2001, 257). U.S. participation in 
these strikes coincided with pressure for increased action from the House and Senate, most 
notably in the form of legislation in favor of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. This vote 
forced Clinton to use his veto power to block the legislation and prevent the implementation of 
unilateral lift, which he believed would create conflict with allies within both the UN and NATO 
(Purdum 1995).  
With the increased and credible threat of external intervention, on November 21, 1995 
Bosnian and Serbian leaders signed the Dayton Accords, agreeing to maintain the sovereignty of 
the Bosnian state at the cost of partitioning the territory into three ethnically-defined areas for 
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. To implement the peace agreement, Clinton promised the 
deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops (Power 2002, 440). These forces served as part of the NATO 
Implementation Force (IFOR) which completed its one-year mandate in 1996 and handed over 
responsibilities to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained in place 
until 2004. 
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In sum, U.S. policy towards Bosnia was characterized by non-intervention and a focus on 
achieving a negotiated solution during 1993 and 1994. U.S. military involvement began to 
escalate in 1995 as NATO launched sustained airstrikes against Serbian targets and culminated 
in the commitment of U.S. troops to enforce the Dayton Accords. Examining the Clinton 
administration’s communication strategy during the first half of 1993 thus addresses the early 
stages expectations. I then evaluate the prolonged non-intervention expectations in late 1993 and 
1994, and 1995 allows me to consider changes in communications as the president mobilizes for 
military action. 
Justifying Humanitarian Non-Intervention 
 The domestic coalition argument expects appeals to cooperative internationalists to 
remain central to the White House communication strategy, even as the content and frequency of 
public statements change to reflect policy shifts. Reports of a humanitarian crisis—readily 
available and graphic during the Bosnian conflict—create the potential for widespread 
opposition if the president fails to effectively justify his decision to pursue a strategy of non-
intervention. This opposition is costly for the president’s domestic political agenda in the short 
term and for his reelection prospects in the long term. To avoid incurring political punishment, 
when the White House is committed to action short of intervention, the communication strategy 
will focus on maintaining the support and patience of cooperative internationalists to prevent 
them from joining a coalition in favor of escalation. To achieve this goal in the early stages of 
the Clinton administration’s involvement, presidential statements should be low in number to 
avoid adding to the perceived urgency of the crisis. As the conflict wears on and humanitarian 
justifications for increased military involvement appear in elite and media discourse, the 
president will need to offset this domestic pressure for action by highlighting humanitarian 
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achievements while downplaying connections to the U.S. national interest. Clinton’s speeches 
and White House documents from this period reveal three patterns consistent with the domestic 
coalition expectations: 1) in the first months of the Clinton administration’s involvement with 
conflict, references to Bosnia in addresses to the nation were few and far between and placed 
relatively low emphasis on humanitarian explanations, 2) when domestic pressure increased and 
public statements became more common, speeches emphasized humanitarian achievements and 
the success of diplomatic efforts, even in the midst of ongoing atrocities, and 3) speeches 
presented the conflict as a European issue and asserted that U.S. interests in the region were non-
vital.  
Attention to the Crisis 
In the early stages of its Bosnia policy, the Clinton administration had an incentive to 
downplay the ongoing humanitarian crisis to avoid mobilizing opposition among militant 
internationalists. As Figure 7.1 illustrates, for the first year of his administration Clinton gave 
few national addresses that referenced the Bosnian crisis. By 1994, however, the administration 
began to face political costs for its relative silence. A National Security Council memo outlined 
the problem: 
With the exception of a few soundbites from the President, the Administration has 
offered little in the way of public explanation or defense of our position. A strategy 
which appears defensive, or even worse, a strategy of silence will not quell public 
uproar; it will make it worse. We need to lay out our policy but with care not to 
promise more or less than we may intend to do in the long-run (Sonenshine, n.d.). 
 
Following this change in communication strategy, the number of addresses increased in 1994, 
but they remained few and far between. However, by mid-July 1995 when the U.S. strategy 
shifted to include participation in intensified NATO airstrikes and the possibility of deploying 
troops to implement a peace agreement loomed, Clinton gave multiple speeches addressing 
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Bosnia each month. This pattern is consistent with the expectation that Clinton would avoid 
attracting additional attention to the Bosnian crisis in the early stages of its policy, intensify its 
efforts to frame non-intervention favorably as domestic pressure mounted, and use public 
statements to mobilize domestic support as military involvement increased.   
Figure 7.1 Number of Speeches to the National Audience by Month of Conflict 
 
 When Clinton did give national addresses that discussed Bosnia, examining the 
distribution of justifications reveals few clear patterns. As Figure 7.2 shows, in the first year of 
the conflict, speeches given by George H.W. Bush placed high levels of emphasis on 
humanitarian claims—employing them as the primary justification in the majority of the 
addresses. During the Clinton administration the relative emphasis placed on humanitarian 
claims became more scattered, with a roughly equal number of speeches that focused primarily 
on humanitarian concerns or used humanitarian justifications as the secondary explanation or not 
at all. The pattern of security justifications during this same period is comparable to the emphasis 
placed on humanitarian claims, suggesting that Clinton often mixed humanitarian and security 
explanations for both action and inaction. The variation in the emphasis of humanitarian claims 
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and the presence of security justifications suggests that humanitarian justifications are not the 
only explanations available nor are they the primary justification in every speech. Instead, this 
pattern is consistent with the argument that Clinton used humanitarian actions in periods of 
inaction and action to appeal to cooperative internationalists while security explanations 
attempted to mitigate opposition from military internationalists.  
Figure 7.2 Relative Emphasis of Humanitarian and Security Justifications 
 
Domestic Pressure for Escalation 
 The increase in Clinton’s speeches on Bosnia beginning in late 1993 coincided with 
rising pressure from opponents lobbying for increased military involvement. In particular, the 
administration faced consistent pressure from members of Congress and opinion leaders 
(“Bosnia Hill Strategy” 1994). In late 1993, Representative Susan Molinari summarized growing 
dissent in Congress in her letter to the President, “Many of my colleagues here in Congress, 
including myself, have been questioning the ‘hands off’ policy by your Administration towards 
the ongoing crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Thus far, the idle threats made by our world leaders 
followed by inaction only increases the number of dead, wounded and homeless” (Molinari 
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1993).  This pressure increased over time and became more politically problematic as it was led 
by Senator Bob Dole, Clinton’s opponent-to-be in the 1996 presidential election. In particular, 
Dole spearheaded efforts to pass legislation that called for the U.S. to unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo on Bosnia. Following the February 1994 attack on a busy Sarajevo marketplace, he and 
Senator Joseph Lieberman coordinated a letter signed by 51 other Senators that asserted the 
attack “emphasized, once again, the imperative of taking immediate and effective action to 
provide the Bosnian government with the means to defend its citizens. The people of Sarajevo 
are not being strangled; they are being slaughtered. As allied and U.N. floundering over these 
past twenty-two months has demonstrated, strong measures cannot be taken without decisive 
U.S. leadership” (Dole and Lieberman 1994). Notably, the call for unilateral lift had bipartisan 
support, including the signatures of Democrats such as Joe Biden and Paul Wellstone alongside 
well-known Republicans such as Jesse Helms, Richard Lugar, and Strom Thurmond.  
In addition to statements from Congress, consistent media coverage communicated 
arguments for escalation to the public as evidence of atrocities continued to mount. In its public 
affairs strategy for April 1994, the White House acknowledged that coverage of attacks on 
civilians and the resulting calls for escalation could not be avoided—“This story is not going to 
fade away although the initial press hysteria will subside”—in part because “Media interest is 
great and the number of outlets is equally great” (Ross/Sonenshine 1994). To offset this pressure 
the White House focused its attention on providing compelling justifications for its policy of 
non-intervention in Bosnia, based on the strong belief that “it is possible to alter the tone and 
tenor of the press coverage of Bosnia, and to contribute to public understanding of our interests 
in the Bosnian conflict” (Ross/Sonenshine 1994).  
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Domestic pressure was also expressed by interest groups and core constituencies. The 
leaders of the American Jewish Congress—a non-pacifist religious group likely to espouse 
cooperative internationalist values—criticized the White House, writing “The cold indifference 
to the massive human catastrophe in Bosnia expressed by your Administration’s policy 
constitutes a betrayal of fundamental American values no less than of America’s national 
interest” (Lifton and Siegman 1993) They then called on the President to “take immediate steps 
to assert U.S. leadership in mobilizing international action to stop the carnage in Bosnia and to 
prevent the catastrophe that the fall of Sarajevo would represent” (Lifton and Siegman 1993). 
Similarly, George Soros, whose foundation provided millions of dollars in relief assistance, 
pressured the White House to increase its protection of civilians, noting “We find it unacceptable 
that ordinary citizens should still be under attack and that others are still being forced from their 
homes. At a minimum, the U.S. should take the lead to ensure that the proposed safe-havens 
really protect civilians” (Soros Humanitarian Fund 1993). These statements demonstrate growing 
domestic discontent with the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia, including among 
non-pacifist religious groups and humanitarian organizations likely to espouse cooperative 
internationalist values.  
However, in line with the domestic coalition expectations, statements from these and 
similar groups also indicate that they could be convinced to accept a non-aggressive policy if it 
was sufficient to end the human suffering. For example, when a group of churches, synagogues, 
and civic groups organized “A Day for Bosnia” in Dallas, TX, the event aimed to “speak out for 
peace and the defense of human rights in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to help provide aid to those 
who have suffered as a result of the tragedy there” (Saperstein 1993). To this end, the group 
coordinated the signing of the “world’s largest postcard” to be delivered to the White House. The 
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postcard urged Clinton to “Please utilize our country’s global leadership and give voice to our 
great nation’s moral force. If we do not act now, how shall we one day tell our children that we 
did nothing,” but organizers emphasized that “the inscription is in no way critical of the 
President’s efforts, and calls only for increased exertion on present White House policy. Neither 
United States military intervention nor a repeal of the arms embargo are included among the 
demands” (Saperstein 1993).  
As these examples illustrate, domestic pressure for increased U.S. action came from 
Congress and domestic groups, including members of the President’s own party and 
organizations that favored non-aggressive solutions to the conflict. However, in line with the 
domestic coalition expectations, the groups most likely to hold cooperative internationalist 
values also demonstrated a willingness to accept non-intervention if the White House’s policy 
was successful in easing the humanitarian crisis. As long as the White House was committed to 
finding a negotiated solution rather than military action, these groups represent the target 
audience for the administration’s communication strategy because they were both politically 
engaged and willing to support continued non-intervention. 
Negotiated Settlement and Humanitarian Achievements 
The non-intervention stages of the Bosnian conflict presented a challenge for official 
communications because the strategy in need of justification occupied a complicated middle 
ground between action and inaction. A National Security Council memo from 1994 outlined this 
problem: “The reality is that we have carefully and consciously crafted a policy position that 
rests somewhere between ‘idling and overdrive.’ This policy centers on a careful balanced 
between the use of power and diplomacy” (Sonenshine 1994). This balanced approached posed 
an “inherent contradiction between short-term imperatives (‘do something’) and longer-term 
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goals (negotiated peace)” which threatened to “trap the US in a quagmire of our own making” 
(Kass 1993a). In an effort to avoid this quagmire the White House needed to convince the 
domestic audience that its moderate position was the right way to bring an end to the Bosnian 
people’s suffering. To this end, the communication strategy emphasized the importance of 
diplomacy, highlighted humanitarian accomplishments, and created visible evidence of 
humanitarian successes, no matter how small, whenever possible. 
From the beginning, the Clinton White House made it clear that it had “decided to give 
top priority to helping negotiating succeed and want to do nothing that could detract from that 
goal” (“Draft, Letter to Rudy Perpich from the President” 1993). In his statements to the 
domestic audience, Clinton reiterated the United States’ focus on achieving a negotiated solution 
and made the case that “A workable, enforceable solution acceptable to all parties is the only 
way to ensure a lasting solution for Sarajevo and for all of Bosnia” (Clinton 1994c). Achieving a 
negotiated settlement remained the stated purpose of U.S. efforts throughout 1994, even as its 
participation in NATO’s enforcement of a no-fly zone and provision of close air support 
increased. In a news conference outlining these efforts, Clinton (1994d) presented them as 
limited and necessary to achieve a negotiated peace:  
Let me be clear about our objective. Working with our allies, the Russians, and 
others, we must help the warring parties in Bosnia to reach a negotiated settlement. 
To do that, we must make the Serbs pay a higher price for continued violence so it 
will be in their own interests, more clearly, to return to the negotiating table. That 
is, after all, why we pushed for NATO’s efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and the 
Sarajevo ultimatum and to provide close air support for U.N. forces who come 
under attack. 
 
While the White House consistently presented a negotiated settlement as its main 
objective, a consistent message alone is insufficient to manage public pressure for action. To 
maintain the support and patience of cooperative internationalists, the White House also needed 
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to make the case that its policy of non-intervention was working. As evidence that current efforts 
were sufficient to address the crisis, Clinton’s addresses also highlighted humanitarian and 
diplomatic accomplishments. This choice is particularly notable because the lauded 
accomplishments took place against the backdrop of ongoing ethnic cleansing—they were thus a 
strategic rhetorical choice rather than evidence of improving conditions on the ground. 
To implement this approach, public affairs talking points on Bosnia advised officials 
asked about the conflict that their “Strategy should be to return to positive things we have done, 
and not let incidents portray our policy as a failed policy” (Kerrick, n.d.). Future guidance 
pursued this strategy by noting that the U.S. had given “the largest quantity of humanitarian 
assistance to the region of any nation” and was the “major single-nation food donor, has 
performed over three-quarters of all airdrops, and has transported over 10,000 metric tons of aid 
by airlift to Sarajevo” (“Talking Points, Bosnia-Herzegovina” 1994). In line with these efforts, 
Clinton’s public statements often included long lists of accomplishments, noting that “We have 
participated in the enforcement of economic sanctions against Serbia. We have initiated airdrops 
of food and medicine and participated in the Sarajevo airlift, a massive effort, running longer 
than the Berlin airlift, which has relieved starvation and suffering for tens of thousands of 
Bosnians” (Clinton 1994b). Speeches also cast temporary calm as a success, mentioning the 
relative quiet in Sarajevo and evidence that the Serbs had stopped shelling specific safe areas 
even as reports of widespread ethnic cleansing continued (Clinton 1994e).  
In addition to highlighting accomplishments as they occurred, the White House also 
sought out opportunities to achieve and publicly demonstrate humanitarian successes. To this 
end, references to the public profile of U.S. efforts factored into discussions about the trade-offs 
of different humanitarian objectives. For example, information papers on the pros and cons of 
 255 
humanitarian airdrops noted both their ability to relieve suffering and their visibility. Airdrops 
were both the safest form of participation and could provide a “Very visible, high profile 
demonstration of US concern/activism” (“Information Paper, Increasing Humanitarian Aid--
Airdrops” 1993). Similarly, expanding the U.S. medical mission to include more children offered 
a “High visibility US humanitarian assistance contribution without commitment of additional 
ground troops” and “Appeals to American sentiment” (“Information Paper, Expansion of 
Mission--US Hospital Zagreb” 1993).  
The U.S. role in collecting evidence to be used by the War Crimes Tribunal was 
particularly helpful in this respect because, “Establishing individual accountability for war 
crimes is ‘law and order’ on an international scale that the public quickly and favorably grasps 
(“Talking Points, Political Rationale for a Special Coordinator for War Crimes” 1995). To 
maximize the political gain from these efforts, some officials recommended the appointment of a 
high profile Special Coordinator for War Crimes (Walker 1993). Taken as a whole, these efforts 
to highlight humanitarian accomplishments helped make the case that the policy of non-
intervention was working and military escalation was not necessary.  
A Non-Vital European Problem 
 The domestic coalition argument does not expect the president to be able to persuade 
militant internationalists that non-intervention is the best way to resolve the crisis. However, it 
does anticipate that the White House will attempt to counter militant internationalists’ arguments 
in favor of escalation by suggesting the crisis does not sufficiently threaten U.S. interests or 
security to warrant putting troops in harm’s way. By countering these claims the White House 
limits the rhetorical space available for dissent (Krebs and Jackson 2007) and the risk that 
opposition will spread to other groups. In the Bosnian case, the Clinton administration responded 
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to pressure for increased military engagement by framing the crisis as a primarily European 
problem that did not affect vital U.S. interests (Albright 2003, 179; Christopher 2001, 252).   
First, Clinton’s statements from 1994 promoted the narrative that responsibility for 
ending the humanitarian crisis was shared and not primarily American. In response to the first 
Sarajevo market attack Clinton condemned the violence and asserted that “America’s interest 
and the responsibilities of America’s leadership demand our active involvement in the search for 
a solution” (Clinton 1994b). However, the limits of U.S. responsibility were carefully qualified: 
Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving the problem and, indeed, it 
has. The United Nations has forces on the ground in Bosnia to protect the 
humanitarian efforts and to limit the carnage. And the vast majority of them are 
European, from all countries in Europe who have worked along with brave 
Canadians and soldiers from other countries. I have not sent American ground units 
into Bosnia. And I will not send American ground forces to impose a settlement 
that the parties to that conflict do not accept (Clinton 1994b). 
 
Clinton’s speeches during this period were consistent with other White House efforts to 
avoid creating the perception that the U.S. was leading the international response. For example, 
when the administration considered appointing a prominent coordinator for the U.S. 
humanitarian assistance efforts in Bosnia, officials from the National Security Council cautioned 
that “naming a prominent official to coordinate with other countries could imply that we were 
taking the lead responsibility for organizing the international relief effort, letting the Europeans 
and/or UN off the hook” (Walker 1993). Similarly, talking points in opposition to the Dole 
Amendment—which would have required the U.S. to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on 
Bosnia—noted that “Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility” 
(“Talking Points, Points on the Dole Amendment” 1995). Instead, the administration’s public 
and political communications emphasized multilateral cooperation with allies and the United 
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Nations to promote the narrative that “The United States is willing to lead. But others must join 
us” (“Draft, Letter from the President to Congressman John Kasich” 1993). 
Second, in addition to allocating responsibility to European allies and the UN, the Clinton 
administration also worked to limit domestic pressure by classifying Bosnia as non-vital to the 
U.S. national interest. For example, announcing NATO’s decision to threaten airstrikes in 1994, 
Clinton explained that the U.S. interests at stake fell short of creating an impetus for direct U.S. 
action: “…we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping to prevent the strangulation of 
Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia. These interests do not justify 
unilateral American intervention in the crisis” (Clinton 1994a). Clinton went on to make a direct 
link between the absence of vital U.S. interests and his policy towards the conflict, explaining, 
“our contribution to resolving the Bosnian conflict will be proportionate to our interests, no more 
and no less” (Clinton 1994a). This distinction appeared in equally strong language in briefing 
materials prepared for official statements in front of the House, which answered the question 
‘What are U.S. interests in Bosnia?” by stating first: “The conflict in Bosnia does not affect U.S. 
vital interests in a way that would warrant unilateral U.S. military intervention” (Kerrick 1994).51  
Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Non-Intervention 
 To this point, Clinton’s justifications are consistent with the types of appeals that Chapter 
4 found to resonate with cooperative internationalists and counter the concerns shown to be 
salient among militant internationalists. But, did the administration’s communication plan reflect 
concern with managing the support and opposition of these individuals? Internal discussions of 
White House policy and communications reveal that the administration actively worked to 
																																																						
51 The guidance goes on to explain that “We do, however, have strong national interests at stake” and outlines the 
same strategic, humanitarian, and political interests Clinton enumerated in his announcement of threatened NATO 
airstrikes (Kerrick 1994). 
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counter domestic pressure, acknowledged the public held a spectrum of policy preferences, and 
recognized that the most effective target audience existed between the extremes of militant 
internationalism and isolationism. In 1993, officials noted domestic pressure for escalation and 
warned of the perils of “military operations born of frustration with diplomacy and a noble desire 
to ‘do something’” which only “lead to more frustration and new appeals to ‘try harder’” (Kass 
1993b). To maintain public approval and avoid being pressured onto an unsuccessful path of 
military escalation, the press strategy recommended that: 
The best explanation is the truth. We have chosen not to pursue either of the 
extremist positions: the do-nothing approach nor the massive use of force approach. 
We strive to find a middle ground between full-fledged isolationism, and full scale 
war. The middle ground is a mixture of minimal force and maximum diplomacy. It 
satisfies neither those who want us to stay out of internal conflicts, altogether, nor 
those who want us to bomb everything in sight. We will accept the fact that both 
ends of the spectrum are dissatisfied. We will pursue what we believe is the best 
course. We will not be steam rolled by those at the extremes of the spectrum 
(Sonenshine, n.d.).52 
 
The domestic audience’s spectrum of beliefs continued to inform the administration’s 
communication plan and reappeared in a 1994 memo that explained, “There are those who are 
trying to portray the US position as either totally passive/inactive. On the other end of the 
spectrum are those who are trying to portray this position as one of over-activity. They are both 
WRONG” (Sonenshine 1994). 
In addition to outlining the administration’s concern with being “steam rolled” by 
domestic pressure, this strategy also explicitly acknowledges that the domestic audience holds a 
spectrum of foreign policy preferences and that not all individuals can be persuaded. Support for 
the U.S. policy of non-intervention from either “those who want us to stay out, altogether” (i.e., 
isolationists) or “those who want us to bomb everything in sight” (i.e., militant internationalists) 
																																																						
52 Emphasis added.  
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was considered unattainable and an ineffective target for official communications. Given this 
expected opposition, the White House could only afford to “accept the fact that both ends of the 
spectrum are dissatisfied” because individuals with cooperative internationalist values existed 
between the two extremes and could be convinced to support the “minimal force and maximum 
diplomacy” approach. Persuading these individuals minimized the risk of a broad coalition of 
dissent and allowed the administration to pursue its desired strategy.53 
The 1993 press strategy is only one example of the Clinton administration’s 
acknowledgement of internationalist and isolationist sentiment as part of its communication plan. 
In a memo summarizing public option, staff drew on the same questions from the Chicago 
Council on Global affairs presented in Chapter 2 to track internationalist attitudes in the context 
of the Bosnian conflict. The memo concluded that despite media coverage of isolationism, 
internationalist sentiment was “holding steady” and “About 60 percent of Americans now favor a 
generally active, cooperative U.S. role in world affairs, compared to about a fourth who oppose 
active involvement abroad” (Richman 1993). This confirmation that a majority of the U.S. public 
supported engagement in international affairs supported the White House’s conclusion that “our 
own principles, as well as public and Congressional pressures, make it difficult to disengage and 
effectively abandon the Bosnians” (“Former Yugoslavia Policy Review” 1995). This 
understanding of public opinion was consistent with the conclusion drawn from earlier polls that 
the majority of the public supported threatening NATO airstrikes and “The strongest arguments 
in support of contributing US troops to a UN peacekeeping operation are based on humanitarian 
considerations” (Kull and Ramsay 1994). Together, these internal discussions and analyses 
																																																						
53 As outlined in Chapters 2 and 4, a coalition of militant internationalists and isolationists does not carry the same 
political weight as a coalition of militant and cooperative internationalists because isolationists are less likely to take 
action to voice their dissent.  
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provide evidence that during periods of non-intervention, the Clinton administration’s 
communication plan both recognized and responded to the diversity of the public’s foreign 
policy preferences. 
Mobilizing Support for Intervention 
While the U.S. pursued a policy of non-intervention in Bosnia from 1993-1994, the 
communication strategy aimed to manage domestic pressure by convincing cooperative 
internationalists that this approach was the best and only way to resolve the conflict. In this 
context, justifications emphasized humanitarian accomplishments and cast the conflict as a non-
vital U.S. interest. As U.S. policy shifted to include increased military involvement and the 
commitment of troops to enforce a peace agreement, the communication strategy remained 
focused on the domestic coalition. In this context, rather than managing domestic pressure, the 
White House had an incentive to mobilize domestic support for action. As before, cooperative 
internationalists remained the target audience of justifications, but these justifications now 
contended that U.S. military action was the only way to achieve the desired humanitarian 
objectives. 
The Necessity of Military Action 
 As Figures 7.1 and 7.2 above show, Clinton’s public statements regarding Bosnia became 
more common in the second half of 1995 as the prospect of sustained military action loomed and 
humanitarian justifications often provided the primary rationale for action. Communication staff 
prepared for this transition in strategy, recognizing that, “It is likely that U.S. military will soon 
be in harm’s way, either as a part of UNPROFOR withdrawal or retaliatory strikes. It is not too 
soon to establish justifications for further U.S. intervention.” (Lorin 1995). As it became clear 
that U.S. military action would take the form of participation in an implementation force for the 
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Dayton Accords, the discussion of military action in Clinton’s speeches shifted. Rather than 
presenting military action as limited and unable to resolve the conflict, Clinton’s statements now 
asserted that the use of force was critical to success. Instead of a policy flip-flop, Clinton also 
worked to frame the prospect of military action as consistent with his administration’s long-term 
strategy, explaining that, “as I have said since early 1993, I believe American must be a part of 
helping implement that agreement.” He went on to assure reporters that while he had 
“consistently opposed the involvement of our troops in any combat and in this United Nations 
mission,” the implementation force would be “a very different thing, and I believe it’s very, very 
important that we play a part of it” (Clinton 1995a). 
From this point forward, Clinton’s public statements consistently employed detailed 
humanitarian justifications for military action and presented the U.S. as the only actor with the 
power to prevent a return to violence and bloodshed. In his announcement of the peace 
agreement, Clinton (1995b) summarized this logic:  
The central fact for us as American is this: Our leadership made this peace 
agreement possible and helped to bring an end to the senseless slaughter of so many 
innocent people that our fellow citizens had to watch night after night after night 
for 4 long years on their television screens. Now American leadership, together 
with our allies, is needed to make this peace real and enduring. 
 
While the implementation force would be multilateral and include significant burden-sharing, 
U.S. participation was critical because NATO was the only force capable of credibility 
implementing the agreement and “If we’re not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will 
collapse; the war will reignite; the slaughter of innocents will begin again” (Clinton 1995c). 
Contrary to earlier assertions that diplomacy was the only way to peace, with a peace agreement 
in sight these justifications made the case that its implementation could only be achieved with 
military action.  
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As the administration made the case that U.S. military action was the only way to achieve 
an end to the humanitarian crisis its rhetoric also changed from countering concern with to 
emphasizing the U.S. national and security interests at stake. By the time Clinton announced that 
a peace agreement had been reached, he claimed “Our values, our interests, and our leadership 
all over the world are at stake” (Clinton 1995b) and presented the need for U.S. troops to protect 
“a region of the world that is vital to our national interests” (Clinton 1995c). This change is 
consistent with the argument that the White House now had an incentive to encourage rather than 
block the formation of a coalition of support for military escalation among militant and 
cooperative internationalists. Additionally, as before, evidence from White House memos and 
correspondence reveals that managing a domestic audience with diverse foreign policy 
preferences remained the goal of communication strategies during this stage of the conflict. This 
goal is noted in press guidance that outlined the administration’s plan “to have broadest possible 
based [sic] of public support—in both parties—for U.S. role in implementation of settlement if 
we achieve one” (Bremner 1995; Feeley 1995). 
Conclusion 
The Clinton administration’s communication strategy for Bosnia from 1993 to 1995 
demonstrates that the White House remained concerned with the domestic coalition during 
periods of humanitarian non-intervention and intervention. Like the Bush administration, the 
Clinton administration also recognized the diversity of public opinion and explicitly considered a 
spectrum of isolationist and internationalist preferences. Acknowledging that neither isolationists 
or militant internationalists could be persuaded to support Clinton’s middle-ground policy 
towards Bosnia, the White House aimed to alleviate domestic pressure by preventing cooperative 
internationalists from joining a coalition in favor of escalation. However, when the White House 
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intended to deploy an implementation force, it targeted these same individuals to convince them 
of the necessity of military action and mobilize a coalition in favor of action. Combined with 
Chapter 4’s finding that humanitarian justifications persuade cooperative internationalists and 
evidence from Chapter 6 that these individuals are a critical constituency in security 
interventions, the Bosnia case shows that in both security and humanitarian interventions, as well 
as during periods of non-intervention, the support of cooperative internationalists is critical and 
humanitarian justification are key to maintaining this support. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Humanitarian justifications build support for military action by emphasizing the suffering 
of foreign civilians and convincing the public that the U.S. has a moral responsibility to respond. 
The conventional wisdom has focused on the utility of these justifications in the context of 
humanitarian interventions where their primary consequence is to enable the use of force in 
response to humanitarian crises—when faced with a humanitarian crisis, presidents will use 
these justifications to make the case for military action, international and domestic audiences 
who have internalized humanitarian norms will endorse the need to respond, and intervention 
will take place. From this view, humanitarian justifications are an embodiment of humanitarian 
norms with the potential to overcome the “society-wide silence” that stands in the way of 
preventing genocide (Power 2002, xvii). However, when the U.S. faces a potential security 
intervention these appeals are expected to be less effective than security justifications which 
convince the public that there is an imminent threat to either its safety or U.S. national interests 
that can only be addressed through military action. While humanitarian claims are useful in 
mobilizing support for humanitarian intervention, security justifications that “demonstrate that 
the threats or costs of war are specific and proximate” should be the optimal explanation for 
military intervention to protect U.S. interests (Western 2005, 22). Why, then, do U.S. presidents 
consistently use humanitarian claims to justify interventions best explained in terms of national 
security? If humanitarian claims simply work better than the conventional wisdom recognizes, 
why do presidents limit their emphasis of these justifications?  
 By raising these questions, the pattern of humanitarian justifications in the post-Cold War 
period challenges conventional wisdom about what is required to mobilize the domestic audience 
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in support of intervention. This project has sought to provide a better understanding of the 
incentives behind presidents’ explanations for military action by considering the composition of 
the audience these justifications are intended to persuade. To this end, it has clarified the pattern 
of humanitarian justifications in national addresses, highlighted the individuals most likely to 
respond to these claims, and investigated the process through which administrations develop 
communication strategies to build support for military action. I argue that the pattern of 
humanitarian justifications is explained by the incentives presidents face to build and maintain a 
stable coalition of support that includes individuals with diverse foreign policy preferences. 
Specifically, I contend that the underlying beliefs known to shape individuals’ support for 
different policies also systematically influence how individuals respond to alternative 
justifications for military action. Disaggregating the domestic audience by foreign policy beliefs 
reveals that the same individuals—cooperative internationalists—who require humanitarian 
justifications also constrain their use. These individuals are key to maintaining both a domestic 
coalition of support and democratic accountability for the use of force because they are most 
likely to voice their dissent and impose political costs on the president. By applying existing 
evidence of heterogeneity in the domestic audience to presidents’ attempts to positively frame 
military interventions, this project both accounts for the pattern of humanitarian justifications 
and clarifies the conditions under which presidents can successfully mobilize support for military 
action. 
Summary of Findings 
 The empirical findings outline the pattern of humanitarian justifications in the post-Cold 
War period and demonstrate that this pattern is driven by the preferences of cooperative 
internationalists and their position in stable domestic coalitions. Content analysis of presidents’ 
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national addresses on potential interventions highlights the amount of time and effort that leaders 
expend explaining military action to the public. Analysis of trends in justifications reveals that 
humanitarian justifications were used in significant numbers throughout the post-Cold War 
period. Additionally, contrary to the explanation that justifications reflect the nature of the crisis, 
the presence of these appeals is not limited to potential humanitarian interventions—
humanitarian claims appeared at least once in the majority of national addresses, regardless of 
the nature of the underlying conflict. However, the pattern of humanitarian justifications is also 
inconsistent with accounts that expect presidents to use all possible justifications all the time to 
placate an emotional and impulsive public. Instead, the evidence suggests that presidents use 
humanitarian justifications widely across interventions types, but exercise discretion in their 
emphasis of these claims in potential security interventions. This pattern is in line with the 
domestic coalition expectation that presidents employ humanitarian claims to persuade 
cooperative internationalists but must be careful not to overstate these claims to avoid backlash 
from the same group. 
 Having illustrated the pattern of justifications in national addresses, the analysis then 
turns to the micro-level to investigate whether and how foreign policy beliefs influence 
individuals’ responses to humanitarian claims. Survey experiments vary both the type and 
sincerity of justifications to evaluate these hypotheses. The findings confirm that cooperative 
internationalists possess a unique combination of traits that makes them a key target audience for 
justifications—they are skeptical of military force, willing to take action to express their 
opposition, and sufficiently attentive to politics to react quickly to interventions and threaten 
leaders’ prospects for reelection. The results also show that cooperative internationalists were the 
only group whose support changed significantly based on the type of justifications used—
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militant internationalists are supportive and isolationists are opposed to interventions regardless 
how the president justified military action, but the majority of cooperative internationalists only 
offered their support when the president included humanitarian justifications. These findings 
indicate that humanitarian justifications are useful in security interventions because they are 
uniquely capable of bolstering support among the group otherwise most likely to form a 
politically costly opposition. 
 Because humanitarian claims generate support from both cooperative and militant 
internationalists, presidents should have an incentive to use these appeals as often as possible. 
Why, then, does the pattern of justifications show that presidents consistently limit their 
emphasis of humanitarian explanations for security interventions? I argue that cooperative 
internationalists both create the need for humanitarian justifications and constrain their use. 
Leveraging the survey experiment’s variation in the sincerity of justifications, I show that all 
respondents offered significantly lower support when the president used humanitarian claims as a 
cover for his own political agenda. However, only cooperative internationalists were 
significantly affected by evidence the president used insincere humanitarian justifications to 
make the case for an intervention motivated primarily by security concerns. These individuals 
offered lower support for the intervention as a whole, but also reported a reduced likelihood of 
voting for the president’s reelection. Based on these results, if presidents need to maintain the 
support of cooperative internationalists they have an incentive not to overstate or misuse 
humanitarian claims.  
On the surface, this finding appears to be good news for the strength of democratic 
accountability. The core constituency will impose political costs when the president is caught 
using insincere justifications, reducing the benefits of and opportunities for deception. The 
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negative consequences of deception are not limited to humanitarian justifications—leaders face 
comparable political costs for the use of deceptive security claims—but different segments of the 
public impose these costs for different justifications. Findings from the survey experiment show 
that individuals with cooperative internationalist beliefs punish leaders for the misuse of 
humanitarian justifications, while individuals with militant internationalist beliefs hold leaders 
accountable for deceptive security justifications. However, the experimental results also show 
that presidents can mitigate these political costs, even among cooperative internationalists, by 
employing half-truths that combine insincere humanitarian justifications with sincere security 
claims. If leaders use humanitarian claims as a secondary explanation for security 
interventions—as the pattern of justifications in Chapter 3 indicates they often do—the costs of 
deception and risk of backlash may be insufficient to prevent presidents from misleading their 
publics.  
The experimental approach employed in these chapters directly varies the type and 
sincerity of the president’s justifications to provide micro-level data on how communications 
influence individuals’ support for military action. It ensures that all respondents receive the same 
information about the intervention, allows me to directly probe foreign policy beliefs and 
separate the effect of the justification from support for the president, and, through randomization, 
controls for the effects of potentially confounding pre-treatment covariates. The benefits of this 
approach are two-fold. First, it establishes a clear link between the justifications used and 
respondents’ support for military intervention, assuaging concerns about whether all individuals 
heard the same speech or explanations for action. Second, it enables me to directly measure 
foreign policy beliefs, support for intervention, views of the president, and support for future 
interventions for the same group of individuals at the same point in time. This data collection 
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facilitates the evaluation of multiple micro-level implications for the domestic coalition 
argument in one place.   
Despite these benefits, the experimental approach also has significant limitations, most 
notably in terms of its external validity. While the experiments reveal how individuals responded 
when presented with information about the president’s justifications for action, they do not 
demonstrate the effect of these justifications on public opinion in actual cases of intervention. 
Future research employing public opinion data is needed to determine whether the combination 
of humanitarian and security justifications Bush and Clinton used in the case studies influenced 
public opinion as the experimental findings suggest. However, as Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 
116) note, “The study of presidents teaches a healthy appreciation for the distinction between 
presidential strategic intent to move public opinion and the actual effect of the White House on 
Americans.” The domestic coalition argument contends that presidents always attempt to shape 
public attitudes towards military action by appealing to a diversity of foreign policy beliefs and 
that humanitarian justifications are well suited to persuading cooperative internationalists, but the 
effectiveness of this strategy in any given case is likely to be subject to the same four conditions 
that Druckman and Jacobs (2015, 15) find to “modify or obstruct elite efforts to move citizen 
attitudes” more broadly: 
First, when the public holds strong opinions about an issue, it will be difficult to 
change basic preferences or the importance attached to the policy. This creates 
incentives for presidents to use their private polling to focus on weakly held 
attitudes or gaps in public knowledge. Second, competing messages from other 
elites and/or the media can neutralize presidential efforts to influence the public’s 
opinions. Research shows that counterframes often offset each other by motivating 
individuals to resist any one perspective. Third, the president’s own history sets 
parameters on what can be done. Presidents with checkered histories on an issue or 
low credibility may find individuals more inclined to resist or question their 
messages. Conversely, public approval of a president’s performance increases his 
influence in moving opinion. Fourth, efforts by elites to direct public opinion are 
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colored by real-world events, especially if circumstances and communications 
clash. 
 
Given these conditions, presidents’ attempts to persuade cooperative internationalists by 
providing humanitarian justifications for action are more likely to be successful when their 
information advantages are strong, general approval is stable, and—consistent with the results of 
deception presented in Chapter 5—claims do not diverge wildly from reports of conditions on 
the ground.  
While the experimental findings indicate that presidents should use humanitarian claims 
if they want to persuade cooperative internationalists, this analysis also cannot determine 
whether administrations have these incentives in mind when developing communication 
strategies. To evaluate whether presidents recognize and respond to these incentives, the case 
studies of the 1991 Gulf War and U.S. policy towards Bosnia 1993-95 consider whether the 
pattern of humanitarian claims reflects an intentional White House communication plan. 
Archival materials from the Gulf War show that the George H.W. Bush administration was 
concerned about public opinion, recognized sources of heterogeneity in the public’s approach to 
foreign policy, and developed a communication strategy that included humanitarian claims in an 
effort to build the broadest possible domestic coalition. In particular, the Bush administration 
used humanitarian claims to target religious communities and college students who expressed 
concern about the human costs of war. Additionally, officials outlined the risk of backlash and 
cautioned against the overuse of humanitarian appeals.  
The Bosnia case then demonstrates that the same domestic coalition logic at play in 
security interventions also drives communication strategies in potential humanitarian 
interventions and during periods of action short of intervention. Speeches and documents from 
this conflict show that the Clinton administration explicitly considered sources of internationalist 
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and isolationist sentiment and consistently targeted cooperative internationalists. During periods 
of non-intervention, official statements used humanitarian claims to manage domestic pressure 
and prevent cooperative internationalists from joining a coalition in support of military 
escalation. When the administration’s policy shifted to include increased participation in NATO 
airstrikes and the commitment of U.S. troops to help enforce the Dayton Accords, humanitarian 
claims were repurposed to mobilize a coalition in support of intervention. Combined, evidence 
from the case studies demonstrates that while U.S. policy and the objectives of interventions 
change over time, the target audience and the justifications used to bring this audience into the 
domestic coalition remain the same. Taken as a whole, the multi-method approach provides 
evidence in support of the domestic coalition argument at multiple levels of analysis.  
The Domestic Coalition in a Changing Political Context 
 To this point, the analysis has provided evidence that the central role of cooperative 
internationalists in domestic coalitions accounts for the pattern of humanitarian justifications in 
post-Cold War interventions. Specifically, the project systematically analyzed national addresses 
from the past 25 years to show that presidents from both political parties have talked about 
foreign policy decisions in comparable language and employed consistent communication 
strategies to build broad coalitions of support for military action. However, the first months of 
the Trump administration indicate this White House may take a dramatically different approach 
to both foreign policy and communication. This potential shift in the U.S. approach to foreign 
policy coincides with evidence of dramatic polarization on a wide range of political issues to 
suggest that both Americans’ policy attitudes and the political context are in a state of flux. 
These shifts raise the question: How stable are White House concerns about the domestic 
coalition and individuals’ foreign policy preferences during periods of dramatic political change? 
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Change and Consistency in Foreign Policy 
 Public opinion polls following the 2016 presidential election reveal significant, polarizing 
shifts in the public’s attitudes towards foreign policy and trust in the actors involved in 
communicating the White House’s message to the domestic audience. In terms of foreign policy, 
Pew polls show that Democrats and Republicans now diverge significantly in their perceptions 
of the greatest threats facing the United States (Pew Research Center 2017a). The three most 
polarizing threats were: 1) refugees from Iraq and Syria, whom 70 percent of Republicans 
viewed as a major threat compared to only 19 percent of Democrats, 2) global climate change, 
which 88 percent of Democrats and only 18 percent of Republicans saw as a major threat, and 3) 
Russia’s power and influence, which posed a major threat to 70 percent of Democrats but only 
39 percent of Republicans (Pew Research Center 2017a). Perceptions of Russia have undergone 
the most dramatic change, with Republicans and Democrats changing places in their views of 
Russia as an adversary in 2017. At the beginning of 2016, 20 percent of Democrats and 25 
percent of Republicans thought of Russia as an adversary, but by 2017 the percentage of 
Democrats with this view increased to 38 percent while the percentage of Republicans dropped 
to 20 percent (Kiley 2017). This change marked the first time in the last decade that Democrats 
have viewed Russia more critically than Republicans. It corresponded with an increase in the 
percentage of Democrats who hold a negative view of Vladimir Putin, as well as partisan 
differences in respondents’ beliefs that Russia was behind the hacking of the Democratic 
National Committee (48 percent of Republicans and 93 percent of Democrats) and that U.S. 
sanctions against Russia were the correct response to hacking accusations (39 percent of 
Republicans compared to 51 percent of Democrats) (Kiley 2017). 
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 In addition to influencing the public’s views of the most pressing foreign policy issues, 
polls conducted in early 2017 also reveal that Republicans’ trust in the government increased by 
17 percent compared to 2015 (11 to 28 percent) while trust among Democrats declined from 26 
percent to 15 percent (Pew Research Center 2017c). Similarly, stark partisan divides now appear 
in opinions about the role of the media in democracies and perceptions that news organizations 
favor one side of the political debate over the other (Bump 2017). Therefore, the public’s view of 
different foreign policy issues changed at the same time that the power of the president to frame 
these issues to his benefit and ability of the media to provide a platform for experts to agree with 
or dispute official claims appeared to be weakened.  
 However, despite departures on other policy dimensions, one early source of consistency 
with previous administrations was Trump’s use of humanitarian justifications in the context of 
military interventions. In his first address to a joint session of Congress, Trump explained that 
his administration would develop a new plan to defeat ISIS and in so doing stop a group that has 
“slaughtered Muslims and Christians, and men and women and children of all faiths and beliefs” 
(Trump 2017a). Similarly, Trump justified U.S. airstrikes against Syria as a response to the 
regime’s “horrible chemical weapons attack on innocent civilians. Using a deadly nerve agent, 
Assad choked out the lives of helpless men, women, and children. It was a slow and brutal death 
for so many” (Trump 2017b). Surprisingly, these justifications closely reflect Obama’s call for 
action in response to the Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013: “Assad’s government gassed 
to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images from this massacre 
are sickening: Men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas. Others foaming at the 
mouth, gasping for breath” (Obama 2013).  
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In the early months of the Trump administration, while the military actions that the 
Trump White House would need to justify remained largely unknown, humanitarian 
justifications provided a rare example of consistency in the face of other changes. This 
persistence suggests that the basic relationship between the domestic coalition and 
communication strategies remained intact. In the context of increasing polarization, humanitarian 
justifications may prove particularly important to efforts to circumvent otherwise unprecedented 
levels of opposition.  
Taken as a whole, these changes in the U.S. political climate raise two questions about 
the validity of the domestic coalition argument and the continued utility of humanitarian 
justifications: 1) Are the experimental results presented in Chapter 4 stable in the face of political 
changes? 2) Has the importance of foreign policy beliefs been overshadowed by partisanship in 
an increasingly polarized political environment? The following sub-sections address these 
questions in turn to establish the scope conditions of the domestic coalition argument and 
highlight areas for future research. 
 The Stability of Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 These dramatic changes in the political climate could limit the scope of the domestic 
coalition argument, either by changing individuals’ willingness to support military intervention 
overall or by altering their perception of alternative justifications. Given the sensitivity of survey 
experiments to differences in wording, samples, and unobservable idiosyncrasies of the time 
period in which they are fielded, Druckman et al. (2011, 20) suggest that “Analytically, a single 
random assignment makes it difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the mediating pathways of 
numerous intervening variables. To clarify such effects, a researcher needs to design several 
experiments, all with different kinds of treatments.” As a robustness check of the experimental 
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results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, I also conducted a series of experimental pre-tests and 
follow-up surveys, which help establish the stability of the relationship between justifications 
and foreign policy beliefs both across samples and over time. Examining trends in the results 
across this time period is particularly important because together the pre-tests and follow-ups can 
be used to evaluate the domestic coalition expectations prior to the 2016 election, in the heat of 
the election campaign, and during the transition to the Trump administration. While this period 
may be unique in the level of political turmoil, understanding how the election season and 
presidential transition did or did not influence the effects of foreign policy beliefs is critical for 
determining the conditions under which these beliefs will be relevant for understanding political 
attitudes in the future.  
 Figure 8.1 illustrates support over time for each type of justifications based on 
respondents’ foreign policy beliefs. The trends in support are compiled from a total of nine 
survey experiments conducted between May 2016 and May 2017. The instruments for each 
survey are included in the appendix. 
 276 
 
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
05 06 07 08 10 12 05/17
Month of Survey
CI MI
ISO
Humanitarian Justifications
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
05 06 07 08 10 12 05/17
Month of Survey
CI MI
ISO
Terrorism Justifications
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
06 12 12 05/17
Month of Survey
CI MI
ISO
FPR Justifications
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
05 07 08 10 12 05/17
Month of Survey
CI MI 
ISO
Combined Humanitarian/Terror
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
06 12 12 05/17
Month of Survey
CI MI
ISO
Combined Humanitarian/FPR
Note: Surveys were conducted during 2016 unless otherwise noted.
Figure 8.1 Changes in Support for Justifications Over Time
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 Comparing the trends for each type of justification demonstrates that, despite dramatic 
changes in the political environment, responses were relatively consistent over time within each 
foreign policy group. Isolationists (ISO) offered the lowest levels of support for all types of 
justifications and this support remained low across experiments. By contrast, a majority of 
cooperative (CI) and militant (MI) internationalists offered support for humanitarian and 
combined justifications with some variation in the relative magnitude of support. However, while 
consistently lower than militant internationalists, the trends in cooperative internationalists’ 
support for terrorism and foreign policy restraint justifications—which explained action as a 
response to cross-border aggression in a foreign country—show an uptick in the percentage of 
individuals in favor of intervention beginning in October 2016 and continuing through December 
2016. This trend indicates that cooperative internationalists’ willingness to support security 
justifications increased during the height of the election campaign and immediate aftermath. This 
increase could be explained both by reports of terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamic State 
during this period and by efforts from candidates of both parties to appear strong on terror during 
the campaign.  
 While the general pattern of support for alternative justifications is stable over time, some 
variation in samples collected at different points during a particularly contentious period in U.S. 
politics is not surprising. Interpreting the substantive importance of this variation hinges on 
whether the changes undermine the significant differences in support based on individuals’ 
foreign policy beliefs that are associated with the domestic coalition argument. Table 8.1 reports 
the levels of support across experiments, as illustrated in Figure 8.1, and highlights the samples 
in which the pattern of support is consistent with the domestic coalition expectations.
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Table 8.1 Trends in Support for Justifications by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Exp. 1: 
May 
2016 
Exp. 2: 
June 
2016 
Exp. 3: 
July 
2016 
Exp. 4: 
August 
2016 
Exp. 5: 
October 
2016 
Exp. 6: 
November 
2016 
Exp. 7: 
December 
12, 2016 
Exp. 8: 
December 
19, 2016 
Exp. 9: 
May 
2017 
Humanitarian 48 46 60 56 57 57 --- 57 65 
 CI 52 53 61 59 71 63 --- 68 70 
 MI 58 67 78 59 56 67 --- 61 86 
 ISO 
 
29 15 21 33 19 23 --- 32 26 
Terror 58 47 54 54 63 62 --- --- 58 
 CI 43 49 48 51 60 58 --- --- 57 
 MI 85 72 82 79 91 81 --- --- 71 
 ISO 
 
50 31 33 28 46 35 --- --- 48 
FPR --- 37 --- --- --- --- 53 68 46 
 CI --- 38 --- --- --- --- 59 71 38 
 MI --- 58 --- --- --- --- 76 71 94 
 ISO 
 
--- 26 --- --- --- --- 20 54 30 
Combined 
(Terror) 
68 --- 62 63 63 59 --- --- 62 
 CI 65 --- 60 66 55 61 --- --- 56 
 MI 92 --- 83 79 84 89 --- --- 87 
 ISO 
 
45 --- 31 30 42 17 --- --- 46 
Combined 
(FPR) 
--- 51 --- --- --- --- 59 63 65 
 CI --- 53 --- --- --- --- 71 71 68 
 MI --- 72 --- --- --- --- 67 71 81 
 ISO --- 36 --- --- --- --- 11 14 31 
Shaded columns represent experiments in which findings are consistent with the domestic coalition hypotheses. 
Experiments 1, 2, and 4 did not include information about experts’ account of the conflict. All samples are from MTurk 
with the exception of experiment 8, which is a national sample fielded through SSI. 
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 In six of the nine experiments, including the most recent follow-up fielded in May 2017, 
participants responded to alternative justifications as expected by the domestic coalition 
argument, i.e., cooperative internationalists appear as the group whose support is significantly 
influenced by the addition of humanitarian justifications to security explanations. Cooperative 
internationalists’ support for the combined justification scenarios was comparable across the nine 
experiments. Rather than variability in their response to combined justifications, the findings 
indicate that in the disconfirming samples cooperative internationalists offered higher than 
normal support for security justifications which muted the positive effect of adding a 
humanitarian claim. Notably, the October 2016 and November 2016 samples were collected 
around the height of the presidential election when all sides had an incentive to appear strong on 
terror. The gradual decline of support for security justifications among cooperative 
internationalists in the aftermath of the election suggests this increase is an artifact of an 
abnormal period in which military interventions are particularly unlikely to take place (Gaubatz 
1999).54   
Evaluating Inconsistencies 
 Alternatively, the pattern of results in experiment 8 present challenges that are not easily 
attributed to any single factor. In this case, the absence of a significant difference in cooperative 
internationalists’ support for security justifications compared to the combined scenario is 
especially troubling because this survey was conducted on a national sample. The sample 
included 2,031 U.S. adults and was fielded through Survey Sampling International (SSI) from 
December 19-30, 2016. In this sample, cooperative internationalists offered high and comparable 
																																																						
54 The lowering of support for terrorism justifications in the May 2017 sample is also noteworthy because this 
survey was fielded the same week as a terrorist attack at a concert in Manchester that received significant U.S. 
media coverage because it involved both young victims and a U.S. musician. 
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levels of support for humanitarian, security, and combined justifications and the addition of 
humanitarian claims did not significantly increase their support. Isolationists also responded to 
security justifications more strongly than in previous samples—54 percent offered their support, 
representing a 24 percent increase over the next highest level of support for the same 
justifications. As in the previous experiments, a majority of militant internationalists also 
supported all three categories of justifications. These changes among cooperative 
internationalists’ and isolationists’ support for security justifications raise the question: is support 
for the domestic coalition hypothesis limited to the sample characteristics associated with 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk?  
 There are two categories of potential explanations for the differences between experiment 
8 and the other samples. First, differences in convenience samples and the national SSI sample 
that targets Census demographics could undermine the results. Second, unobserved factors, 
including potential changes in the political and media environment as the U.S. grappled with 
evidence of Russian hacking and prepared for the presidential transition, as well as the Christmas 
holiday, could influence participants’ associations with different types of justifications and alter 
their responses to the treatment scenarios. Evidence in support of the first explanation would 
effectively falsify the micro-level expectations of the domestic coalition argument and 
undermine the results presented in Chapter 4. Alternatively, evidence in support of the second 
explanation would indicate that changes in the political climate may limit the scope of the 
domestic coalition argument and suggest that future research is needed to determine whether the 
argument holds among a national sample.  
If the changes in support are a result of improved representativeness in the national 
sample, I expect to find: 1) differences in sample demographics, both overall and in the 
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composition of different foreign policy groups, 2) that the pattern found in previous experiments 
holds for individuals in the SSI sample who most closely resemble MTurk participants, and 3) 
differences in the behavior of foreign policy groups across justification categories. Alternatively, 
if the inconsistent SSI results are a product of noise—either random or related to the political 
climate and events of late December—that influenced the meaning and salience of security 
justifications, I expect that: 1) the demographic composition of the foreign policy groups remains 
stable, 2) subgroup analysis fails to produce results similar to the MTurk samples, and 3) support 
for the other justification categories is consistent with the results from previous experiments. I 
evaluate each of these expectations in turn. 
 Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, respectively, summarize the demographic composition of the 
MTurk sample reported in Chapter 4 which was conducted in July 2016, a follow-up MTurk 
sample conducted on December 12, 2016 that used a foreign policy restraint scenario as the 
security justification, and the national SSI sample fielded December 19-30, 2016 which also used 
a foreign policy restraint scenario.55 As expected for convenience samples, comparing the MTurk 
demographics in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 reveals some differences—the July sample contained more 
female respondents, had a lower average level of education, and included fewer Democrats. 
Comparing these MTurk experiments to the SSI survey shows that in terms of gender and party 
identification the demographics of the national sample fall within the range of and are not 
substantively different from the convenience samples. However, the samples diverge 
significantly on education, measured here as the percentage of respondents with a college 
degree.56 The SSI experiment matched Census education levels, which are lower than the 
																																																						
55 Table 8.2 repeats the information previously reported in Chapter 4 as Table 4.3. It is duplicated here to facilitate 
comparisons.  
56 These differences remain when education is measured as the last grade/year of school completed and as whether 
the individual entered college.  
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average education level of MTurk respondents. If these differences in education drive the change 
in results, the connection between foreign policy beliefs and responses to justifications for 
military action may only hold among educated individuals.  
Table 8.2 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs  
(MTurk July 2016, as presented in Chapter 4) 
 Cooperative  Militant Isolationist All  
Gender 
(0=Female; 1=Male) 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.44 
Education 
(0=Less than 
College; 1=College) 
0.55 0.51 0.46 0.52 
Party ID 
(1=Republican; 
7=Democrat) 
4.94 3.44 4.14 4.39 
N 850 419 243 1510 
 
Table 8.3 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs (MTurk December 12, 2016) 
 Cooperative Militant  Isolationist All  
Gender 
(0=Female; 1=Male) 0.51 0.52 0.70 0.55 
Education 
(0=Less than 
College; 1=College) 
0.58 0.40 0.41 0.49 
Party ID 
(1=Republican; 
7=Democrat) 
5.16 3.46 4.07 4.50 
N 106 50 44 201 
 
Table 8.4 Demographics by Foreign Policy Beliefs (SSI December 19-30, 2016) 
 Cooperative  Militant  Isolationist All  
Gender 
(0=Female; 1=Male) 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.45 
Education 
(0=Less than 
College; 1=College) 
0.36 0.31 0.28 0.33 
Party ID 
(1=Republican; 
7=Democrat) 
4.91 3.90 4.43 4.42 
N 871 808 349 2031 
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 I took two steps to evaluate the likelihood that differences in education are responsible 
for the inconsistencies in the SSI sample. First, tests of proportions demonstrate that there are no 
significant differences in the level of support for humanitarian, security, or combined 
justifications offered by individuals with different education backgrounds.57 Nor did education 
make a significant difference in cooperative internationalists’ support for security justifications 
(p=0.8022)—the factor responsible for inconsistencies with the domestic coalition expectations. 
Second, I replicated the analysis of support based on foreign policy beliefs using only the subset 
of SSI respondents with a college degree to determine whether the domestic coalition pattern 
reappeared among educated respondents in this sample. Rather than replicating the pattern of 
results presented in Chapter 4 and shown in the majority experiments outlined in Table 8.1 
above, cooperative internationalists’ heightened support for security justifications remained—73 
percent compared to 71 percent in the full sample.58 Taken as a whole, these diagnostics 
consistently fail to provide evidence that the difference in findings is driven by education levels 
or the increased representativeness of the SSI sample.   
 Finally, if the difference in results is a symptom of a more representative sample, I would 
also expect to find general differences in the way respondents thought about and supported 
multiple types of justifications for military action. Instead, the levels of support for humanitarian 
and combined justifications, as reported in Table 8.1, are consistent with MTurk responses to 
comparable treatment conditions across all subgroups.59 Additionally, militant internationalists’ 
support for security justifications remained consistent. The substantive differences between 
																																																						
57 See appendix for full results.  
58 I also ran the analysis using only subsets of respondents who were Democrats or had entered college. Neither case 
returned results consistent with the MTurk findings.  
59 Responses to the December 12, 2016 MTurk survey are the most appropriate point of comparison for the security 
and combined justifications because this instrument included the same foreign policy restraint justifications that 
were used on the SSI sample. The wording of the humanitarian-only justification scenario is consistent and thus 
comparable across all samples. 
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samples are thus limited to cooperative internationalists’ and isolationists’ support for security 
justifications, which is consistent with the argument that factors in the political and media 
environment altered the meaning of these justifications among these subgroups. 
In sum, evaluating the alternative explanations provides no evidence that the difference in 
results is driven by the improved representativeness of the SSI sample. Instead, the evidence is 
consistent with the noise explanation and the most recent survey results indicate that responses 
are returning to their previous patterns in the election’s aftermath. Therefore, while additional 
research is needed, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the results presented in the previous 
chapters are valid and, combined with replication efforts from five additional samples, provide 
support for the domestic coalition claims.   
The Effects of Political Polarization 
 The dramatic partisan differences in political attitudes outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter pose an additional question for the domestic coalition argument: To what extent do 
foreign policy beliefs remain relevant for understanding public opinion in increasingly polarized 
environments? Up to this point, the survey experiments used to evaluate the connection between 
individuals’ foreign policy beliefs and support for alternative justifications primed respondents to 
set aside partisan considerations, telling them: “The situation reflects actions taken by presidents 
from both political parties. It is NOT about the current president and it is NOT about any specific 
country in the news today.”60 In reality, individuals’ opinions of the current president influence 
their willingness to support his foreign policies and partisanship provides a heuristic for 
evaluating the merits of complex foreign policy plans. How the partisanship of the president and 
																																																						
60 At different stages surrounding the 2016 election respondents were also told that the scenario was not about any of 
the current presidential candidates or the president-elect.  
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individuals’ foreign policy beliefs interact to shape attitudes towards military action is thus an 
important and open question. 
 To investigate the relevance of foreign policy beliefs in a polarized environment, I 
conducted an additional survey experiment that randomized the president’s partisan identity.61 I 
fielded this experiment to 1,171 U.S. adults via MTurk on June 3-6, 2017. Within each category 
of justifications—humanitarian, security (FPR), and combined—participants were randomly 
assigned to read justifications for military action from either a Democratic or Republican 
president. Combining information about respondent’s assigned treatment condition with their 
self-reported party identity allows me to measure whether individuals respond differently to 
Democratic or Republican presidents or to co-partisans. Table 8.5 presents the results of this 
analysis. 
Table 8.5 Support for Justifications by Partisanship of the President 
 Overall  
Support 
Co-partisan 
President 
Republican 
President 
Democratic 
President 
Humanitarian 58 61 55 61 
 CI 67 69 66 68 
 MI 74 76 75 72 
 ISO 
 
9 8 5 14 
Security (FPR) 59 62 54 65 
 CI 63 60 63 62 
 MI 74 70 57 86 
 ISO 
 
26 55 25 29 
Combo 50 59 49 50 
 CI 52 59 48 56 
 MI 65 80 62 67 
 ISO 13 13 30 0 
Table reports the percentage of respondents in each category who supported intervention.  
  
																																																						
61 Survey instrument included in appendix. 
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 The results outlined in Table 8.5 indicate that among each group of foreign policy beliefs, 
support for humanitarian and security justifications remains stable regardless of the partisanship 
of the president. The exception is isolationists, who were more than twice as likely to support 
security interventions proposed by a president from the same political party. However, given 
isolationists’ opposition to prolonged involvement in international affairs, even their support for 
co-partisan presidents is unlikely to be sufficient to sustain interventions in the long-term. There 
is also a modest partisan pattern in support for combined justifications where both cooperative 
and militant internationalists offered the highest support for justifications from presidents who 
shared their party identity.  
While suggestive, the summary statistics presented in Table 8.5 are not a direct test of the 
interaction between partisanship and the effect of foreign policy beliefs on support for 
intervention. To examine whether these trends meet the standards of statistical significance, I 
also used logistic regression models with interactions for the binary co-partisan and foreign 
policy belief variables to evaluate the extent to which the president’s party identity moderates the 
effect of foreign policy beliefs on support (Baron and Kenny 1986). The results, presented in full 
in the appendix, confirm that the only significant moderation occurs for isolationists in the 
security condition. In this case, a positive and significant interaction term (p=0.015) indicates 
that individuals with isolationist values are significantly more likely to support security 
justifications offered by a president from their own political party. Otherwise, the moderation 
analysis provides no evidence that the effects of foreign policy beliefs on support are 
significantly altered by partisanship. Thus, while the U.S. political climate is rapidly changing, to 
date foreign policy beliefs appear to remain relevant for understanding support for military 
interventions. 
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Contributions and Implications 
 This research makes three main contributions. First, it highlights the role that moral 
appeals play in mediating the relationship between the president and public support for the use of 
force. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings imply that national security justifications 
are neither the most effective nor the only way to bolster public support for military action. In 
addition to threats to their own self-interest, individuals also respond to moral appeals for 
military action, even outside of cases of humanitarian intervention. By demonstrating how 
humanitarian appeals contribute to domestic support for intervention the findings help explain 
why these justifications have historical precedents long before the evolution of humanitarian 
intervention norms (Bass 2008; Bogen 1966; Rodogno 2012). 
 Second, the project speaks to the broader questions of how much public support is 
necessary to facilitate intervention and the conditions under which presidents are able to generate 
this support. Studies of public attitudes towards military action implicitly assume that more 
support is better without considering the threshold at which support is sufficient to initiate 
intervention. Disaggregating public opinion based on individuals’ foreign policy beliefs reveals 
that all support is not created equal and that the content of support matters as much as the 
magnitude. Regardless of the overall magnitude of support, if the domestic coalition does not 
include cooperative internationalists, it will be difficult to sustain and subject to active 
opposition. Presidents are able to build this necessary coalition of support by employing 
humanitarian justifications that appeal to both cooperative and militant internationalists. 
However, if presidents attempt to use insincere humanitarian claims as the sole pretext for 
security interventions or as a cover for their own political agenda, humanitarian justifications 
will not generate sufficient public support. Selecting the right combination of justifications thus 
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gives presidents leeway to pursue military action, but there are limits to the power of 
humanitarian rhetoric.  
 Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of connecting findings from scholarship on 
representation and political psychology that highlight heterogeneity in public opinion to the 
study of attitudes towards military action. In particular, the U.S. public is a diverse audience with 
systematically different foreign policy beliefs that influence its response to military action. While 
the corresponding percentage of the population varies, cooperative internationalist, militant 
internationalist, and isolationist beliefs have persisted for more than 30 years and are likely here 
to stay. Disregarding this source of heterogeneity in individuals’ approaches to foreign policy 
risks overstating the stability of support and overlooking likely sources of domestic opposition. 
Implications for the Presidency 
Through these theoretical and empirical contributions, the project also has implications 
for the presidency, humanitarian and anti-war advocates, and U.S. foreign policy. First, for 
presidential administrations, the project highlights the leeway presidents have to frame military 
interventions to their benefit and build public support for action. Even among cooperative 
internationalists, the group most likely to impose political costs for unpopular interventions, 
presidents are viewed as the authority on foreign policy decisions and can easily prime these 
individuals’ other-regarding concerns by alluding to humanitarian objectives. Notably, these 
allusions require minimal time and are in fact more effective when they are used as supplements 
to security claims in security-driven interventions. Humanitarian justifications are thus a key part 
of effective presidential appeals, but more is not always better. In security-driven interventions, 
the president’s persuasive power will be maximized if he or she employs humanitarian claims 
sparingly and avoids attracting scrutiny of their validity.  
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 The findings also provide guidance for how the White House should interpret public 
opinion polls regarding attitudes towards military action. Aggregate numbers alone are 
insufficient to separate the base of supporters—militant internationalists—from potential swing 
supporters—cooperative internationalists—and isolationists who will not be persuaded by any 
justification strategy short of a direct and immediate attack on the U.S. Because presidents 
should be concerned both with maintaining a majority of support and preventing the formation of 
politically costly dissent, understanding who makes up the domestic coalition is key to 
evaluating the threat of domestic opposition. If the coalition does not contain a significant 
number of cooperative internationalists, the White House will likely face vocal and politically 
problematic opposition. Presidential administrations thus have an incentive to poll foreign policy 
orientations more directly and apply the logic of electoral coalition building to support for 
military action. Additionally, communication strategies will benefit from acknowledging the 
central role played by individuals with cooperative internationalist values, recognizing that these 
individuals exist across party lines, and monitoring changes in their support over the course of 
interventions. 
Humanitarian and Anti-War Advocates 
 Second, the project has implications for the strategies used by humanitarian advocates 
and anti-war activists. On the one hand, the experimental results appear to mitigate the gravest 
concerns about the misuse of humanitarian appeals—i.e., that presidents’ overreliance on 
humanitarian claims in non-humanitarian interventions could justify otherwise illegitimate 
interventions and weaken the international community’s willingness to respond to mass atrocities 
in the future. When humanitarian claims were perceived as insincere or illegitimate, they no 
longer bolstered support among cooperative internationalists and the perceived misuse of these 
 290 
claims reduced respondents’ willingness to vote for the president’s reelection. However, even 
illegitimate humanitarian justifications did not undermine respondents’ future support for U.S. 
action to end an ongoing genocide. Therefore, the widespread use of humanitarian justifications 
outlined in Chapter 3 does not appear to pose a direct threat to the future development of 
humanitarian norms. Instead, because humanitarian claims increase public expectations that the 
intervention will create humanitarian outcomes, savvy advocates can use the president’s rhetoric 
to pressure the White House to pursue humanitarian objectives. 
 However, organizations opposed to war, as well as those concerned about the treatment 
of foreign civilians, should be concerned by the ease with which the White House is able to co-
opt the humanitarian narrative. Krebs (2015) has demonstrated that anti-terror narratives allow 
the president to block channels for dissent and reduce the political costs of foreign policy 
decisions.62 The experimental results in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that humanitarian 
justifications, when used correctly, have a similar effect on opportunities for domestic opposition 
to take hold. To increase their chances of effectively countering the president’s rhetoric, anti-war 
movements should shine light on and directly counter the validity of the president’s humanitarian 
justifications, focusing their messaging on cooperative internationalists. If movements can 
convince cooperative internationalists that the president’s humanitarian explanations are 
insincere or illegitimate, they both weaken the president’s domestic coalition and attract the 
individuals most likely to become engaged in the opposition. Because of the president’s first-
mover and information advantages, efforts to directly counter the White House’s claims are 
likely to be more effective that attempts to reframe the conflict as a whole.  
 
																																																						
62 See also Krebs and Lobasz’s (2007) account of the effect of the war on terror narrative on opposition to the 
George W. Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.  
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U.S. Foreign Policy 
 Finally, the project has two sets of implications for the practice of U.S. foreign policy, 
including the influence of humanitarian norms in contemporary interventions and the status of 
democratic accountability for the use of force. Following debates over the prudence of using 
force to end humanitarian crises and the responsibilities of U.S. leadership (Mandelbaum 1996; 
Power 2002), with the exception of short-lived involvement in Libya in 2011, U.S.-led 
humanitarian interventions increasingly appeared to be a relic of the 1990s. This project shows 
that while the practice of humanitarian intervention may be in decline, humanitarian rhetoric 
remains a central part of contemporary U.S. military action. Presidents have incentives to use 
these justifications in security-driven interventions to persuade cooperative internationalists, but 
doing so also increases the public’s expectation that intervention will lead to humanitarian 
outcomes. Thus, presidents’ use of humanitarian appeals may tie their hands in the practice of 
intervention, increasing attention to the safety of civilians and the success of post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 Additionally, democratic institutions that incentivize presidents to obtain and sustain 
public support are known to shape when and how the U.S. pursues military interventions (Maoz 
and Russett 1993; Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 1993; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). The 
domestic coalition argument implies that this burden of democratic accountability is not evenly 
distributed across the American public. Instead, it is individuals with cooperative internationalist 
values who hold the key to domestic consent for action and impose political costs on leaders who 
act without sufficient public support. The prevalence of individuals with these views and their 
perception of the president’s credibility are central determinants of the conditions under which 
the White House is able to generate the support necessary to ease public constraints on the use of 
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force. While grounded in moral foundations, foreign policy beliefs can shift in response to major 
geopolitical or economic changes (Chanley 1999; Kertzer 2013). If militant internationalist 
sentiments become more prevalent, presidents will have an easier time mobilizing the domestic 
audience to support military action. Alternatively, if growing isolationist sentiment pulls 
individuals from the cooperative internationalist category, the president will have fewer options 
for building a sustainable domestic coalition. If this shift marks a decline in cooperative 
internationalists’ engagement with politics, it may also lower the risks of costly domestic dissent; 
however, if former cooperative internationalists remain engaged they may instead become a 
powerful and consistent source of opposition to humanitarian and security interventions. 
Similarly, if polarization undermines the credibility of the president among individuals who are 
not co-partisans, Republican presidents will face tighter domestic constraints on the use of force 
than Democratic presidents, whose electoral coalition makes their message more likely to 
resonate with a significant number of cooperative internationalists.  
Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
 This project takes a first step towards understanding how the public’s foreign policy 
preferences shape White House communication strategies and influence the president’s ability to 
mobilize domestic support for action. However, the findings raise a number of questions beyond 
the scope of this dissertation that create avenues for future research. First, while the project relies 
on survey experiments to evaluate the relationship between foreign policy beliefs and responses 
to justifications for military action, future research is needed to validate these findings with a 
national sample. Additionally, the argument carries implications for aggregate public opinion 
and the analysis of public opinion data from recent conflicts can further clarify how foreign 
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policy beliefs interact with other factors to shape attitudes in the context of ongoing military 
interventions.  
 Second, here I focus primarily on how presidents employ justifications to mobilize the 
domestic audience at the moment when their information and first-mover advantages are 
greatest: the build-up to military action. The case studies provide an initial overview of how 
justification strategies change over time, but future work should consider whether individuals’ 
foreign policy beliefs also influence the durability of their support over the course of an 
intervention and whether the justifications they find most persuasive remain consistent. In 
particular, I would expect the support of isolationists to decline most rapidly, the support of 
cooperative internationalists to be particularly sensitive to changes in the relative success and 
human costs of intervention, and militant internationalists to offer the most steadfast support. 
 Finally, here I focused on how presidents use humanitarian justifications to bolster the 
support of cooperative internationalists, the group that is both skeptical of military action and the 
most likely source of costly political opposition. In addition to increasing the level of support, 
humanitarian claims are also expected to reduce the risks of dissent—even cooperative 
internationalists who do not offer explicit support for military action justified in humanitarian 
terms should be less likely to take direct action to oppose the intervention. This expectation is in 
line with Krebs’ (2015) argument that by establishing the dominant narrative of the intervention 
the president can block the available channels for dissent. Directly examining the effect of 
official humanitarian justifications on both the content and magnitude of domestic dissent is a 
central task for future work.  
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
 
Chicago Council Survey Measures of Foreign Policy Beliefs, “Very Important” Foreign 
Policy Goals for Cooperative and Militant Internationalists 
 
These policies are taken from Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979, 41-42). Reponses were 
collected from 13 waves of the Chicago Council Survey. 
 
Table A2.1: Foreign Policy Goals Associated with Cooperative and Militant Internationalists 
Foreign Policy Beliefs Associated Foreign Policy Goals 
Cooperative  
(Liberal) 
Internationalism 
Keeping peace in the world. 
Securing adequate supplies of energy. 
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as 
food, inflation, and energy. 
Worldwide arms control. 
Helping solve world inflation. 
Combating world hunger. 
Maintaining a balance of power. 
Strengthening the United Nations. 
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries. 
Militant (Conservative) 
Internationalism 
Containing Communism 
Protecting the interests of American business abroad. 
Strengthening countries who are friendly toward us. 
Defending our allies’ security. 
Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression. 
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations. 
Promoting the development of capitalism abroad. 
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Table A2.2: Importance of Cooperative Internationalist Goals 
 1974 1979 1982 1987 1995 1998 2001 2002 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Keeping peace in the 
world. 
85 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Securing adequate 
supplies of energy. 
76 78 70 69 62 64 69 75 80 68 -- 66 61 
Fostering 
international 
cooperation to solve 
common problems, 
such as food, 
inflation, and 
energy. 
66 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Worldwide arms 
control. 
66 64 64 69 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Helping solve world 
inflation. 
64 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Combating world 
hunger 
60 59 58 63 56 62 34 61 46 42 42 42 42 
Maintaining a 
balance of power. 
48 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Strengthening the 
United Nations. 
46 47 48 46 51 45 46 57 39 37 35 37 -- 
Helping to improve 
the standard of 
living in less 
developed countries. 
39 35 35 37 22 29 20 30 -- -- -- -- -- 
Average 61 57 55 57 48 50 43 56 55 49 37 48 52 
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Table A2.3: Importance of Militant Internationalist Goals 
 1974 1979 1982 1987 1995 1998 2001 2002 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Containing 
Communism. 
55 60 59 57 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Protecting the 
interests of 
American 
business 
abroad. 
39 45 44 43 52 -- 30 49 -- -- -- 44 -- 
Strengthening 
countries who 
are friendly 
toward us. 
38 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Defending our 
allies’ security. 
33 50 50 56 41 44 -- 57 -- -- -- 38 38 
Protecting 
weaker nations 
against foreign 
aggression. 
28 34 -- 32 24 32 -- 41 24 24 -- 25 -- 
Helping to 
bring a 
democratic 
form of 
government to 
other nations. 
28 26 29 30 25 29 24 34 17 -- 14 17 -- 
Promoting the 
development of 
capitalism 
abroad. 
17 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19 -- -- -- 
Average 34 43 46 44 36 35 27 45 21 22 14 31 38 
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Table A2.4 Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Ideology 
 Liberal Conservative Moderate Total 
Cooperative 
Internationalist 
62% 
(526) 
 
17% 
(142) 
21% 
(180) 
100% 
(848) 
Militant 
Internationalist 
23% 
(96) 
 
58% 
(243) 
19% 
(79) 
100% 
(418) 
Isolationist 38% 
(92) 
32% 
(77) 
30% 
(74) 
100% 
(243) 
N 715 462 333  
Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of 
individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with 
the given political ideology. Counts reported in parentheses. 
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Table A2.5: Cross Tabulation of Foreign Policy Beliefs by Partisan 
ID, Leaners Coded as Independents 
 Democrat 
No Lean 
Republican 
No Lean 
Independent 
with Leaners 
Total 
Cooperative 
Internationalist 
40% 
(342) 
 
10% 
(83) 
50% 
(423) 
100% 
(848) 
Militant 
Internationalist 
20% 
(82) 
 
40% 
(166) 
41% 
(170) 
100% 
(418) 
Isolationist 33% 
(56) 
18% 
(43) 
59% 
(144) 
100% 
(243) 
N 480 292 738  
Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of 
individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify with 
the given party. Counts reported in parentheses. 
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Table A2.6: Distribution of Strong Partisans by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Strong Democrat Strong Republican Total 
Cooperative 
Internationalist 
16% 
(138) 
 
1% 
(11) 
17% 
(149) 
Militant 
Internationalist 
5% 
(19) 
 
12% 
(50) 
17% 
(69) 
Isolationist 6% 
(14) 
5% 
(11) 
11% 
(25) 
N 171 72  
Percentages are calculated across rows to report the percentage of 
individuals with each category of foreign policy beliefs that identify as 
strong partisans. Counts reported in parentheses. 
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A2.7 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Cooperative Internationalism by Party ID 
 
Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted 
probability an individual is a cooperative internationalist. Results are 
shown clockwise for the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 
7=Strong Republican) and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 
1=identified as) for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.  
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A2.8 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Militant Internationalism by Party ID 
 
 
Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted 
probability an individual is a militant internationalist. Results are shown 
clockwise for the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 7=Strong 
Republican) and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 1=identified as) 
for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.  
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A2.9 Results of Logistic Regressions Predicting Isolationism by Party ID 
 
  
Figure illustrates the marginal effect of party identification on the predicted 
probability an individual is an isolationist. Results are shown clockwise for 
the party identification scale (1=Strong Democrat; 7=Strong Republican) 
and binary variables (0=did not identify as; 1=identified as) for Democrats, 
Republicans, and independents.  
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CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
Table A3.1: Included Categories of Presidential Speeches 
Type of 
Speech Description 
Number of 
Speeches 
Percentage of 
Total 
Documents 
Remarks 
Includes “remarks” in the title, most often 
commemorating a holiday or anniversary, 
announcing a new initiative, or before departing 
on a planned trip. 
158 19.7% 
Statement 
Includes “statement” in the title, most often on 
a pressing event, emergency, or (in)action by 
Congress. 
277 34.6% 
News/Press 
Conference 
Includes the prepared portion of presidents’ 
news and press conferences. Excludes news 
conferences given with other leaders or 
immediately following events, in addition to 
non-prepared, off-the-cuff remarks and 
responses to reporters’ questions. 
58 7.2% 
Radio Includes all weekly addresses broadcast over the radio. 225 28.1% 
State of the 
Union 
Yearly addresses before a joint session of 
Congress on the State of the Union.  16 2.0% 
Address 
All other labeled addresses, excluding the State 
of the Union, most often announcing a new 
initiative, in response to an attack, or to update 
the nation on the progress of ongoing military 
action. 
42 5.2% 
Message Includes “message” in the title, most often on the observance of a holiday.  13 1.6% 
Other 
All other speeches that address the nation as the 
primary audience. Includes untitled speeches 
and prepared exchanges with reporters outside 
of news or press conferences.  
12 1.5% 
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Table A3.2: Dictionary of Humanitarian Justifications 
Humanitarian 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
Humanitarian 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
abhorrent 100% savage 100% 
appalled 100% shelling 100% 
atrocit* 100% siege 100% 
barbarism 100% slaughter 100% 
bodies 100% snipers 100% 
cleansing 100% starvation 100% 
concentration 100% starving 100% 
conscripting 100% refuge* 90% 
convoy 100% population 90% 
defenseless 100% brutal* 89% 
detained 100% humanitarian 87% 
dying 100% displac* 83% 
egregious 100% civilians 82% 
exhausted 100% suffering 80% 
flee 100% surviv* 80% 
genocid* 100% airdrops 80% 
heinous 100% suffer 77% 
huddle 100% tortur* 75% 
immoral 100% hospitals 71% 
inhumane 100% ethnic* 71% 
Kosovars 100% universal 70% 
malnourished 100% innocent 69% 
massacre 100% supplies 67% 
mutilation 100% rations 67% 
norms 100% delivery 66% 
oppression 100% horrif* 66% 
palaces 100% nightmare 66% 
reconstruction 100% rape 66% 
revulsion 100%   
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Table A3.3: Dictionary of Security Justifications 
Security 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
Security 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
arming 100% comply 83% 
autonomy 100% mass 81% 
axis 100% invade 80% 
battalions 100% stability 80% 
bunker 100% inspect* 76% 
centrifuge 100% occup* 75% 
defiance 100% territor* 75% 
degrade 100% resort 75% 
destabiliz* 100% chaos 75% 
disarm* 100% destroy 73% 
equipping 100% withdraw 73% 
exercises 100% extremist 73% 
germ 100% offensive 73% 
harbor 100% defeat 72% 
hijacker 100% victory 72% 
hostility 100% enrichment 71% 
IEDs 100% biological 70% 
jets 100% weapons 68% 
provocation 100% strike 68% 
scud 100% raids 67% 
spillover 100% fronts 67% 
strongholds 100% isolat* 67% 
uranium 100% neighboring 67% 
sovereign* 95% ballistic 67% 
aggression 95% defy 67% 
killers 88% outlaw 67% 
destruction 87% aerial 67% 
missiles 86% dismantle 63% 
plot 85% surge 63% 
deter 83% warfare 60% 
unarmed 83% invasion 60% 
militia 83%   
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Table A3.4: Dictionary of Ideological Justifications 
Ideological 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
Ideological 
Phrases 
Percentage 
Correct 
Ballots 100% Suppress 100% 
Democratization 100% Transformation 100% 
Electoral 100% Turnout 100% 
Enfranchised 100% Unelected 100% 
Ink 100% Representative 80% 
Interim 100% Corrupt 75% 
Judiciary 100% Transitional 75% 
Misrule 100% Self-government 71% 
Nondemocratic 100% Opposition 66% 
Parliamentary 100% Aspirations 66% 
Pluralistic 100% Dialog 66% 
Polls 100% Democratically 63% 
Prodemocracy 100%   
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Table A3.5: Intervention Type by Conflict-Year 
Target State Year Intervention 
Type 
 Target State Year Intervention 
Type 
Afghanistan 1992 Humanitarian  Cuba 1996 Security 
Afghanistan 1998 Security  DRC 1996 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 1999 Security  DRC 1997 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2001 Security  DRC 2006 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2002 Security  El Salvador 1990 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2003 Security  El Salvador 1991 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2004 Security  Eritrea 1999 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2005 Security  Ethiopia 1990 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2006 Security  Ethiopia 1999 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2007 Security  Guatemala 1993 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2008 Security  Guinea-Bissau 1998 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2009 Security  Haiti 1991 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2010 Security  Haiti 1993 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2011 Security  Haiti 2004 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2012 Security  Indonesia 1998 Humanitarian 
Afghanistan 2013 Security  Indonesia 1999 Humanitarian 
Angola 1990 Security  Iran 1993 Security 
Angola 1992 Security  Iran 1996 Security 
Angola 1993 Security  Iran 1997 Security 
Azerbaijan 1992 Humanitarian  Iran 2003 Security 
Bosnia 1992 Humanitarian  Iran 2004 Security 
Bosnia 1993 Humanitarian  Iran 2005 Security 
Bosnia 1994 Humanitarian  Iran 2006 Security 
Bosnia 1995 Humanitarian  Iran 2007 Security 
Burma 1991 Humanitarian  Iran 2008 Security 
Burma 1993 Humanitarian  Iran 2009 Security 
Burma 1994 Humanitarian  Iran 2010 Security 
Burma 1996 Humanitarian  Iran 2011 Security 
Burma 1997 Humanitarian  Iraq 1990 Security 
Burma 2003 Humanitarian  Iraq 1991 Security 
Burma 2007 Humanitarian  Iraq 1992 Security 
Burma 2008 Humanitarian  Iraq 1993 Security 
Burma 2010 Humanitarian  Iraq 1994 Security 
Cambodia 1990 Humanitarian  Iraq 1995 Security 
Cambodia 1992 Humanitarian  Iraq 1996 Security 
Chad 2008 Humanitarian  Iraq 1997 Security 
Cote d’Ivoire 2002 Humanitarian  Iraq 2002 Security 
Cote d’Ivoire 2011 Humanitarian  Iraq 2003 Security 
Croatia 1992 Humanitarian  Iraq 2004 Security 
Croatia 1993 Humanitarian  Iraq 2005 Security 
Croatia 1995 Humanitarian  Iraq 2006 Security 
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Target State Year Intervention 
Type 
 Target State Year Intervention 
Type 
Iraq 2007 Security  Sudan 1998 Security 
Iraq 2008 Security  Sudan 2000 Humanitarian 
Iraq 2009 Security  Sudan 2001 Humanitarian 
Iraq 2010 Security  Sudan 2004 Humanitarian 
Kosovo/Serbia 1998 Humanitarian  Sudan 2005 Humanitarian 
Kosovo/Serbia 1999 Humanitarian  Sudan 2006 Humanitarian 
Lebanon 1990 Security  Sudan 2007 Humanitarian 
Liberia 1990 Humanitarian  Sudan 2008 Humanitarian 
Liberia 1998 Humanitarian  Sudan 2009 Humanitarian 
Liberia 2000 Humanitarian  Sudan 2010 Humanitarian 
Liberia 2003 Humanitarian  Sudan 2011 Humanitarian 
Libya 2011 Humanitarian  Syria 2004 Security 
Macedonia 2001 Humanitarian  Syria 2008 Security 
Mali 2013 Security  Syria 2011 Humanitarian 
North Korea 1993 Security  Syria 2012 Humanitarian 
North Korea 1994 Security  Syria 2013 Humanitarian 
North Korea 2002 Security  Uganda 2010 Humanitarian 
North Korea 2003 Security  Yemen 2009 Security 
North Korea 2004 Security  Yemen 2011 Humanitarian 
North Korea 2010 Security  Yemen 2012 Humanitarian 
Pakistan 1994 Security  Yugoslavia 1991 Humanitarian 
Peru 1992 Humanitarian  
Rwanda 1994 Humanitarian  
Rwanda 1996 Humanitarian  
Sierra Leone 1997 Humanitarian  
Sierra Leone 1998 Humanitarian  
Sierra Leone 2000 Humanitarian  
Sierra Leone 2001 Humanitarian  
Somalia 1992 Humanitarian  
Somalia 1993 Humanitarian  
Somalia 1995 Humanitarian  
Somalia 2006 Security  
Somalia 2007 Security  
Somalia 2008 Security  
Somalia 2009 Security  
Somalia 2010 Security  
Somalia 2012 Security  
Somalia 2013 Security  
South Sudan 2013 Humanitarian  
Sri Lanka 2009 Humanitarian  
Sudan 1994 Humanitarian  
Sudan 1996 Security  
Sudan 1997 Security  
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CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX 
A4.1: Main Survey Instrument 
Fielded July 14-23 2016 to 1,512 U.S. adults through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
 
1. Treatment Conditions 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. president said: 
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to [its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children/the security of the United States, including the 
American people/its own civilians and the security of the United States]. It has [killed thousands 
of its own people and directly targeted civilians/created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened 
the United States/created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people].” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of [Numar’s civilians/the United 
States/Numar’s civilians and the United States] is at stake and we must act. This is why, after 
careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with 
military action.” 
 
After the President’s address, most experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President’s 
reasons for intervention. [They, too/they] thought the U.S. action would [1-10 from table below]. 
 
Summary: 
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar. 
• He said the U.S. must act to protect [Numar’s civilians/U.S. security/Numar’s civilians 
and U.S. security]. 
• Experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President’s reasons for intervention. 
• Experts said military action would mainly protect [Numar’s civilians/U.S. security/the 
President’s own political agenda]. 
Experts thought the U.S. should… 
 Humanitarian Security Combo 
Agree (1)…protect Numar’s civilians.  
(2)…protect U.S. 
security.  
(3)…protect Numar’s civilians and 
U.S. security.  
Disagree, 
legitimate 
(4)… instead of 
concern for civilians, 
the real motivation of 
the U.S. action was to 
protect U.S. security. 
(5)… instead of 
concern for U.S. 
security the real 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was to 
protect Numar’s 
civilians.  
(6)… instead of 
concern for 
civilians the 
only motivation 
of the U.S. 
action was to 
protect U.S. 
security. 
(7)... instead of 
concern for U.S. 
security the only 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was 
to protect 
Numar’s 
civilians. 
Disagree, 
illegitimate 
(8)… protecting 
Numar’s civilians 
was a story to cover 
up the President’s 
own political agenda. 
(9)… protecting U.S. 
security was a story 
to cover up the 
President’s own 
political agenda.  
(10)… protecting Numar’s civilians 
and U.S. security was a story to 
cover up the President’s own 
political agenda. 
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2. Indicators of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Follow-Up Questions 
 
Foreign Policy Beliefs 
Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the 
world: 
(response options randomized) 
• It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as 
overpopulation, hunger, and pollution. 
• It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace. 
• It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs. 
 
Support and Opposition 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Neither oppose nor favor 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
 
[Asked only of respondents who select: “Neither oppose nor favor.”] 
If you had to choose, would you lean towards opposing or favoring military action in this 
situation? 
• Lean towards opposing 
• Lean towards favoring 
 
Which of the following actions would you be willing to take to show your support or opposition 
to this military action? Check all that apply. 
(Response order randomized) 
 
• Use social media to express my opinion about the military action. 
• Sign a petition about the military action. 
• Write a letter to the editor of my local newspaper expressing my opinion about the 
military action. 
• Contact my Member of Congress to express my opinion about the military action. 
• Participate in a protest about the military action.  
• None of the above. 
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Intervention Outcomes 
If the United States takes military action in this case, how likely do you think each of the 
following outcomes will be: 
 
Civilians in Numar will be safe. 
• Very unlikely 
• Somewhat unlikely 
• Somewhat likely 
• Very likely 
 
The United States will be more secure. 
• Very unlikely 
• Somewhat unlikely 
• Somewhat likely 
• Very likely 
 
Attention to Politics 
Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time. 
Others aren’t that interested. How often would you say you get news about politics from TV, 
radio, newspaper, or online outlets? 
• A couple of times a month or less 
• Once a week 
• 2-3 times a week 
• Daily 
• Several times a day 
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A4.2: Control Condition 
Fielded May 6-22, 2016 to 147 U.S. adults through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
 
1. Control Condition 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
 
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. This is not a world we should accept. For generations, the 
United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we cannot be the world's police 
force, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this 
crisis with military action." 
 
2. Support 
Do you favor or oppose U.S. military action in this situation?  
• Favor strongly (1) 
• Favor somewhat (2) 
• Neither favor nor oppose (3) 
• Oppose somewhat (4) 
• Oppose strongly (5) 
 
 
If you had to choose, would you favor or oppose U.S. military action in this situation? 
(Given only to respondents who selected “Neither favor nor oppose” in the previous question.)  
• Favor strongly 
• Favor somewhat 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Oppose strong 
 
 
3. Assumed Motivations 
Which of the following best explains why the U.S. is taking military action in this situation:  
• To protect U.S. national security 
• To protect the people of Kundu 
• To protect US economic interests 
• To promote democracy around the world 
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A4.3: Preliminary Experiment Survey Instrument 
Fielded June 10, 2016 to 607 U.S. adults through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
 
1. Demographics and Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 
First, we are going to ask you a few background questions. 
 
What is your gender?  
• Male 
• Female 
• Other 
 
Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the 
world:  
(response options randomized) 
• It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as 
overpopulation, hunger, and pollution. 
• The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it. 
• We should not think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on our own 
national problems. 
 
Did you vote in the 2012 general election? 
• No 
• I usually vote, but did not in 2012. 
• I am not sure. 
• Yes. I definitely voted. 
 
What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?  
• None or grades 1-8 
• High school incomplete (grades 9-11) 
• High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate) 
• Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school 
• Some college, no 4-year degree (including 2 year Associate Degree) 
• College graduate (BS, BA, or other 4-year degree) 
• Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college  
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2. Treatment Conditions 
Respondents were randomly assigned to read one of the following four scenarios.  
 
Security – Terrorism 
 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we 
cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. 
This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to 
this crisis with military action. 
 
 
Security—FPR 
 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and 
its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we 
cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we must act. 
This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to 
this crisis with military action.” 
 
Humanitarian 
 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:  
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has killed thousands of its own 
people and poses a threat to its civilians.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. While we 
cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must 
act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond 
to this crisis with military action.”  
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Combo—Humanitarian & FPR 
 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring state and 
killed thousands of civilians.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While we 
cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we must 
act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond 
to this crisis with military action.” 
 
 
3. Support  
All respondents were then asked: 
Do you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation?  
• Oppose strongly  (1) 
• Oppose somewhat (2) 
• Favor somewhat (3) 
• Favor strongly (4) 
 
 
  
 316 
Table A4.4: Support for Justifications by Party ID 
 Security Combined Difference 
Democrats 
 
0.49 
(0.06) 
0.59 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
Republicans 
 
0.73 
(0.07) 
0.71 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Independents 0.39 
(0.09) 
0.50 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
Democrats (no lean) 0.45 
(0.07) 
0.61 
(0.07) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
Republicans (no lean) 0.85 
(0.07) 
0.75 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
Independents (no lean) 0.50 
(0.06) 
0.56 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Strong Democrats 0.25 
(0.11) 
0.46 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
Strong Republicans 1.00 
(0.00) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
0.29 
(0.17) 
N 153 151  
Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table A4.5 Support for Humanitarian Justifications by Party ID 
 Humanitarian Difference from Democrats 
Democrats 0.64 
(0.05) 
 
Republicans 0.61 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Independents 0.41 
(0.09) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
Democrats (no lean) 0.63 
(0.06) 
 
Republicans (no lean) 0.67 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
Independents (no lean) 0.52 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
Strong Democrats 0.60 
(0.11) 
 
Strong Republicans 0.71 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.20) 
N 153  
Table reports results from two-tailed tests of proportions. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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CHAPTER 5 APPENDIX 
 
A5.1: Survey Instrument 
1. Treatment Conditions 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. president said: 
 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar—why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to [its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children/the security of the United States, including the 
American people/its own civilians and the security of the United States]. It has [killed thousands 
of its own people and directly targeted civilians/created a safe haven for terrorists and threatened 
the United States/created a safe haven for terrorists and killed thousands of its own people].” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of [Numar’s civilians/the United 
States/Numar’s civilians and the United States] is at stake and we must act. This is why, after 
careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with 
military action.” 
 
After the President’s address, most experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President’s 
reasons for intervention. [They, too/they] thought the U.S. action would [1-10 from table below]. 
 
Summary: 
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar. 
• He said the U.S. must act to protect [Numar’s civilians/U.S. security/Numar’s civilians 
and U.S. security]. 
• Experts publicly [agreed with/disputed] the President’s reasons for intervention. 
• Experts said military action would mainly protect [Numar’s civilians/U.S. security/the 
President’s own political agenda]. 
  
Experts thought the U.S. should… 
 Humanitarian Security Combo 
Agree (1)…protect Numar’s civilians.  
(2)…protect U.S. 
security.  
(3)…protect Numar’s civilians and 
U.S. security.  
Disagree, 
legitimate 
(4)… instead of 
concern for civilians, 
the real motivation of 
the U.S. action was to 
protect U.S. security. 
(5)… instead of 
concern for U.S. 
security the real 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was to 
protect Numar’s 
civilians.  
(6)… instead of 
concern for 
civilians the 
only motivation 
of the U.S. 
action was to 
protect U.S. 
security. 
(7)... instead of 
concern for U.S. 
security the only 
motivation of the 
U.S. action was 
to protect 
Numar’s 
civilians. 
Disagree, 
illegitimate 
(8)… protecting 
Numar’s civilians 
was a story to cover 
up the President’s 
own political agenda. 
(9)… protecting U.S. 
security was a story 
to cover up the 
President’s own 
political agenda.  
(10)… protecting Numar’s civilians 
and U.S. security was a story to 
cover up the President’s own 
political agenda. 
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2. Indicators of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Follow-Up Questions 
 
Foreign Policy Beliefs 
Which of the following best reflects the role you think the United States should play in the 
world: 
(response options randomized) 
• It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as 
overpopulation, hunger, and pollution. 
• It is important for the United States to maintain a strong military to ensure world peace. 
• It is best for the future of the United States if we stay out of world affairs. 
 
 
Support and Opposition 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Neither oppose nor favor 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
 
[Asked only of respondents who select: “Neither oppose nor favor.”] 
If you had to choose, would you lean towards opposing or favoring military action in this 
situation? 
• Lean towards opposing 
• Lean towards favoring 
 
 
Political Costs 
To what extent do you disagree or agree with each of the following statements: 
 
I approve of the way the president handled the situation in Numar. 
• Disagree strongly 
• Disagree somewhat 
• Agree somewhat 
• Agree strongly 
 
The president described the situation in Numar accurately. 
• Disagree strongly 
• Disagree somewhat 
• Agree somewhat 
• Agree strongly 
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If the hypothetical president were running for reelection, how likely would you be to vote for 
him? 
• Very unlikely 
• Somewhat unlikely 
• Somewhat likely 
• Very likely 
 
 
Future Intervention 
Now we are going to describe another situation this hypothetical President faced about a year 
after taking military action in Numar. As before, the scenario reflects a situation the U.S. has 
faced many times in the past and will likely face again in the future, but it is not about any 
country in the news today. 
 
In an address to the nation, the President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I have received gruesome evidence that genocide is taking place 
in Rundu. Innocent civilians, including women and children, are being massacred in their homes 
by neighbors who support Rundu's government. The United States cannot be the world's police 
force, but when we can stop children from being killed in their own homes, we have a 
responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
 
Based on your best guess and what you’ve read about the situation in Rundu, to what extent do 
you agree with the following statements: 
 
I trust the president to handle the situation in Rundu. 
• Disagree strongly 
• Disagree somewhat 
• Agree somewhat 
• Agree strongly 
 
The president described the situation in Rundu accurately. 
• Disagree strongly 
• Disagree somewhat 
• Agree somewhat 
• Agree strongly 
  
 321 
 
Table A5.2 Approve of the Way the President Handled the Crisis 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
Sincere 0.63 
(0.55, 0.70) 
0.63 
(0.55, 0.71) 
 
0.67 
(0.59, 0.74) 
Insincere 0.41 
(0.33, 0.49) 
0.44 
(0.36, 0.52) 
 
0.57# 
(0.49, 0.65) 
0.59## 
(0.51, 0.67) 
Illegitimate 0.39 
(0.31, 0.46) 
0.41 
(0.33, 0.49) 
0.38 
(0.30, 0.46) 
N 456 451 606 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses. #Insincere humanitarian claim, sincere security claim. ##Insincere 
security claim, sincere humanitarian claim. 
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Table A5.3 Belief in President’s Accuracy by Foreign Policy Beliefs 
 Cooperative 
Internationalists 
Militant 
Internationalists Isolationists 
Sincere 0.81 
(0.73, 0.89) 
0.89 
(0.80, 0.98) 
0.75 
(0.58, 0.92) 
 
Insincere 
 
0.51 
(0.40, 0.62) 
 
0.75 
(0.62, 0.88) 
 
0.50 
(0.31, 0.69) 
 
Illegitimate 
 
0.57 
(0.46, 0.67) 
 
0.58 
(0.42, 0.74) 
 
0.45 
(0.27, 0.63) 
N 254 121 81 
Table reports the results of two-tailed tests of proportions. 95% confidence intervals 
reported in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 8 APPENDIX 
 
A8.1 Treatment Conditions for Survey Experiments Reported in Table 8.1 
 
Experiment 1, May 2016, MTurk 
  
Humanitarian  
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:   
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed, imprisoned, and tortured 
thousands of its own people." 
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. For 
generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we 
cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, we 
have a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that 
the United States must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
Security 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:   
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven 
for terrorists and its actions would weaken U.S. military security."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. For 
generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for peace. While we 
cannot be the world's police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we have 
a responsibility to act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the 
United States must respond to this crisis with military action."   
 
Combined 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said:   
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kundu--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kundu poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and killed, imprisoned, and tortured thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians and the United 
States is at stake. For generations, the United States of America has been an advocate for 
peace. While we cannot be the world's police force, when our security is at risk and we 
can prevent civilians from being targeted, we have a responsibility to act. That is why, 
after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this 
crisis with military action."   
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Experiment 2, June 2016, MTurk 
 
 Humanitarian 
 As part of an address to the nation, the President said:  
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why 
it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has killed thousands of its 
own people and poses a threat to its civilians.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of thousands of civilians is at stake. 
While we cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is 
at risk, we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the 
United States must respond to this crisis with military action.” 
 
Terrorism 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why 
it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has created a safe haven for 
terrorists and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While 
we cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action. 
 
Foreign Policy Restraint 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why 
it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring 
state and its actions pose a threat to U.S. military security.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While 
we cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of the United States is at risk, we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action.” 
 
Combined (FPR+Humanitarian) 
As part of an address to the nation, the President said: 
“My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Kumar—why 
it matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Kumar has invaded its neighboring 
state and killed thousands of civilians.” 
 
“This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake. While 
we cannot be the world’s police force, when the safety of thousands of civilians is at risk, 
we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United 
States must respond to this crisis with military action.” 
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Experiment 3, July 2016, MTurk 
Results from this survey are reported in Chapters 4 and 5. See appendix A4.1 for treatment 
wording. 
 
Experiment 4, August 2016, MTurk 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:       
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."           
 
Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven 
for terrorists and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The United States' national security and the safety 
of the American people are at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful 
deliberation, I have determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with 
military action." 
 
Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and of the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action." 
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Experiment 5, October 2016, MTurk 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:       
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."          
   
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven 
for terrorists and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."     
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
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Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."    
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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Experiment 6, November 2016, MTurk 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:       
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."          
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven 
for terrorists and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
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Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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Experiment 7, December 12, 2016, MTurk 
 
 Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its 
neighboring state and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
 
Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and 
killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action." 
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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Experiment 8, December 19-30, 2016, SSI 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:       
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."            
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its 
neighboring state and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."     
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
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Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and 
killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."    
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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Experiment 9, May 2017, MTurk 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:       
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."            
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Terrorism 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has created a safe haven 
for terrorists and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."     
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
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Foreign Policy Restraint 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its 
neighboring state and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."     
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
 
Combined (Humanitarian + Terrorism) 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has created a safe haven for terrorists 
and killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."    
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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Combined (Humanitarian + FPR) 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President said:    
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and 
killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."    
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security. 
 
Summary:    
• The U.S. President has announced his plans to take military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
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A8.2 Results from Moderation Analysis of Effects of Foreign Policy Beliefs and 
Partisanship on Support 
 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
CI 1.08*** 
(0.41) 
 
0.66* 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.39) 
Co-Partisan 0.25 
(0.48) 
 
0.67 
(0.46) 
0.93* 
(0.49) 
CI*Co-Partisan -0.17 
(0.62) 
-0.83 
(0.61) 
-0.51 
(0.63) 
    
MI 0.78 
(0.53) 
 
1.21** 
(0.51) 
0.49 
(0.43) 
Co-Partisan 0.14 
(0.32) 
 
0.33 
(0.35) 
0.39 
(0.36) 
MI*Co-Partisan 0.13 
(0.82) 
-0.76 
(0.73) 
0.85 
(0.76) 
    
ISO -2.99*** 
(0.78) 
-2.64*** 
(0.66) 
 
-1.91** 
(0.78) 
Co-Partisan 0.12 
(0.34) 
-0.18 
(0.34) 
 
0.68** 
(0.33) 
ISO*Co-Partisan -0.36 
(1.32) 
2.26** 
(0.93) 
-0.68 
(1.35) 
N 195 196 189 
Table reports coefficients from logistic regression models of binary foreign policy belief and 
co-partisan variables and interactions on a binary measure of support for each category of 
justification. Standard errors reported in parentheses.. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Note: Data for the analysis reported above were collected from a survey experiment conducted in 
June 2017. See A8.4 for complete instrument.  
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A8.3 Tests of Proportions for Support by Education Level (SSI Sample) 
 
 Humanitarian Security Combined 
No College Degree 0.59 
(0.04) 
 
0.67 
(0.04) 
0.67 
(0.04) 
College Degree 0.52 
(0.06) 
 
0.69 
(0.06) 
0.57 
(0.06) 
Difference 0.07 
(0.07) 
 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.07) 
N 208 202 202 
Table reports the results of tests of proportions using data from the SSI sample. No college 
degree=0, college degree=1. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  
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A8.4 Presidential Partisanship Survey Instrument 
 
The following survey was conducted using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to a sample of 1,177 
U.S. adults in June 2017. The partisanship of the president was randomized within each 
treatment condition. 
 
 Humanitarian 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], 
said:      
 
 "My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians, including innocent women and children. It has killed thousands of its own 
people and directly targeted civilians."      
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."            
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians.      
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], has announced his plans to take 
military action in Numar.   
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians. 
 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
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Security 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], 
said:     
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to the 
security of the United States, including the American people. It has invaded its 
neighboring state and threatened the United States."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of the United States is at stake and we 
must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have determined that the United States 
must respond to this crisis with military action."     
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], has announced his plans to take 
military action in Numar.  
• He said the U.S. must act to protect U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect U.S. security. 
 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
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Combined 
Over the last few months, a violent conflict has developed in the country of Numar. In his 
address to the nation about this conflict, the U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], 
said:   
"My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in Numar--why it 
matters, and where we go from here. The regime in Numar poses a grave threat to its own 
civilians and to the security of the United States. It has invaded its neighboring state and 
killed thousands of its own people."   
 
"This is not a world we should accept. The safety of Numar's civilians and the United 
States is at stake and we must act. This is why, after careful deliberation, I have 
determined that the United States must respond to this crisis with military action."    
 
After the President's address, most experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons 
for intervention. They, too, thought the U.S. action would protect Numar's civilians and 
U.S. security.     
 
Summary:     
• The U.S. President, a [Republican/Democrat], has announced his plans to take 
military action in Numar.    
• He said the U.S. must act to protect Numar's civilians and U.S. security.   
• Experts publicly agreed with the President's reasons for intervention.   
• Experts said military action would mainly protect Numar's civilians and U.S. 
security. 
 
Would you oppose or favor U.S. military action in this situation? 
• Oppose strongly 
• Oppose somewhat 
• Favor somewhat 
• Favor strongly 
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